Strategic Rebalancing in the Contested Global Order: The United States’ Cost–Benefit Analysis of Foreign Policy Regarding Greece and Türkiye in the Eastern Mediterranean

Introduction

How does the United States (US) balance its commitments to Türkiye and Greece, when these two key allies come into conflict? How will it do so in the foreseeable future? Rarely has such a strategic dilemma been more pronounced than in the Eastern Mediterranean. The US has long sought to balance its interests by maintaining strong ties with both countries. In recent years, however, tensions between the US and Türkiye, both of which are NATO allies, have escalated over the latter’s relations with China and Russia, and its shift away from the liberal system, testing Washington’s ability – and willingness – to maintain an even-handed approach.

To analyze this dynamic, this article draws on Kai He’s positive–negative balancing model, which conceptualizes how states respond to threats not only by building alliances and deepening cooperation (positive balancing), but also by restricting or distancing themselves from actors (negative balancing) if they perceive normative risks and ideological alienation (He 2009; 2012; 2022). Applying this lens to the US policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, the study finds that American policymakers have increasingly used cost–benefit calculations when seeking to manage risks, through deepening ties with one partner, while not excluding but undertaking some punitive measures toward the other. By synthesizing these approaches, this study conceptualizes the US’ cost–benefit calculations not as fixed or purely rational, but as context-dependent assessments that reflect evolving strategic, normative, and institutional constraints within the shifting global order.

Through two core case studies – the S-400 missile defense system crisis and the expansion of Greek–US defense cooperation – as well as ancillary case studies such as the relations between China and Türkiye, Türkiye’s approach to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, and the growing US military presence on a number of Greek islands, this article explains how shifting attitudes toward both geostrategic utility and normative coherence have guided the US’ strategic recalibration. The analysis shows how, in an era of increasing challenges to the liberal international system, the United States has used a synthesis of positive balancing toward Greece and negative balancing toward Türkiye to navigate complex alliance commitments, taking into account cost–benefit calculations. The article argues that US policy regarding its balancing act between Türkiye and Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean can best be understood through such a cost–benefit analysis, that is by showing how the strategic, political, and alliance dimensions of choosing one partner over the other weighs into diplomatic relations and geopolitics.

Setting the theoretical framework, the study starts by synthesizing Kai He’s dynamic positive–negative balancing model (He 2009; 2012; 2022). This is followed by a methodology section that sheds light on the rationale behind and structure of the case selection. Next, I provide context for the deteriorating relationship between Türkiye and the US, highlighting the key conflict points, and for the evolution of the relations between the United States and Greece. The latter went from being an ally to a strategic partner for the US, characterized by the Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement (MDCA), shared positions on Russia’s war against Ukraine, and, importantly, the expansion of US military bases in the region. Applying Kai He’s theory, I then analyze the current state of Türkiye–US–Greece relations and show how the US has employed a strategy of negative balancing between the two countries. I discuss the dynamic positive–negative balancing model applied by the US in the case of the two countries in terms of the Eastern Mediterranean problem, the F-16 and F-32 weapons crises, and the strategies for the armament of the Aegean Islands, as well as recent US foreign policy strategies aimed at strengthening Greece rather than Türkiye in these areas. In the last section of the paper, I evaluate how the bilateral paths pursued by the US have coincided with a changing regional triangle and demonstrate how the US has progressively prioritized Greece in the areas of military collaboration, arms sales, and security for the Eastern Mediterranean. In so doing, I strengthen my argument that Washington has been adopting a negative balancing tactic against Türkiye while positively reinforcing relations with Greece. A summary table shows how the analyzed dimensions and case studies reflect the US’ strategic calculations.

In line with all these points, I show how the cost–benefit logic has also been reshaped by normative and strategic shifts in the global system. While historically Turkey was an ally of strategic depth for the US, such shifts have recently changed this. Increasingly, the US has sought to reduce costs by means of a balancing strategy (hedging) through Greece, while on the other hand they have tried to preserve their strategic advantage without completely alienating Turkey. The article thus contributes to the debate about how US cost–benefit assessments of its relations Turkey and Greece have been shaped by global changes, the contestation of the liberal order, and the changing role of middle powers.

