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Corruption and the Balance of Gender Power
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Luciana Echazu
Published/Copyright:
April 12, 2010
This paper seeks to explain the negative relationship between female participation in a government and corruption found in empirical research. We propose that even if there are no innate gender differences towards moral values, the costs of corrupt behavior may still differ across genders and are related to the proportion of female participation in government agencies. Hence, females behave more honestly than males do, not because they are naturally prone to it, but because they cannot afford to be corrupt if they are a minority. In that sense, the total density of corruption is non-monotonic in the proportion of female participation.
Published Online: 2010-4-12
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
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