Why SEPs have been involved in Antitrust Cases – From A Chinese Scholar’s Perspective
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Xiaoye Wang
Abstract
If patents have been included in a technical standard and thus have become standard essential patents (SEPs), the SEP holders normally have to commit to the Standard Setting Organization (SSO) to license their SEPs on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. Although the FRAND commitments already put constraints on the patentees, more and more disputes over FRAND licensing fees involving SEPs are reaching antitrust enforcement agencies and courts, perhaps due to the fact that the FRAND commitments are often not workable. As demonstrated in the case Huawei v. IDC in Chinese courts, SEPs have special characteristics compared to non-SEPs, i.e. the licensing of SEPs relates more to the public interest, the holders of the SEPs may be thought to have dominant positions in the licensing market of their SEPs, the holder of the SEPs often have made commitments to license on the FRAND terms, and the holder of the SEPs should be allowed to use the injunctive relief only in limited circumstances. This article also proposes that Article 55 of the Chinese Antimonopoly Law (AML) should be reconsidered because it exempts the undertakings who exercise their IPRs in accordance with the laws and administrative regulations on IPRs from the application of the AML. However, as this article shows, the excessive royalty requested or the injunction sought by the holder of SEPs may not violate the patent law, but nonetheless may violate the antitrust law.
Abstract
Why SEPs have been involved in Antitrust Cases – From A Chinese Scholar’s Perspective
Even though the FRAND commitments set the boundary of self-governance for the patentee, due to the fact that these commitments are not very operable, and there are actually no limits, there is more and more debate over FRAND commitment, and more and more cases involving SEPs go to antitrust enforcement agencies and courts. As demonstrated in Huawei v. IDC, compared with owners of general patents, the SEP owners often have a dominant position in their patent licensing markets, and therefore they should not charge excessively high licensing fees or rates, and should have limited right to ask for injunctive relief. The debates in Huawei v. IDC were emerging issues at the crossroads of antitrust law and intellectual property law. As the first case in which the licensing rate of the SEPs was decided by a court in China, Huawei v. IDC has some significant impact around the world.
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Artikel in diesem Heft
- Cover
- Inhaltsverzeichnis
- Veranstaltungshinweise
- Aufsätze
- Das Subventionsrecht der WTO: Ordnung des Welthandels und Schutz des Wettbewerbs
- Verbandsautonomie im Verhältnis gegenüber Dritten – Kein Spiel ohne (kartell-)rechtliche Grenzen!
- Zentralvermarktung der Fußball-Bundesliga im Lichte neuer kartellrechtlicher Kriterien wie „No-Single-Buyer-Rule“ und alternative Modelle der Rechteverwertung
- Why SEPs have been involved in Antitrust Cases – From A Chinese Scholar’s Perspective
- Die Sonderkartellverordnungen der Europäischen Kommission vom April 2016 zur Planung der Milcherzeugung
- Impressum
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Cover
- Inhaltsverzeichnis
- Veranstaltungshinweise
- Aufsätze
- Das Subventionsrecht der WTO: Ordnung des Welthandels und Schutz des Wettbewerbs
- Verbandsautonomie im Verhältnis gegenüber Dritten – Kein Spiel ohne (kartell-)rechtliche Grenzen!
- Zentralvermarktung der Fußball-Bundesliga im Lichte neuer kartellrechtlicher Kriterien wie „No-Single-Buyer-Rule“ und alternative Modelle der Rechteverwertung
- Why SEPs have been involved in Antitrust Cases – From A Chinese Scholar’s Perspective
- Die Sonderkartellverordnungen der Europäischen Kommission vom April 2016 zur Planung der Milcherzeugung
- Impressum