Dynamic Threat Perceptions and Strategic Cost–Benefit Calculations in US Foreign Policy as Part of the Contested Liberal International Order: Theoretical Framework

This study uses two complementary theoretical perspectives to analyze the changing alliance preferences and balancing strategies of the US in the Eastern Mediterranean: Kai He’s dynamic balancing model (He 2009; 2012; 2022) as well as neoclassical rationalist perspectives in foreign policy analysis. Together, these two perspectives help to highlight how the US, as a global hegemonic power, has managed and recalibrated its alliance strategies vis-à-vis the changing international order that has shaped both external threat perceptions and internal strategic calculations.

While Waltz (1979) argued that states balance their power in what he (already) saw as an anarchic international order, and Walt (1985; 1987), somewhat similarly, saw alliances as being constructed by perceived threats, which in turn increased the search for alliances, He (2009; 2022) claims that such approaches cannot capture the dynamic nature of the interaction between system polarity and state behavior. He offers a more dynamic model, in which political leaders’ shifting threat perceptions function as a stimulus for multiple balancing strategies, including both internal and external factors – such as strengthening one’s military and existing or new external alliances (He 2022, 51–2). In a unipolar world order, the hegemon may use both internal and external balancing to preserve their power and prevent the ascent of their rivals, as can be observed in US efforts to resist the rise of China and Russia through international organizations such as NATO, bilateral alliances, and military investments (He 2022, 51–2). Somewhat echoing Waltz and Walt, He further establishes that multipolar systems tend to be characterized by instability and uncertainty, because threat perceptions can differ and it is thus harder to predict states’ behavior (He 2022, 54). Writing before the Russian aggression against Ukraine, He forecast that the international system was likely to evolve into a bipolarity of nations led by the US and China, in which external balancing would be the primary strategy, followed by military investments and other means of internal balancing (He 2022, 57).

In addition, He (2012) distinguishes between positive balancing, which refers to balancing strategies pursued by a given state to increase its own power, and negative balancing, which refers to the policies a state undertakes to prevent the rise of a rival. Which of the two balancing strategies a state will follow is shaped by the threat perception inherent in the international system. When it comes to US strategies toward Türkiye and Greece, these concepts help to analyze how Washington has rewarded the reliable and stable partner – Greece – and constrained the unstable partner – Türkiye – based on changing threat perceptions.

To complete this perception-based approach, the study also borrows from older neoclassical and rationalist approaches which make use of cost–benefit analyses in foreign policy. According to Fearon (1995) and Rose (1998), for example, policymakers rationally pursue strategic interests, but are often constrained by the need to minimize economic, political, or alliance costs. Similarly, Snyder (1984) and Moravcsik (1997) underlined how domestic political constraints limit foreign policy preferences, especially when it comes to alliance behavior. Walt (1987) and Jervis (1976) emphasized the role played by perceptions of credibility and cohesion. They argued that alliances are determined not only by material threats, but also reputational cost and reliability. Snyder (1984) presented a framework of entrapment and abandonment which is related to maximizing net benefits, while minimizing one’s own costs and risks. He argued that, consequently, states in asymmetric alliances constantly oscillate between these two risks on differing levels. This is certainly true of Türkiye and Greece. Accordingly, patron states like the US cautiously calculate their risk of being dragged into existing conflicts (entrapment) or losing an important partner (abandonment).

According to neoclassical scholars such as Zakaria (1998) and Rose (1998), the enactment of foreign policy is not only shaped by systemic incentives, but also by ideological preferences and political institutions. Dueck (2006) for example highlights that US foreign policy has historically been constructed as a synthesis of realist perspectives (security, balance of power) and liberal norms (democracy), with partisan ideology also playing an important role. Jentleson (2014) provided a useful framework for understanding US foreign policy as a balancing act between realist-oriented interests and liberal values, often also involving complex trade-offs. Using these insights, this article conceptualizes US foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean as a strategic evaluation process that balances the political and normative costs of dealing with partners who have been adopting increasingly illiberal stances and have seen a decline in their credibility with the advantages of sustained engagement, such as military reach, regional influence, and alliance cohesion.

