The Selection and Pricing of Mixed Multi-Channel Marketing Model for Mid-High Wines Under Experience Driven

Chunxiang Guo; Hong Zhou

doi:10.21078/JSSI-2019-037-17

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The Selection and Pricing of Mixed Multi-Channel Marketing Model for Mid-High Wines Under Experience Driven

Chunxiang Guo und Hong Zhou

Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 18. März 2019

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Aus der Zeitschrift Journal of Systems Science and Information Band 7 Heft 1

Abstract

The experience of consumers for products has great effect on the pre-sale strategy. Based on this, the paper studies the selection and pricing of multi-channel marketing models consisting of a brewer, an electronic retailer and a traditional retailer, constructing the non-cooperative game model of brewers and retailers with equal status in four contexts. Finally, the result shows that the introduction of direct channel is beneficial to increase the brewer’s revenue. When the pre-sale marginal revenue is greater than two times the average spot-sale marginal revenue, the total profit of supply chain will achieve the best under mode I. i.e. both the brewer and e-retailer adopt pre-sale strategy.

Keywords: experienced score; mid-high wines; pre-sale strategy; multi-channel; pricing

Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (71471123); the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (skqy201621); and the Fundamental Research Funds for Soft Science and Technology Project in Sichuan province (2017ZR0030)

Appendix

Proof 1

∂pi/∂t=−t(1+r)−(t+1)(1−δcv)s1−η<0.

Proof 2

π1rIII∗=(θs1−ηt−c2)w2r+Ωw2r+Ω+(1+γ)t(θs1−ηt)N=(θs1−ηt−c4)(1−(1+γ)t(θs1−ηt)−(w2r+Ω)w2r+Ω+(1+γ)t(θs1−ηt))N,

when (1 + γ)^t(θs₁− ηt) − (w_2r + Ω) = 0, then p2r=(1+γ)t(θs1−ηt),π1rIII∗=π1rI∗when p_2r< (1 + γ)^t(θs₁− ηt), then π1rIII∗<π1rI∗;otherwise p2r≥(1+γ)t(θs1−ηt),π1rIII∗>π1rI∗.

Proof 3

π1rIV∗=(θs1−ηt−c2)(1+γ)t(θs1−ηt)+w2r+Ψ2[2(1+γ)t(θs1−ηt)+w2r+Ψ]N=(θs1−ηt−c4)w2r+Ψ2(1+γ)t(θs1−ηt)+w2r+ΨN<θs1−ηt−c4N,

namely π1rIV∗<π1rI∗.

Proof 4

π1mIV∗=32(θs1−ηt−c)(1+γ)t(θs1−ηt)+w2r+Ψ2[2(1+γ)t(θs1−ηt)+w2r+Ψ]N+Ψ(θs1−ηt)e−λ(w2r+Ψ)2(1+γ)t(θs1−ηt)+w2r+ΨN=34(θs1−ηt−c)(1−(1+γ)t(θs1−ηt)2(1+γ)t(θs1−ηt)+w2r+Ψ)N+Ψ(θs1−ηt)e−λ(w2r+Ψ)2(1+γ)t(θs1−ηt)+w2r+ΨN,

i.e., when the price satisfies 4(p2rIV−w2r)e−λp2rIV<3(1+γ)t(p1rIV−c),then π1mIV∗<34(θs1−ηt−c),π1mIV∗<π1mI∗.

π1mII∗=(θs1−ηt−c)(w2r+Ω)(1+γ)t(θs1−ηt)+w2r+ΩN+Ω(θs1−ηt)e−λ(w2r+Ω)(1+γ)t(θs1−ηt)+w2r+ΩN>(w2r+Ω)(θs1−ηt−c)/2w2r+Ω+(1+γ)t(θs1−ηt)N+Ω(θs1−ηt)e−λ(w2r+Ω)w2r+Ω+(1+γ)t(θs1−ηt)N=π1mIII∗,

then π1mII∗>π1mIII∗.

π1mII∗=(θs1−ηt−c)(w2r+Ω)(1+γ)t(θs1−ηt)+w2r+ΩN+Ω(θs1−ηt)e−λ(w2r+Ω)(1+γ)t(θs1−ηt)+w2r+ΩN=3(θs1−ηt−c)4(1+w2r+Ω3[(1+γ)t(θs1−ηt)+w2r+Ω])N+Ω(θs1−ηt)e−λ(w2r+Ω)(1+γ)t(θs1−ηt)+w2r+ΩN>π1mI∗,

then π1mII∗>π1mI∗.

Proof 5

II−IIV=(θs1−ηt−c)N−[(θs1−ηt−c)(1+γ)t(θs1−ηt)+w2rIV∗+Ψ2(1+γ)t(θs1−ηt)+w2rIV∗+ΨN +2Ψ(θs1−ηt)e−λ(w2rIV∗+Ψ)2(1+γ)t(θs1−ηt)+w2rIV∗+Ψ=(θs1−ηt)[(p1rIV∗−c)(1+γ)t−2(p2rIV∗−w2rIV∗)e−λp2rIV∗]2(1+γ)t(θs1−ηt)+w2rIV∗+ΨN,

when (p1rIV∗−c)(1+γ)t>2(p2rIV∗−w2rIV∗)e−λp2rIV∗,thenII>IIV.

II−III=(θs1−ηt−c)N−[(θs1−ηt−c)(1+γ)t(θs1−ηt)+w2rII∗+Ω(1+γ)t(θs1−ηt)+w2rII∗+ΩN +2Ω(θs1−ηt)e−λ(w2rII∗+Ω)(1+γ)t(θs1−ηt)+w2rII∗+ΩN=(θs1−ηt)[(p1rII∗−c)(1+γ)t−2(p2rII∗−w2rII∗)e−λp2rII∗](1+γ)t(θs1−ηt)+w2rII∗+ΩN,

when (p1rII∗−c)(1+γ)t>2(p2rII∗−w2rII∗)e−λp2rII∗,thenII>III.

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Received: 2017-11-28

Accepted: 2018-03-06

Published Online: 2019-03-18

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Artikel in diesem Heft

https://doi.org/10.21078/JSSI-2019-037-17

Schlagwörter für diesen Artikel

experienced score; mid-high wines; pre-sale strategy; multi-channel; pricing