Wittgenstein’s Notebooks, Diaries and Diaristic Remarks

2.1 Tagebücher 1914 – 1916 / Notebooks 1914 – 1916

The editions of Wittgenstein’s wartime notebooks released so far, published as Notebooks 1914 – 1916, comprise only his philosophical entries on the right-hand sides of MS 101, MS 102 and MS 103, beginning on August 22, 1914 and ending on January 10, 1917, and were first published by Georg Henrik von Wright and Elizabeth Anscombe in 1960, in Schriften 1 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1960).

A bilingual edition of the notebooks appeared in 1961, ed. by G.H. von Wright and G.E.M. Anscombe with an English translation by G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), and a revised and partly extended edition by Basil Blackwell appeared in 1979.

The philosophical parts of MS 101, 102 and 103, first published as Notebooks 1914 – 1916, as mentioned above, served as the basis of the Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung that was first published in the last issue of Oswald’s Annalen der Naturphilosophie in 1921 (Volume 14, Heft 3 – 4). As Wittgenstein was not at all happy about the publication and called it a “Raubdruck” (IEA 2011: 5. 8. 1922) (it was full of mistakes because the logical formulae were distorted), a new and bilingual edition entitled Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus was published by Routledge & Kegan Paul in London in 1922, with a translation by F.P. Ramsey and C.K. Ogden and an introduction by Bertrand Russell.

Wittgenstein corrected the German Text for a revised edition, edited by D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1933).

Finally, a revised version containing some more remarks was published by Basil Blackwell in 1971.

MS 104 was found in Vienna in 1965 and published in 1971 as Prototractatus. An early version of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus by Ludwig Wittgenstein. It was edited by B.F. McGuinness, T. Nyberg, G.H. von Wright with a translation by D.F. Pears, B.F. McGuinness, a historical introduction by G.H. von Wright and a facsimile of the author’s manuscript (Routledge and K. Paul, 1971).

Wittgenstein’s personal and coded notes on the left-hand sides of the wartime notebooks, beginning on August 9, 1914 and ending on August 19, 1916, were withheld from the public and thus from researchers for many years. In the microfilm versions of the Nachlass, the left-hand sides were also covered up, as decided by the Trustees.

In 1982, parts of the coded remarks were illegally published by Wilhelm Baum in the Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie; in 1985, the entire coded parts appeared in the philosophical magazine Saber (in a German-Spanish-Catalanic edition). In 1990, the first German edition was published by Turia & Kant under the title Geheime Tagebücher 1914 – 1916.

The publication of these so-called “Secret Diaries” evoked numerous discussions in the field of Wittgenstein research; it led to a “scandal”. The image of Wittgenstein as a dispassionate philosopher known for his rational way of philosophizing was shattered. On the other hand, the insight into his personal problems led to a gradual understanding of the connection between his life and his work and to his attitude toward ethical and religious questions. Unfortunately, it also led to an increase in the number of myths surrounding Wittgenstein, sometimes even to a distorted presentation of his personality.

In 2021, Marjorie Perloff edited and translated the coded part of the wartime diaries into English under the title Ludwig Wittgenstein. Private Notebooks 1914 – 1916. (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation; London: W.W. Norton & Company Ltd.).

In 2015, Sool Park edited a Korean version of the complete Notebooks 1914 – 1916 – according to the original manuscripts MS 101, MS 102 and MS 103, the recto-sides with the philosophical remarks, the verso-sides with the private and coded remarks.

So far, a German version in book form is still missing. However, due to the machine-readable version of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass, viz. the electronic edition of WAB, researchers have access to the complete notebooks. Furthermore, Joachim Schulte, Katia Saporiti and David Stern are currently working on a project which will allow insights into the relations between Wittgenstein’s philosophical notes and his personal coded diaries and thus the path that led to the final text of the Tractatus.

2.2 Vermischte Bemerkungen / Culture & Value

In 1977, G.H. von Wright chose a selection of remarks from Wittgenstein’s Nachlass which deviate from the strictly philosophical discourse and published them under the title Vermischte Bemerkungen by Suhrkamp. In 1980 the volume was translated into English by Peter Winch und published under the title Culture & Value.

In part, these are isolated remarks, sporadically occurring between philosophical entries. They do not appear to have anything in common with the philosophical context, but rather strike one as being something different altogether. For the most part, they can be seen as Wittgenstein’s personal reflections on cultural issues such as art, music, ethics, religion and politics.