The erosion of the liberal international order – due to factors such as the end of what had been perceived as a US-led unipolar order, the rise of right-wing populism, and growing authoritarianism, all leading to heavy norm contestation – has contributed to changing cost–benefit calculations in foreign policy. Scholars such as Ikenberry (2018), Acharya (2014), and Lake (2021) discuss how these changing domestic and global dynamics have affected the US’ normative power, forcing it to adopt a more pragmatic attitude in its alliance strategies.

In this changing international system, the policies of middle powers too have increasingly included the use of balancing (hedging) strategies. For example, regional alignments have been created that have tended toward normative differentiation. While Jordaan (2003) drew attention to their strategic flexibility, Aydın (2021) has, more recently, highlighted how middle powers can exert regional influence and how they have departed from liberal norms when necessary. According to Aydın, this behavior of middle powers is a reflection of their growing strategic autonomy in the face of increased global instability. However, Türkiye and Greece have responded in a completely different manner to these global dynamics. Türkiye, once an exemplary member of NATO, has repositioned itself as a revisionist, illiberal middle power that seeks autonomy from Western institutions and norms (Oğuzlu 2016). Greece, on the other hand, has expanded its cooperation with the United States and sought to adopt a status quo approach in line with liberal norms. Lastly, the US’ recent alignment strategies in the Eastern Mediterranean show a synthesis of dynamic threat perception and cost–benefit calculations, as described above.

Methodology

This study focuses on the period between 2015 and 2024, a time characterized by significant geopolitical shifts and resulting changes in US foreign policy interests and alliances. I adopt a qualitative approach to examine the US’ changing alliance strategies regarding Türkiye and Greece. Specifically, I divide the decade into two phases that have shaped the changes in US foreign policy understanding within the framework of cost–benefit calculations. After, between 2015 and 2017, pursuing a more independent foreign policy orientation that included a rapprochement to Russia and China, between 2017 and 2019, Türkiye then made several deals with Russia, among them the purchase of Russia’s S-400 missile defense system. This sparked a major diplomatic crisis with the United States and led both to a deterioration in relations between the two countries and changes in US foreign policy. Such changes became evident in the second half of the decade under scrutiny – 2020 to 2024. Recent developments included amendments to the US–Greek Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement (MDCA) of 1990. Beyond Türkiye’s stance in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, Finland and Sweden joining NATO as a consequence of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has also reshaped the security architecture of Europe, forcing the US to react.

As mentioned above, the US’ foreign policy-related cost–benefit calculations are based on geopolitical, normative, and ideological considerations. In order to identify these factors, I have used a comprehensive data pool made up of a wide range of primary sources, such as official statements by the US government, policy documents (including US defense agreements), speeches by key policymakers, and media coverage by numerous Turkish and international news outlets. These primary sources are complemented by secondary sources such as academic articles and books, as well as reports and analyses by various think tanks.

The analysis focuses on identifying the rationalist factors shaping US foreign policy decisions, such as strategic and normative calculations that have influenced alliance choices. The data used in this context is analyzed using the process tracing method, which provides insights into how important developments such as the S-400 deal and the Greece–US defense agreement changed US policy. The case study approach adopted throughout the paper is important, as it allows for an in-depth examination of the details of each case, while at the same time analyzing the findings in the broader global context.

