A Test for Collusion between a Bidder and an Auctioneer in Sealed-Bid Auctions
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Allan T Ingraham
This paper derives a regression-based test to detect bidder-auctioneer cheating in sealed bid auctions. I apply this regression test to data from the New York City School Construction Authority auctions, an approximate one billion dollar per year auction market in which an auctioneer engaged in bidder-auctioneer cheating. Using the regression analysis to compare lots where bid rigging occurred with certainty to all other auctions allows one to conclude that bidder-auctioneer cheating significantly distorted the bid distribution. Comparing specific auctioneer lots before news of the cheating scandal became public with those after the scandal, I find significant differences in bidding, at the 10 percent level of significance, for two auctioneers. Therefore, bidder-auctioneer cheating may not have been limited to the one auctioneer charged with rigging bids.
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
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Artikel in diesem Heft
- Contributions Article
- Cash Constraints and Business Start-Ups: Deutschmarks Versus Dollars
- On-the-Job Learning, Firing Costs and Employment
- The Effect of the Nonprofit Motive on Hospital Competitive Behavior
- Electoral Competition and Redistribution with Rationally Informed Voters
- The Environmental Kuznets Curve: Exploring a Fresh Specification
- Uncertain R&D and the Porter Hypothesis
- Do Economists Recognize an Opportunity Cost When They See One? A Dismal Performance from the Dismal Science
- A Theory of Health Disparities and Medical Technology
- Entry-Level Products with Consumer Learning
- A Test for Collusion between a Bidder and an Auctioneer in Sealed-Bid Auctions
- Fatalistic Tendencies: An Explanation of Why People Don't Save
- Adjustment Costs and Irreversibility as Determinants of Investment: Evidence from African Manufacturing
- An Index For Venture Capital, 1987-2003
- Environmental Information Provision as a Public Policy Instrument
- Competition Policy and Exit Rates: Evidence from Switzerland
- Political Variables as Instruments for the Minimum Wage