Alois Pichler published a revision of the first edition by G.H. von Wright in 1994 and a revised and bilingual edition by Blackwell Publishing in 1998. In the editorial note of 1994, Pichler mentions that a considerable number of these remarks are partly or wholly written in code. However, apart from the coded remarks published in Vermischte Bemerkungen, there are a great number of further coded remarks in the Nachlass.

2.3 Denkbewegungen / Movements of Thought

In 1993, Johannes Koder, the son of Wittgenstein’s friend Rudolf Koder, informed the Brenner-archives about a number of Wittgensteinian documents found in the literary estate of his father. Apart from a typescript of the Tractatus, a manuscript of the Philosophical Investigations (MS 142) and a manuscript of the Lecture on Ethics (MS 139b), there was a diary written in the 1930s. After having transcribed the text according to MECSWIT, I published the diary in book form under the title Denkbewegungen in 1997. It has since been incorporated into the Nachlass as MS 183 by G.H. von Wright.

MECSWIT allowed to edit the diary in two versions – a normalized, so-called reading version and a diplomatic version, which tracks accurately Wittgenstein’s movements of thought with all their changes and alterations including orthographic and stylistic mistakes. In the diplomatic version, the coded remarks are left in code and are not transferred into normal script as is the case with the normalized version; and whereas in the diplomatic version the changes can be seen according to the place where Wittgenstein put them (over or under or after the first version), these alternatives are placed in footnotes in the normalized version.

This diary, beginning on April 26, 1930 in Cambridge and ending on September 24 in 1937 in Skjolden, Norway, contains personal and cultural reflections and a few philosophical reflections. Above all, the parts written in Norway consist of Wittgenstein’s preoccupation with religious, in particular Christian questions, his attitude toward madness and his striving for an ethical way of life. These entries are predominantly written in code. In contrast to the wartime notebooks, philosophical and personal entries are not strictly separated by the categories of coded and not coded writing. Instead, the two different types of script alternate again and again over the course of the text.

3.1 The significance of Wittgenstein’s diaristic (and coded) remarks within his philosophical remarks. The connection between his life and his work

While the reception of Wittgenstein’s writings has for decades mainly focused on his philosophical writings, the discoveries of his personal notes and letters has now led to an increasing interest in his life and personality, and many scholars and researchers have questioned whether one can speak of a connection between Wittgenstein’s personal attitude to the world and his philosophical ideas.

As one can already observe in Wittgenstein’s coded entries during the First World War, there are various thoughts which gradually found their way into the philosophical part written in normal script. Above all, Wittgenstein’s preoccupation with ethical / moral and religious questions, which dominate his coded remarks, seems to have heavily influenced his philosophical reflections over the course of time. Thus, in the philosophical part, his thoughts start to circle around the meaning of the world, God, the I as the bearer of the ethical, death, etc. – i. e. metaphysical questions Wittgenstein explicitly avoided to treat within his philosophy; yet he obviously longed to treat them somehow. Consequently, he approached these questions via the mystical as is also evident on the last few pages of the Tractatus.

His turn to the mystical must be understood in connection with the ethical – in the sense of a devout and respectful attitude toward the realm which transcends the world of facts and is thus unassailable by language and by science. It is only with an ethical attitude of wonder that one might somehow grasp the significance of the world “that it is” (TLP 1972: 6.44). In contrast, seeing the world “how [it] is” (TLP 1972: 6.44) means to see the world within space and time and not “sub specie aeternitatis” (NB 1979: 7. 10. 1916) – the highest form of perfection according to Spinoza, a view that is both rational and intuitive –, an ethical and a mystical view of what is essential but exceeds the ordinary view of humans.

In later years, Wittgenstein continued to preoccupy himself with ethical and religious questions by frequent use of his code in his so-called diaristic remarks scattered throughout his philosophical remarks as mentioned before.

3.2 The Notebooks 1914 – 1916

The separation between personal and philosophical entries by different types of text is particularly obvious in Wittgenstein’s wartime notebooks. However, this separation cannot be applied to all of his entries, for there are a few exceptions. In the first manuscript Wittgenstein begins to report on personal matters in normal writing, starting on August 9, 1914; on August 15, in the middle of a sentence written in normal script, he switches to writing in code. It is not before August 22, 1914 that he begins to write his philosophical entries (in a normal fashion) on the right-hand side of his manuscripts, whilst he now puts his coded remarks on the left-hand side.