From Important to Unfaithful Ally? The Deterioration of US–Türkiye Relations

For many years, Türkiye was an important ally of the US in the Middle East. This position has recently begun to change, as the two countries have started to disagree on various political and military issues. As relations between the two countries have changed, the US has increasingly perceived Türkiye as “neither a friend nor a foe” in the context of their shifting interactions.^[1] The disagreements between the two countries have largely been over (allegedly) PKK-linked Syrian Kurds and Türkiye’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile defense system in 2019, which triggered US sanctions and arms restrictions.^[2] Tensions have escalated over Türkiye’s suspicions about the US role in the 2016 coup attempt by a faction of the Turkish armed forces.^[3]

The basis of the disagreement regarding the Kurds in Syria is that while the US supports the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the fight against the Islamic State (IS) in the region, Türkiye regards the SDF, which is composed primarily of Syrian Kurds, as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK). The US’ cooperation with the SDF to prevent the Islamic State from taking hold in northern Syria is just one reason for the tensions in Turkish–US relations.^[4]

Türkiye’s growing ties with China and Russia have raised some concerns in the US. While the latter perceives the rise of China and Russia as a threat, Türkiye sees it as an opportunity for a multipolar system (Ülgen 2021). In January 2024, the director of Türkiye’s National Intelligence Organization, İbrahim Kalın, stated that China and Russia played a constructive role in a multipolar world order and that Türkiye aimed to build bridges with both countries (Soylu 2024).^[5]

Turkish–US relations have been tense over the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, especially since the events of October 2023 and the war that has followed. The two countries have diametrically opposed views on the conflict. Unlike the leaders of United Kingdom (UK), the US, and the European Union, as well as several Arab countries, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan describes the Islamic Resistance Movement, commonly known as Hamas, as a freedom fighter rather than a terrorist organization. In line with an increasing number of other states, as well as the UN, Erdoğan has described the Israeli actions as “genocide”. The US expressed concerns about Türkiye facilitating Hamas’ financial affairs.^[6] Erdoğan criticized US plans to send aircraft carriers to the region and warned that this could lead to massacres. He also stated that Türkiye was ready to play a mediating role in the region.^[7] In March 2024, the Turkish government announced that it had decided to stop trade with Israel until a permanent ceasefire was achieved in Gaza.^[8] In the US, on the other hand, the need to take retaliatory measures against Türkiye, including sanctions, was discussed,^[9] which in turn led to increased anti-Americanism in Türkiye.^[10]

The most prominent indicator of the tense relationship between the two sides is the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), a federal law signed by US president Donald Trump during his first term in office. The law took effect in August 2017, imposing sanctions on Iran, North Korea, and Russia. In the long run, the sanctions were expected to have a serious impact on the Turkish defense industry and economy as well.^[11] Erdoğan criticized CAATSA as a “blatant attack on Türkiye’s sovereignty”, highlighting that, for the first time, such sanctions had been effectively applied to an allied NATO member state.^[12] All disagreements and conflicts mentioned above have strained Türkiye–US relations to breaking point. They are now characterized by mutual distrust and the US’ perception of Türkiye is now that of an “unfaithful ally”.^[13]

From Ally to Strategic Partnership: The Evolving Relationship Between the US and Greece

Due to its geographical location, Greece has historically been an important US ally. In recent years, with Türkiye increasingly distancing itself from West, this relationship has reached the dimension of a “strategic partnership”. The US and Greece have significantly expanded their areas of cooperation.^[14] Former US Secretary of State Antony Blinken described Greece as an “indispensable partner”, underlining the strength of their ties in particular across different military and regional security areas.^[15]

The foundations of this cooperation date back to Donald Trump’s first term in office. In 2017, he hosted the then Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras with the aim of increasing military and political cooperation. In 2019, this resulted in an update of the Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement (MDCA) that had been in place since 1990.^[16] Greece increased its military purchases from the US, now estimated to total more than 1 billion dollars, strengthening its air force.^[17] Since 2018, the US has increased its military presence in Greece at its bases in Souda Bay, Larissa, Volos, and Alexandroupoli. Joint military training has also been intensified since 2020 at a base near Mount Olympus.^[18]

In 2021, under the subsequent Greek government led by Kyriakos Mitsotakis, another important amendment was made to the MDCA, extending it indefinitely. After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, this update has been seen as a pivotal one. Greece has positioned itself on the same side as the US vis-à-vis Russia’s aggression, supporting Ukraine diplomatically and in terms of humanitarian aid (Sokou 2023, 4–5).^[19] The US already began strengthening Greece in 2019 when it launched an initiative for diplomatic and economic cooperation between Greece, Israel, and the US in the Eastern Mediterranean, with the aim of limiting Chinese and Russian influence.^[20] A stronger Greece also aligns with US interests in ensuring energy security and regional stability in the Eastern Mediterranean and Southeastern Europe (Axt 2022).

