Oligopoly Deregulation and the Taxation of Commodities
-
Gilbert E. Metcalf
and George Norman
We examine market structure and optimal commodity taxation in a world in which firms produce differentiated products and can exert some degree of market power. Building on Kay and Keen (1983), we model two forms of product technologies, two forms of market entry structures, and two forms of pricing. This yields eight models providing a richer analysis of the role of taxes as regulatory tools than could be provided in Kay and Keen's analysis. In the presence of price discrimination, tax policy loses much of its effectiveness at serving as a substitute for direct regulation. Moreover, in cases where taxes can influence market structure, subsides rather than taxes may be required to achieve optimum market structure. Our results should remove the presumption that has developed over the past twenty years that the ad valorem tax rate should be positive to discourage excess entry in imperfectly competitive markets.
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
Articles in the same Issue
- Contributions Article
- Suggested Subsidies are Sub-optimal Unless Combined with an Output Tax
- War or Peace
- Selective Information Provision and Special Interest Influence: The Case of Trade Policy
- Price Discrimination via Proprietary Aftermarkets
- The Spite Motive and Equilibrium Behavior in Auctions
- Optimal Liability for Libel
- Aggregation of Non Stationary Demand Systems
- The Savings Impact of College Financial Aid
- A Theory of Utilization Review
- Cigarette Demand, Structural Change, and Advertising Bans: International Evidence, 1970-1995
- Piracy and the Legitimate Demand for Recorded Music
- Oligopoly Deregulation and the Taxation of Commodities
- Forming Voting Blocs and Coalitions as a Prisoner's Dilemma: A Possible Theoretical Explanation for Political Instability
- Ethnicity and Networks in African Trade
- Endogenous Preferential Trade Agreements: An Empirical Analysis
Articles in the same Issue
- Contributions Article
- Suggested Subsidies are Sub-optimal Unless Combined with an Output Tax
- War or Peace
- Selective Information Provision and Special Interest Influence: The Case of Trade Policy
- Price Discrimination via Proprietary Aftermarkets
- The Spite Motive and Equilibrium Behavior in Auctions
- Optimal Liability for Libel
- Aggregation of Non Stationary Demand Systems
- The Savings Impact of College Financial Aid
- A Theory of Utilization Review
- Cigarette Demand, Structural Change, and Advertising Bans: International Evidence, 1970-1995
- Piracy and the Legitimate Demand for Recorded Music
- Oligopoly Deregulation and the Taxation of Commodities
- Forming Voting Blocs and Coalitions as a Prisoner's Dilemma: A Possible Theoretical Explanation for Political Instability
- Ethnicity and Networks in African Trade
- Endogenous Preferential Trade Agreements: An Empirical Analysis