On Certainty, Epistemic Incommensurability and Epistemic Relativism
-
Nicola Claudio Salvatore
Abstract:
In this paper, I present Wittgenstein’s remarks on the structure of reason, drawing on the notions of “hinges” he developed in On Certainty. I then outline some of the unpalatable relativistic consequences that can be extracted by Wittgenstein’s epistemological views. Then, developing the similarities between Wittgenstein’s treatment of “hinges” and his views on metrology and religious beliefs, I aim to show that his remarks on the structure of reason, once correctly understood and developed, can help us to block rather than license relativistic conclusions. I argue that following Wittgenstein’s views on epistemology, we should be able to dismiss all the cases of apparent unsolvable disagreement between communities committed to radically different worldviews; this is so because, once seen in the light of his conception of the structure of reason, these disagreements are either solvable, as they are based on lack of knowledge and can thus be solved through education and training, or are mere pseudo-problems that stem from misguided comparisons between constitutively different language games and are thus the result of a misleading way of representing the nature and aim of our epistemic practices.
Bibliography
Behe, Michael: Darwin’s Black Box, New York 1996.Suche in Google Scholar
Behe, Michael: The Edge of Evolution, New York 2007.Suche in Google Scholar
Coliva, Annalisa: Extended Rationality. A Hinge Epistemology, Basingstoke 2015.10.1057/9781137501899Suche in Google Scholar
Coliva, Annalisa: Moore and Wittgenstein. Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense, Basingstoke 2010a.10.1057/9780230289697Suche in Google Scholar
Coliva, Annalisa: “Was Wittgenstein an Epistemic Relativist?”, in: Philosophical Investigations, vol. 33, iss. 1, 2010b.10.1111/j.1467-9205.2009.01394.xSuche in Google Scholar
Conant, James: “Wittgenstein on meaning and use”, in: Philosophical Investigations, vol. 21, iss. 1, 1998.10.1111/1467-9205.00069Suche in Google Scholar
Dembsky, William: The Design Inference: Eliminating Chance through Small Probabilities, Cambridge 1998.10.1017/CBO9780511570643Suche in Google Scholar
Dembsky, William: Intelligent Design: The Bridge between Science and Theology. Downer’s Grove, Illinois 1999.Suche in Google Scholar
Dembsky, William: No Free Lunch: Why Specified Complexity Cannot Be Purchased without Intelligence, Lanham 2002.Suche in Google Scholar
Dembsky, William: The Design Revolution: Answering the Toughest Questions about Intelligent Design. Downer’s Grove, Illinois 2004.Suche in Google Scholar
Dembsky, William: The End of Christianity: Finding a Good God in an Evil World. Nashville, 2010.Suche in Google Scholar
Glock, Hans Johann: A Wittgenstein Dictionary, Oxford 1996.10.1111/b.9780631185376.1996.00007.xSuche in Google Scholar
Glock, Hans Johann: Relativism, Commensurability and Translatability, in: John Preston (ed.): Wittgenstein and Reason, Oxford 2008.Suche in Google Scholar
Hacker, Peter: On Davidson’s Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, in: Philosophical Quarterly 46, 1996.10.2307/2956442Suche in Google Scholar
Kusch, Martin: Relativism in On Certainty and Other Writings of the 1930s and 1940s, unpublished (manuscript).Suche in Google Scholar
Kusch, Martin: Annalisa Coliva on Wittgenstein and Epistemic Relativism, in: Philosophia, vol. 41, iss. 1, 2013.10.1007/s11406-012-9403-4Suche in Google Scholar
Moore, George: A Defence of Common Sense, in: Contemporary British Philosophers, 1925, reprinted in: George Moore: Philosophical Papers, London 1962a.Suche in Google Scholar
Moore, George: Proof of an External World, in: Proceedings of the British Academy, 1939, reprinted in: George Moore: Philosophical Papers, London 1962b.Suche in Google Scholar
Moyal-Sharrock, Danièle & Brenner, William: Readings of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. London 2005.10.1057/9780230505346Suche in Google Scholar
Moyal-Sharrock, Danièle: Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, London 2004.10.1057/9780230504462Suche in Google Scholar
McGinn, Marie: Sense and Certainty: A Dissolution of Scepticism, Oxford 1989.Suche in Google Scholar
Morawetz, Thomas: Wittgenstein & Knowledge: The Importance of ‘On Certainty’. Cambridge 1978.Suche in Google Scholar
Newman, John: Sermons, Chiefly on the Theory of Religious Belief, preached before the University of Oxford, London 1844.Suche in Google Scholar
Newman, John: An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, Ian Ker (ed.), Oxford 1870 – 1985.10.1093/actrade/9780198127512.book.1Suche in Google Scholar
Pritchard, Duncan: Wittgenstein on Hinges and Radical Scepticism in On Certainty, in: Hans-Johann Glock & John Hyman (eds.): Blackwell Companion to Wittgenstein, Oxford 2017.Suche in Google Scholar
Pritchard, Duncan: Epistemic Angst. Radical Scepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing, Princeton 2015.10.23943/princeton/9780691167237.001.0001Suche in Google Scholar