Türkiye’s policies play a critical role in this context. During the era of Ahmet Davutoğlu, chief foreign policy advisor to Erdoğan, foreign minister, and prime minister between 2003 and 2016, Türkiye aimed to obtain a leadership role in the Islamic world and viewed Greece as a tool the West was using against it.^[21] Ankara’s perceptions of the West and Greece have remained largely unchanged ever since, eventually paving the way for a process in which the US has effectively distanced itself from Türkiye as an ally in the region and moved closer to Greece. Both countries have benefitted from this strengthened partnership. Greece needs US support to ensure its security, which has included increasing its military capacity to defend against Türkiye. The US, on the other hand, continues to see Greece as a stable partner to prevent non-Western influence in the Eastern Mediterranean.

A Historically Interdependent Triangle: Türkiye–Greece–US Relations

Given that the rivalry between Greece and Türkiye is enduring and still unresolved (Katsoulas 2022), it is their NATO membership that has prevented major conflicts. Reflecting on the US’ long-term strategy to balance the two, Stearns characterized them as “entangled allies” (Stearns 1992). It is this balance that has shifted in recent years, mainly because of changing US threat perceptions. While ties with Türkiye have deteriorated, with the latter been labeled a “troubled partner” (Larrabee 2010), US–Greece relations have continued to deepen, especially in defense and military cooperation. What is the reason for the shift in US’ policy of balance between the two countries, in favor of one side?

While tensions between the US and Türkiye have been increasingly palpable recently, relations with Greece, in contrast, have become ever closer. Among the contentious issues are Greece’s militarization of several of its islands in the eastern Aegean Sea (many near the Turkish coast); Türkiye’s long-winded F-16 fighter jet acquisition from the US; Greece’s acquisition of F-35 fighter jets from the same; as well as the aforementioned increasing number of US military bases in Greece. The İncirlik Air Base, built in the 1950s in southern Turkey near the border with Syria and historically important for the US, remains operational, but its strategic value has diminished not only due to the political tensions, but also newer alternative US bases in Greece as well as Romania.^[22] Statements related to a potential Russian presence in İncirlik in combination with Türkiye’s opposition to Sweden’s and Finland’s NATO membership have led the US to reconsider their reliance on Türkiye.^[23]

The first amendment of the US–Greece Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement in 2019 allowed for the US to expand its operations in key locations, including Larissa, Stefanovikio, Alexandroupoli, Souda Bay, and other areas of central and northern Greece.^[24] The agreement has meant military and economic strengthening for Greece, but it has given the US a whole lot more. Former US ambassador to Greece Geoffrey Pyatt called it the jewel in the crown of the fantastic military relationship between the two countries.^[25] He emphasized the centrality of the deal for US regional military strategy, given its reach from Syria to Libya.^[26]

Sales of the F-35 and F-16 constituted another crucial item in the deteriorating relations between the US and Türkiye. After Türkiye purchased the Russian S-400 missile defense system in 2019, it was removed from the US F-35 program. The US stated that it was impossible for Türkiye to have both a Russian air system and a US fifth-generation system at the same time, and that Türkiye, a NATO member, was not working in cooperation with the West in the way that would be expected of a NATO ally.^[27] Although not completely removed in the first place, Türkiye was then excluded from the program altogether. Turkish F-35 personnel based in the US were asked to leave the country.^[28] Türkiye’s expulsion was followed by Greece’s attempts to acquire the F-35, which led to tensions with Türkiye.^[29] The US did not approve the F-16 sale to Türkiye until after the latter had agreed to Sweden’s NATO membership, highlighting how the US used arms sales as strategic leverage.^[30]

