Article
Licensed
Unlicensed
Requires Authentication
Cost Recovery, Efficiency, and Economic Organization for Water Utilities
-
Edna T. Loehman
Published/Copyright:
September 20, 2004
This paper describes a new method of utility pricing – Variable Unit Pricing (VUP) – that results in both economic efficiency and cost recovery for a variety of supply situations faced by water utilities. The main advantage of VUP – compared to Increasing Block Rates – is that its parameters can be objectively determined from demand and cost information.The theoretical support for VUP is a welfare economics paradigm that integrates pricing with economic organization. VUP is shown to achieve social efficiency for a fixed-fee contractual arrangement between a profit-maximizing water utility and a public agency.Public involvement is required to express equity concerns, demand for public goods such as water quality and security, and to identify appropriate supply limits for conservation.
Published Online: 2004-9-20
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
You are currently not able to access this content.
You are currently not able to access this content.
Articles in the same Issue
- Contributions Article
- Contestable Licensing
- Willingness to Pay for Environmental Quality: Testable Empirical Implications of the Growth and Environment Literature
- Why Do the Poor and the Less-Educated Pay More for Long-Distance Calls?
- A Model of Welfare-Reducing Settlement
- How Does Job Loss Affect the Timing of Retirement?
- Information, the Introduction of Roths, and IRA Participation
- Willingness to Pay for Environmental Quality: Testable Empirical Implications of the Growth and Environment Literature: Comment
- Quantity Controls, License Transferability, and the Level of Investment
- Instrumental Variables for Binary Treatments with Heterogenous Treatment Effects: A Simple Exposition
- Do Parents Value Changes in Test Scores? High Stakes Testing in Texas
- Law Serials Pricing and Mergers: A Portfolio Approach
- Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Additional Theory and Evidence
- Poverty Measurement Under Risk Aversion Using Panel Data
- Anti-trade Bias in Trade Policy and General Equilibrium
- Race and the Digital Divide
- Cost Recovery, Efficiency, and Economic Organization for Water Utilities
- A Minimum of Rivalry: Evidence from Transition Economies on the Importance of Competition for Innovation and Growth
- Selective Enforcement of Copyright as an Optimal Monopolistic Behavior
- Robin Hood's Compromise: The Economics of Moderate Land Reforms
- Pricing Coordination Failures and Health Care Provider Integration
- Access Charges in the Presence of Call Externalities
Keywords for this article
water;
public utility;
nonlinear pricing;
cost recovery;
privatization;
investment
Articles in the same Issue
- Contributions Article
- Contestable Licensing
- Willingness to Pay for Environmental Quality: Testable Empirical Implications of the Growth and Environment Literature
- Why Do the Poor and the Less-Educated Pay More for Long-Distance Calls?
- A Model of Welfare-Reducing Settlement
- How Does Job Loss Affect the Timing of Retirement?
- Information, the Introduction of Roths, and IRA Participation
- Willingness to Pay for Environmental Quality: Testable Empirical Implications of the Growth and Environment Literature: Comment
- Quantity Controls, License Transferability, and the Level of Investment
- Instrumental Variables for Binary Treatments with Heterogenous Treatment Effects: A Simple Exposition
- Do Parents Value Changes in Test Scores? High Stakes Testing in Texas
- Law Serials Pricing and Mergers: A Portfolio Approach
- Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Additional Theory and Evidence
- Poverty Measurement Under Risk Aversion Using Panel Data
- Anti-trade Bias in Trade Policy and General Equilibrium
- Race and the Digital Divide
- Cost Recovery, Efficiency, and Economic Organization for Water Utilities
- A Minimum of Rivalry: Evidence from Transition Economies on the Importance of Competition for Innovation and Growth
- Selective Enforcement of Copyright as an Optimal Monopolistic Behavior
- Robin Hood's Compromise: The Economics of Moderate Land Reforms
- Pricing Coordination Failures and Health Care Provider Integration
- Access Charges in the Presence of Call Externalities
