Irrational-behavior-proof (IBP) conditions are important aspects to keep stable cooperation in dynamic cooperative games. In this paper, we focus on the establishment of IBP conditions. Firstly, the relations of three kinds of IBP conditions are described. An example is given to show that they may not hold, which could lead to the fail of cooperation. Then, based on a kind of limit characteristic function, all these conditions are proved to be true along the cooperative trajectory in a transformed cooperative game. It is surprising that these facts depend only upon the individual rationalities of players for the Shapley value and the group rationalities of players for the core. Finally, an illustrative example is given.
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