Uncertain R&D and the Porter Hypothesis
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David Popp
Ever since Michael Porter proposed that environmental regulations can improve competitiveness, much economic research has examined the potential for such outcomes. Attempts to model Porter hypothesis outcomes in a way consistent with neoclassical economics have focused on things such as strategic relationships between firms, moral hazard problems, and economies of scale. In this paper, I offer a simpler alternative. The results of any R&D project are uncertain. Calibrating a simple model of induced R&D with uncertainty so that the expected value of research is only positive with environmental policy, I find that between 8 and 24 percent of simulations result in cases where post-regulation profits are higher than pre-regulation profits. This result is consistent both with Porter finding specific cases with complete innovation offsets and with macro-level findings that environmental policy is not costless. I conclude by discussing the implication of these results for environmental policy and future research.
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
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Articles in the same Issue
- Contributions Article
- Cash Constraints and Business Start-Ups: Deutschmarks Versus Dollars
- On-the-Job Learning, Firing Costs and Employment
- The Effect of the Nonprofit Motive on Hospital Competitive Behavior
- Electoral Competition and Redistribution with Rationally Informed Voters
- The Environmental Kuznets Curve: Exploring a Fresh Specification
- Uncertain R&D and the Porter Hypothesis
- Do Economists Recognize an Opportunity Cost When They See One? A Dismal Performance from the Dismal Science
- A Theory of Health Disparities and Medical Technology
- Entry-Level Products with Consumer Learning
- A Test for Collusion between a Bidder and an Auctioneer in Sealed-Bid Auctions
- Fatalistic Tendencies: An Explanation of Why People Don't Save
- Adjustment Costs and Irreversibility as Determinants of Investment: Evidence from African Manufacturing
- An Index For Venture Capital, 1987-2003
- Environmental Information Provision as a Public Policy Instrument
- Competition Policy and Exit Rates: Evidence from Switzerland
- Political Variables as Instruments for the Minimum Wage