Regional dynamics have also shaped the relational triangle. Long-term disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean continue, including over territorial waters, islands, and exclusive economic zones (Axt 2022). The complexity of these problems is compounded by the fact that the two countries have different expectations of a solution, and that the disputes involve various parties as well as global powers such as the US. Türkiye has a more restrictive view on the establishment of an exclusive economic zone; Greece adopts a more comprehensive position here. Türkiye opposes the Cypriot administration having sole say in the utilization of energy resources on the island and demands the inclusion of the Northern Cyprus administration in this process; and while Greece would prefer an international arbitration to solve these problems, Türkiye seeks a bilateral compromise solution.^[31] Greece’s recent militarization of several Aegean Islands was met with sharp reactions from Türkiye, which included accusing the US of issuing provocative diplomatic notes.^[32]

Since 2019, the US has strengthened its cooperation with Israel, Greece, and Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean. At the 3 + 1 summit held in May 2019, Greece, Israel, Cyprus, plus the US, sought to coordinate regional security and energy policies.^[33] The US highlighted its support for these countries’ regional policies, viewing them as a counterweight to Türkiye’s assertiveness and Russian–Chinese influence in the region (Tsardanidis 2019, 79; Tziampiris 2021, 14–5). Overall, the US–Greece–Türkiye triangle has shifted from an unstable balance that involved all three sides to a more symmetrical bilateral balance in which US policy was more closely aligned with Greece’s interests, while its relations with Türkiye remain tense and subject to multiple conditions.

US Strategic Balancing Between Türkiye and Greece: Applying a Cost–Benefit Framework

This section analyzes US foreign policy strategies toward Türkiye and Greece, highlighting key turning points by applying a cost–benefit calculation within the framework of the contested liberal international order. I examine how the United States has reshaped its strategic engagement in the region and at the same time deepened its defense cooperation with Greece in response to the increasing tensions mentioned above. In a sense, the analysis shows that the US balancing policy between Türkiye and Greece reflects a complex calculus shaped not only by material strategic factors, but also by strategic value, normative alignment – shared values and political system – and perceived geopolitical risks.

The S-400 missile defense crisis in particular shows how Türkiye’s growing challenges to the liberal system, revisionist stance, and strategic cooperation with Russia have imposed new costs on its relations with the US: it has strained alliance relations and created a security dilemma within NATO. Here, US decision-making has been characterized by punitive containment (punishing to prevent further escalation) when Türkiye’s actions posed systemic risks. This can be seen as a case of negative balancing (He 2022), with the US seeking to limit the influence of an increasingly unreliable partner. In contrast, the expansion of US–Greece defense cooperation reveals how normative coherence and geostrategic credibility have increased the value of another partner for the US.

Türkiye’s purchase of the S-400 weapons system was followed by the US imposing CAATSA sanctions and excluding Türkiye from the F-35 program (Zanotti and Thomas 2023),^[34] both of which demonstrate that for the US the high normative costs of Türkiye’s actions outweigh the geopolitical benefits so far. In other words, the US response to Türkiye’s purchase of the S-400, in the context of the sanctions it had imposed, was based on the calculation that the costs of non-response – such as exposing alliance incoherence and undermining the NATO defense system – would outweigh the benefits of continuing to view Türkiye as the established NATO member it once was. This calculation ultimately led to the aforementioned punitive actions. Although this policy came at the cost of alienating Ankara, US policymakers calculated that the strategic advantages of diversifying military cooperation in the region outweighed this.^[35] This reflects Snyder’s notion of abandonment risk (Snyder 1984, 467) – the US has distanced itself from Türkiye due to the increasing costs, while avoiding full entrapment in bilateral tensions.