Wittgenstein’s gradual preoccupation with existential problems of life, and thus universal questions of philosophy, and his tendency toward a mystical approach is observable as early as 1915, at a time when his future role in the war was uncertain and his fears began to mount. On May 25, 1915, he writes that the “drive toward the mystical comes from the dissatisfaction of our wishes by the sciences”^[4], and he adds the following sentence, which he later slightly alters in the Tractatus: “We feel that even if all of the possible questions of science were answered, our problem is still left untouched. Of course, then no question remains; and this is exactly the answer” (cf. TLP 1972: 6.52).

Thus, concerning ethical and religious matters – the sphere of the “ineffable” –, a gradual mingling can be observed in some passages. That is to say we can also find philosophical reflections in the personal, coded part of the notebooks – even essential thoughts that are then further developed in the philosophical part before they attain their final, concentrated and precise form in the Tractatus: For example, Wittgenstein first writes the sentence, “What cannot be said, cannot be said!” (MS 103: 7. 7. 1916; my transl.) in its determinate tone in code.^[5] On the same day we find the following entry in the philosophical part of the notebooks: “Isn’t this the reason why men to whom the meaning of life had become clear after long doubting could not say what this meaning consisted in?” (NB 1979: 7. 7. 1916; cf. also TLP 1972: 6.521)

Thus, on the same day that he reflects on the meaning of life which he sees outside the world of facts – in the sphere of the ineffable – in recognition of the problems that cannot to be grasped in words, he formulates this sentence about the impossibility of saying what cannot be said. One day later, on July 8, he writes: “To believe in a God means to understand the question about the meaning of life” (NB 1979: 8. 7. 1916).

In the preceding passages of the philosophical part, we find further reflections on the meaning of life, on God, the Will, on conscience, fate, death, on time and eternity in the philosophical part. These entries reveal Wittgenstein’s gradual approach toward a personal God, one he had already often addressed in the coded remarks, presumably shaped by his wartime experiences, above all by the proximity of death as well as by Tolstoy’s Gospel in Brief. Still, there are also pantheistic and panentheistic tendencies which can apparently be related to the philosophies of Spinoza and Schopenhauer. But while these tendencies characterize the philosophical part of the notebooks, the coded parts reveal a religious attitude toward a personal God in a Christian sense.

The impression that Wittgenstein’s philosophical movements of thought were rooted in his personal experience is particularly relevant for the idea of a life in the present. On July 8, 1916 he noted in his philosophical notebook: “Only a man who lives not in time but in the present is happy. For life in the present there is no death” (NB 1979: 8. 7. 1916).

Reading Wittgenstein’s coded diaries from the same time one finds very similar thoughts that obviously originated in the extreme borderline situation of the war when he was confronted with death on a daily basis: On May 4 of the same year, i. e. two months before his philosophical preoccupation with life in the present, he notes: “[…] then war will finally begin for me. And – maybe – life, as well! Perhaps the nearness of death will bring me the light of life! […]” (MS 103: 4. 5. 1916; my transl.). And a few days later he notes that life gets its meaning through death (cf. MS 103: 9. 5. 1916; my transl.).

As is already clear in 1914, he continues to urge the pursuance of a happy life, which, in an idealistic sense, he sees as living “in the good and in the beautiful until life ends itself” (MS 101: 7. 10. 1914; my transl.). Conversely, fear of the future and fear in the face of death is the best sign of a false, i. e. a bad life (cf. NB 1979: 8. 7. 1916). As a consequence, we can observe a tendency toward a kind of stoic attitude regarding the hardships of life, which Wittgenstein hoped to reach by an increasing inclination toward the spiritual – a “life in the spirit”, not unlike the Spinozian understanding of surrender to one’s fate as being God’s plan. All these aspects characterize both the coded diary entries and the philosophical notes, which he regards as the “work” that paved the way for the Tractatus. It must be mentioned that these thoughts first occur in the coded part of the Notebooks and are only later – in MS 103 (1916) – introduced into the philosophical part. Thus, it becomes obvious what kind of philosophy Wittgenstein himself seemed to need for his life – in borderline situations such as those of the war – and how these thoughts eventually influenced his philosophical work. While in earlier years he was mainly preoccupied with the problems of language and its correct logical analysis (distinguishing between meaningful and meaningless propositions), his reflections on language problems gradually turned to a sphere that lies beyond the issues to be treated in the world: to put it in Wittgenstein’s terms, a sphere which lies outside the world of facts and where the philosophical urge centres on the problem of life. However, since this sphere belongs to the metaphysical, it cannot be verbalized and thus cannot be explained rationally: “That something about it [the world] is problematic, which we call its meaning. That this meaning does not lie in it but outside it” (NB 1979: 11. 6. 1916; cf. TLP 1972: 6.41).^[6]