Pritchard, Duncan: Entitlement and the Groundlessness of Our Believing, in: Dylan Dodd & Elia Zardini (eds.): Contemporary Perspectives on Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, Oxford 2014.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658343.003.0010Suche in Google Scholar
Pritchard, Duncan (with Boult, Cameron): Wittgensteinian Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Vertigo, in: Philosophia, vol. 41, iss. 1, 2013.10.1007/s11406-012-9401-6Suche in Google Scholar
Pritchard, Duncan: Epistemic Relativism, Epistemic Incommensurability and Wittgensteinian Epistemology, in Steven Hales (ed.): Blackwell Companion to Relativism, Oxford 2010.10.1002/9781444392494.ch14Suche in Google Scholar
Pritchard, Duncan: Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and Contemporary Anti-scepticism, in: Danièle Moyal-Sharrock and William Brenner (eds.): Readings of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, London 2005.10.1057/9780230505346_11Suche in Google Scholar
Pritchard, Duncan: Is “God Exists” a “Hinge” Proposition of Religious Belief, in: International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 47, 2000.Suche in Google Scholar
Salvatore, Nicola Claudio: Wittgenstein and Epistemology, in: Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/witt-epi/ (accessed: 14/07/2017).Suche in Google Scholar
Salvatore, Nicola Claudio: Wittgensteinian Epistemology and Cartesian Skepticism, in: Kriterion-Journal of Philosophy, vol.29, iss. 2, 2015.10.1515/krt-2015-290205Suche in Google Scholar
Salvatore, Nicola Claudio: Skepticism, Rules and Grammar, in: Polish Journal of Philosophy, vol. VII, iss. 1, 2013.10.5840/pjphil2013713Suche in Google Scholar
Vasiliou, Iakovos: Wittgenstein, Religious Belief, and On Certainty, in: Robert Arrington & Mark Addis (eds.): Wittgenstein and Philosophy of Religion, London 2004.Suche in Google Scholar
Williams, Michael: Unnatural Doubts, Cambridge 1991.Suche in Google Scholar
Williams, Michael: Problems of Knowledge. A Critical Introduction to Epistemology, Oxford 2001.Suche in Google Scholar
Williams, Michael: Wittgenstein’s refutation of idealism, in: Denis McManus (ed.): Wittgenstein and Skepticism, London 2004a.10.4324/9780203467794-3Suche in Google Scholar
Williams, Michael: Wittgenstein, truth and certainty, in: Max Kolbel & Bernhard Weiss (eds.): Wittgenstein’s lasting significance, London 2004b.Suche in Google Scholar
Williams, Michael: Why Wittgenstein isn’t a foundationalist, in: Danièle Moyal-Sharrock and William Brenner (eds.): Readings of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, London 2005.10.1057/9780230505346_4Suche in Google Scholar
Williams, Michael: Why (Wittgensteinian) Contextualism is not Relativism, in: Episteme, vol. 4, iss. 1, 2007.10.3366/epi.2007.4.1.93Suche in Google Scholar
Wright, Crispin: Warrant for nothing (and foundation for free)?”, in: Aristotelian Society Supplement, vol. 78, iss.1, 2004a.10.1111/j.0309-7013.2004.00121.xSuche in Google Scholar
Wright, Crispin: Wittgensteinian Certainties, in: Denis McManus (ed.): Wittgenstein and Skepticism, London 2004b.10.4324/9780203467794-1Suche in Google Scholar
© 2018 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Titelseiten
- Titelseiten
- Articles
- Hinweis für Leser / Note for Readers
- Wittgenstein’s Vienna around 1900
- Wittgenstein’s Ambivalent Attitude toward Science and Culture
- Wittgenstein and the Theatre of Confession
- “What belongs to a language game is a whole culture.”
- Lebensform and “socio-cultural background”
- Culture as a Monastic Rule
- Frontverläufe in Wittgensteins Prototractatus
- Recherchen zu „Teil II“ der Philosophischen Untersuchungen und zur von Wittgenstein erstellten „C-Sammlung“ im Nachlass
- Wittgenstein’s Criticism of the “Atmosphere” Conception of Meaning in PI § 117
- Revisiting the Philosophical Investigations’ Children
- On Certainty, Epistemic Incommensurability and Epistemic Relativism
- „Das Buch ist voller Leben …“
- Die Autorinnen und Autoren des Bandes / Authors of this Volume
- Bisher erschienene Bände / Previously published Volumes
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Titelseiten
- Titelseiten
- Articles
- Hinweis für Leser / Note for Readers
- Wittgenstein’s Vienna around 1900
- Wittgenstein’s Ambivalent Attitude toward Science and Culture
- Wittgenstein and the Theatre of Confession
- “What belongs to a language game is a whole culture.”
- Lebensform and “socio-cultural background”
- Culture as a Monastic Rule
- Frontverläufe in Wittgensteins Prototractatus
- Recherchen zu „Teil II“ der Philosophischen Untersuchungen und zur von Wittgenstein erstellten „C-Sammlung“ im Nachlass
- Wittgenstein’s Criticism of the “Atmosphere” Conception of Meaning in PI § 117
- Revisiting the Philosophical Investigations’ Children
- On Certainty, Epistemic Incommensurability and Epistemic Relativism
- „Das Buch ist voller Leben …“
- Die Autorinnen und Autoren des Bandes / Authors of this Volume
- Bisher erschienene Bände / Previously published Volumes
