The Spite Motive and Equilibrium Behavior in Auctions
-
John Morgan
We study auctions where bidders have independent private values but attach a disutility to the surplus of rivals, and derive symmetric equilibria for first-price, second-price, English, and Dutch auctions. We find that equilibrium bidding is more aggressive than standard predictions. Indeed, in second-price auctions it is optimal to bid above one's valuation; that is, bidding "frenzies" can arise in equilibrium. Further, revenue equivalence between second-price and first-price auctions breaks down, with second-price outperforming first-price. We also find that strategic equivalence between second-price and English auctions no longer holds, although they remain revenue equivalent. We conclude that spiteful bidding rationalizes anomalies observed in laboratory experiments across the four auction forms better than the leading alternatives.
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Contributions Article
- Suggested Subsidies are Sub-optimal Unless Combined with an Output Tax
- War or Peace
- Selective Information Provision and Special Interest Influence: The Case of Trade Policy
- Price Discrimination via Proprietary Aftermarkets
- The Spite Motive and Equilibrium Behavior in Auctions
- Optimal Liability for Libel
- Aggregation of Non Stationary Demand Systems
- The Savings Impact of College Financial Aid
- A Theory of Utilization Review
- Cigarette Demand, Structural Change, and Advertising Bans: International Evidence, 1970-1995
- Piracy and the Legitimate Demand for Recorded Music
- Oligopoly Deregulation and the Taxation of Commodities
- Forming Voting Blocs and Coalitions as a Prisoner's Dilemma: A Possible Theoretical Explanation for Political Instability
- Ethnicity and Networks in African Trade
- Endogenous Preferential Trade Agreements: An Empirical Analysis
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Contributions Article
- Suggested Subsidies are Sub-optimal Unless Combined with an Output Tax
- War or Peace
- Selective Information Provision and Special Interest Influence: The Case of Trade Policy
- Price Discrimination via Proprietary Aftermarkets
- The Spite Motive and Equilibrium Behavior in Auctions
- Optimal Liability for Libel
- Aggregation of Non Stationary Demand Systems
- The Savings Impact of College Financial Aid
- A Theory of Utilization Review
- Cigarette Demand, Structural Change, and Advertising Bans: International Evidence, 1970-1995
- Piracy and the Legitimate Demand for Recorded Music
- Oligopoly Deregulation and the Taxation of Commodities
- Forming Voting Blocs and Coalitions as a Prisoner's Dilemma: A Possible Theoretical Explanation for Political Instability
- Ethnicity and Networks in African Trade
- Endogenous Preferential Trade Agreements: An Empirical Analysis