Feeling totally dependent on the world, Wittgenstein exhorts himself to surrender without trying to make himself independent. In other words, to surrender and thus obtain freedom in the sense of Spinoza’s philosophy of determinism that can only be escaped by its recognition and acceptance as the necessity of God’s eternal nature – to “master it by renouncing any influence on happenings” (NB 1979: 11. 6. 1916), as Wittgenstein puts it. By being dependent on the outer world, Wittgenstein lacks the inner poise and serenity he would need in order to work – “work” in the sense of his philosophical reflections which he regularly reports on in the coded parts.

The question arises whether he did not consider his reflections touching upon metaphysical questions as belonging to his philosophical work – as he emphasized in the Tractatus and other passages of his work. However, this assumption seems to contradict the fact that he did take up these reflections on metaphysical problems in the Tractatus and thus into his philosophical work. In fact, there are several thoughts written on the last few pages of the wartime notebooks (penned in 1916) that I contend have their beginnings or roots in the earlier coded diaries. For example, thoughts about the dependency upon the world and that of a life in the present – aspects upon which Wittgenstein first reflected in his personal diaries and which later became the subject of his philosophizing – also occur in the Tractatus.

Even though these reflections – often labelled as Wittgenstein’s mystical thoughts – stand in contrast to his analytic preoccupation with philosophical problems, Wittgenstein implicitly hints at their significance within philosophy. And, as is well known, Wittgenstein emphasized both in his preface to the Tractatus and on other occasions, e. g., in his letter to Ludwig von Ficker, the importance of these thoughts.^[7]

Surrounded by danger, Wittgenstein’s fears begin to intensify and with them his willingness to surrender to God’s will. Yet his will to live remains, and he accuses himself of “a wrong view of life” (MS 103: 29. 7. 1916; my transl.). On the same day, his thoughts in the philosophical part are focused on ethical questions of willing and not willing, on the world of the happy in contrast to the world of the unhappy. Personal reflections are clearly transferred into philosophical thoughts: “For it is a fact of logic that wanting does not stand in any logical connexion with its own fulfilment. And it is also clear that the world of the happy is a different world from the world of the unhappy” (NB 1979: 29. 7. 1916; cf. also TLP 1972: 6.43).

The term “redeeming word” [erlösendes Wort] occurs several times: first in the coded part and later again in the philosophical part. This term can be seen in connection with Wittgenstein’s obsessive search for the right word or formulation in his philosophical writings (cf. Pichler 1993: 8 – 26) but also in relation to his search for an answer to his religious questions and to his personal, moral problems. In later years the term appears several times, characterizing the aim of the philosopher to find peace in her thoughts, as it were (cf. MS 105: 46; MS 107: 44).

Wittgenstein’s remarks about his existential position written in code gradually turn into reflections on the problem of life in general and of the philosophical “I” in relation to the world. He now reflects on solipsism and on microcosm in macrocosm and formulates sentences like the following (a few of which are well known from the Tractatus):

“The I, the I is what is deeply mysterious!” (NB 1979: 5. 8. 1916) or, “The I makes its appearance in philosophy through the world’s being my world.” (NB 1979: 12. 8. 1916; see also TLP 1972: 5.641).

“It is true: Man is the microcosm: I am my world.” (NB 1979: 12. 10. 1916; see also TLP 1972: 5.63).

Even though in the reception most scholars focus on the Tractatus, assuming that Wittgenstein has selected what he considered the essence of his thoughts, one must not neglect the importance of the Notebooks as preliminary steps to the Tractatus. According to Joachim Schulte, the spirit of the Tractatus is closer to the Notebooks than it is to later writings (cf. Schulte 2001: 211). Similarly, I daresay that the spirit of Wittgenstein’s thoughts as found in the Notebooks contains several aspects that have been developed from remarks encoded in the personal diaries of that time. These remarks illuminate his personal view on various matters, predominantly on existential questions with respect to both mankind in general and the individual in his or her social and cultural environment. In this sense, they reflect the importance of the “uniqueness” of the individual’s consciousness and apprehension of the world which Wittgenstein himself emphasized: “Only from the consciousness of the uniqueness of my life arises religion – science – and art” (NB 1979: 1. 8. 1916).

