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Do Parents Value Changes in Test Scores? High Stakes Testing in Texas
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Angela K. Dills
Veröffentlicht/Copyright:
5. August 2004
Texas evaluates, accredits, and financially rewards schools based on student test scores. Test scores increased dramatically following this implementation of high stakes testing. This paper examines whether homebuyers valued these test score increases. The results show little or no relation between changes in test scores and changes in total housing value in a district. Strikingly, improved performance on college entrance exams is associated with increased total housing value. Using the college entrance exams as a benchmark, the results on the state test suggest that high stakes testing failed to increase perceived school quality.
Published Online: 2004-8-5
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
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Artikel in diesem Heft
- Contributions Article
- Contestable Licensing
- Willingness to Pay for Environmental Quality: Testable Empirical Implications of the Growth and Environment Literature
- Why Do the Poor and the Less-Educated Pay More for Long-Distance Calls?
- A Model of Welfare-Reducing Settlement
- How Does Job Loss Affect the Timing of Retirement?
- Information, the Introduction of Roths, and IRA Participation
- Willingness to Pay for Environmental Quality: Testable Empirical Implications of the Growth and Environment Literature: Comment
- Quantity Controls, License Transferability, and the Level of Investment
- Instrumental Variables for Binary Treatments with Heterogenous Treatment Effects: A Simple Exposition
- Do Parents Value Changes in Test Scores? High Stakes Testing in Texas
- Law Serials Pricing and Mergers: A Portfolio Approach
- Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Additional Theory and Evidence
- Poverty Measurement Under Risk Aversion Using Panel Data
- Anti-trade Bias in Trade Policy and General Equilibrium
- Race and the Digital Divide
- Cost Recovery, Efficiency, and Economic Organization for Water Utilities
- A Minimum of Rivalry: Evidence from Transition Economies on the Importance of Competition for Innovation and Growth
- Selective Enforcement of Copyright as an Optimal Monopolistic Behavior
- Robin Hood's Compromise: The Economics of Moderate Land Reforms
- Pricing Coordination Failures and Health Care Provider Integration
- Access Charges in the Presence of Call Externalities