Therefore, it would be tremendously important to also have a German version of the complete wartime notebooks in book form according to the original manuscripts with the coded remarks on the left-hand side and the scientific part on the right-hand side.

3.3 Denkbewegungen / Movements of Thought

As mentioned above, there are also coded remarks in Wittgenstein’s diary of the 1930s (DB 1997). These coded entries contain predominantly personal reflections on moral and religious questions, whereas other entries, for instance autobiographical ones about his relation to Marguerite Respinger, are not in code. Apart from cultural issues, there are a few philosophical entries on the “idea” [Idee] or “archetype/prototype” [Urbild], the “sign” [Zeichen], etc. – entries occurring in a similar form in the Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein also handles metaphysical questions – questions transcending the phenomenal world – in these diaries, although not coded and in a more general tone. However, when it comes to his intensely personal struggles with ethics and religion, he makes use of his code. He quite possibly considered these problems too precious and sublime for the superficial reader to easily gain access to. The metaphor of the casket mentioned above would support this reading. There are also remarks about his lack of seriousness and love for truth in his philosophical work, about his doubts in his search for God, his wavering between religious devotion and scepticism, sometimes even rebellion. These entries have a striking resemblance to those of the coded diaries of the First World War – in several cases, the content and wording are almost identical. These involve his prayers written in a passionate tone: “May God help!” (DB 1997: 144; 20. 11. 1936; my transl.); “May God have mercy on me” (DB 1997: 157; 28. 1. 1937; my transl.), etc.

Similarly, there are coded entries on his fear of losing his sanity and succumbing to a kind of madness. Caught between philosophical knowledge and failure in achieving certainty, he thus often finds himself on the borderline between sanity and madness. Wittgenstein tries to endure his spiritual torments by means of his prayers for spiritual enlightenment.

3.4 (Coded) remarks scattered throughout the Nachlass

Although a great number of these remarks are published in Culture & Value (Vermischte Bemerkungen), they have been chosen predominantly according to their treatment of cultural questions. Thus, Culture & Value also contains many remarks that are not coded. The volume does contain coded remarks on ethical and religious but not on autobiographical matters.

The question arises whether the coded remarks interspersed within the philosophical texts have some special value or significance and whether there might be a connection between them and the philosophical entries. As mentioned above, it is reasonable to ask whether these remarks might be seen as an example of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language – in so far as he regarded them as having a specific kind of function within language which could not be attained by normal usage and not by scholarly disputes. Perhaps they should serve as a special way of demonstrating different language games and, as previously mentioned, as a means of separating what can be shown from what can be said: for example, the use of a language related more to literature as a counterpart to strict philosophical discourse – in other words, a poetic, intuitive approach instead of a rational, discursive approach to the objects of his philosophizing. In this context, I want to hint at the importance of the “impression” phenomena of nature or other objects in the world might leave on us: In MS 110, 180, Wittgenstein writes that he actually wanted to give his book the following motto: “Do you see the moon over there? It is only half to see, & yet it is round & beautiful.” (my transl.)^[8]

And in his Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough, Wittgenstein states: “Here we can only describe and say: such is human life. An explanation compared with the impression a description renders, is too insecure. For every explanation is but a hypothesis” (MS 110: 180; my transl.).

To give another example of Wittgenstein’s intuitive approach is the following remark, written in code: “O why do I feel as if I wrote a poem when I write philosophy? It is here as if there was something small that has a wonderful meaning. Like a leaf, or a flower.” (MS 133: 31. 10. 1946; my transl.)

This remark seems to me to be a striking example of Wittgenstein’s poetic approach toward philosophy – his attitude of wonder at the world thus implying not only an aesthetic, but also an ethical component. By way of encoding, though, Wittgenstein still wanted to mark the difference between philosophizing in a rational and discursive sense and philosophizing in an act of aesthetic, even poetic expression. Wittgenstein placed this passage in between normal script passages about the meaning of names in language games. This passage quoted earlier and further remarks on the nature of his philosophizing suggest that he occasionally seemed to pause in the middle of strenuous movements of thought on philosophy in order to catch his breath, so to speak. Probably as a result of the difficulty involved in solving the problems analytically, he became aware of other forms of treating language and philosophy – forms that are closer to showing than explaining. However, as these remarks interrupt his philosophical discourse in the same way in which his reflections on cultural topics or his personal entries now and again throughout his manuscripts, Wittgenstein clearly separates them from the strictly philosophical discourse by means of a special kind of script.

Yet it is not only the different type of writing but also the tone and style that help distinguish these entries from the more dispassionate tone of his philosophical discourse. One might speak of two different voices of Wittgenstein: the passionate voice of Wittgenstein as a person and the sober voice of the philosopher, in other words, the voice of “heart” versus that of “mind”. In addition, there is a third voice, the one giving comments on his writings from a meta-level.

The coded remarks hold what one could call a middle-position between Wittgenstein’s philosophical reflections and his personal view on the world. They touch both “spheres”, although in their own specific way which is not only to be seen in the peculiar script but also in the difference of style and content.

Whereas the relatively strict distinction between philosophical and personal, ethical and religious entries according to normal writing on the one hand and coded on the other is, as previously mentioned, particularly relevant to Wittgenstein’s wartime notebooks, we find an intermingling of the two different types of text in later years, i. e. in the various entries spread across his philosophical works. There are numerous reflections on cultural, ethical and religious matters, sometimes written in code, sometimes not.

This is especially evident in the years 1931, 1936 and 1937, the years in which Wittgenstein tended more towards writing diaries and was even considering writing an autobiography. This was also the time when he considered making a confession (according to a diary entry and a report by Drury), which he in fact (according to written sources) did not do until the end of 1936.^[9] That his writing on personal matters at that time is not coded seems to confirm my assumption that with regard to autobiographical remarks, such as a confessional report, he no longer wanted to hide these notes via code. In accordance with his self-imposed standard of utmost honesty, he left personal notes which included all of the negative or ugly sides of his character out in the open for general inspection, i. e. not coded.

The encoded entries predominantly involve highly personal remarks concerning God, e. g. prayers written in a passionate and at the same time devout tone, often with the formulation “may” [möge], as also found in his wartime diaries:

“May God forbid!” (MS 108: 38; 25. 12. 1929); “May God send me purity & truth” (MS 108: 47; 28. 12. 1929); “May God hold my ideal up!” (MS 107: 161; 11. 10. 1929; my transl.)

It thus seems that the code was a means of expressing his awe and his distant approach toward God – a relationship too profound and precious to be laid bare for others to see.

So, even if many of his reflections on religious belief are written in a normal script, Wittgenstein switches to code whenever the matter is more personal, and thus his tone is more passionate and obviously rooted in utmost despair:

But if I am to be REALLY redeemed, I need certainty – not wisdom, dreams, speculation – and this certainty is faith. And faith is faith in what my heart, my soul needs, not my speculative intellect. For my soul, with its passions, as it were with its flesh & blood, must be redeemed, not my abstract mind. Perhaps one may say: Only love can believe the Resurrection. Or: It is love that believes the Resurrection. (MS 120: 108; 12. 12. 1937, CV 1998: 38e–39e.)

During his long stay in Norway, when he spent a great deal of time in solitude, he wrote longer passages in code. These passages were mainly about his personal situation and thus prove one of the reasons he gave for writing diaries, i. e. to use his diaries as a kind of substitute for a confidant: He reports on his fears of madness, illness and death – on his feelings of loneliness that reveal his deep desperation. And he tends to give himself up to the hands of fate or God and write in a devout and resigned tone:

“God, in your hands I give myself! […]” (MS 118: 10; 25. 8. 1937; my transl.); “I am in the hand of fate & have to find myself in it somehow” (MS 118: 37; 29. 8. 1937; my transl.); “But if it is so, you have to accept it” (MS 118: 37; 29.8.37; my transl.).

Similar to his writings during the First World War, Wittgenstein often reports on his philosophical work in code, although in later years in much greater detail. He does not consider most of his writings mature enough for a book and thus wants to re-work them. Thus, his coded entries provide us with a vivid picture of the reasons and methods for his numerous alterations, deletions, etc. in his philosophical manuscripts.