In stark contrast to this punitive policy toward Türkiye, the US deepening ties with Greece reflects a positive cost–benefit balancing, reinforcing its position as a reliable ally which demonstrates normative alignment with the US. The main rationale for this construction was that cooperation with Greece offered a high-benefit, low-cost option in the wake of Türkiye’s departure from NATO norms. In short, expanding the MDCA and increasing the military infrastructure in certain areas, notably in places like Souda Bay and Alexandroupol, represents a cost-effective strategic enhancement for the United States.^[36] Moreover, Greece’s normative alignment with Western institutions and its stable, democratic and status quo governance have made it a reliable and low-risk but highly beneficial partner in an unstable region.

In moderate rather than high-tension situations (in terms of their impact on the US), such as Türkiye’s recent rapprochement with Russia and China and its positioning against the US and Israel in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the approach appears to be more pragmatic. Accordingly, on the one hand, the US tends to maintain cooperation on core strategic issues, while on the other, it attempts to manage divergence in such intermediate situations. The US’ acceptance of Türkiye’s conditions for supporting Sweden and Finland’s NATO membership is an example of a compromise model, aimed at reaching a certain consensus within the alliance.^[37] According to Güvenç and Özel (2020) and Turan,^[38] these are examples in which the US–Türkiye relationship has shown signs of transactional accommodation, i.e., give-and-take arrangements or a deal-making approach (Table 1).

The balancing policies pursued by the US vis-à-vis the two countries reflect a logic of strategic redundancy, that is of maintaining multiple options for security. In this scheme, Greece is a reliable, normatively important, and supportive partner, while Türkiye is a high-value but increasingly unpredictable partner, managed in a framework in which its risks outweigh its benefits.^[39] The cost–benefit analysis suggests that the United States faces the challenge of how to balance its normative commitments with its geopolitical pragmatism in its relations with regional powers such as Türkiye, which has moved away from liberal norms. In contrast, partners like Greece offer both normative coherence and strategic benefits for the United States, making them relatively low-cost and high-benefit allies in an ideologically challenged international system. Analyzing US foreign policy through this dual lens shows how great powers reconstruct alliance strategies in response to structural and normative shifts. In general, the US strategy and overall approach toward these two countries has been dominated by a strategic pragmatist approach with Türkiye, with the preferred approach to Greece remaining normative alignment. Increasingly, different dimensions, such as regime type, political credibility, and reputational risk (risk of losing credibility), have been incorporated into US foreign policy strategic calculations, mirroring an ever-more fragmented alliance environment.

Conclusion

In his 2022 National Security Strategy, then US President Joe Biden argued that the world was on the threshold of a decisive decade characterized by competition between great powers, and that the strategies to be developed around this turning point would determine the future of the international system. In this multipolar environment of the new world order, Biden maintained, US leadership was needed not only at the regional but also at the global level. He pointed to Russia and China as the main countries creating this multipolarity and great power competition. According to him, the biggest threat to international order and stability came from these two authoritarian countries, and he underlined how they were quite willing to export their authoritarian and illiberal systems to other countries.^[40]

In this multipolar international system that Biden envisaged, the strategies that the US would implement at the regional level, and the allies it would acquire, played a crucial role. Especially in order to maintain its influence in the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as to prevent an increase in Russian and Chinese influence in these regions, the US has felt the need to pursue a new policy of balance and to define its allies accordingly.

The changing attitude of the US toward Türkiye and Greece goes beyond regional rebalancing: it reveals a crisis of the liberal order in the international system and shows how the great powers have been steering their alliance management in the face of middle powers increasingly departing from the previous consensus on liberal norms (broadly speaking). The US’ balancing strategies in the Eastern Mediterranean illustrate how great powers reacted to this development by rewarding those powers that conform to liberal norms with alliance-building, while protecting the illiberal ones from drifting away, but punishing them when necessary.

Analyzed through this framework, Türkiye, with its increasingly illiberal tendencies and revisionist regional approach, is in many respects a normative cost for the US, while at the same time maintaining strategic utility (airbases, geography, etc.). On the other hand, as the expansion of US–Greece defense cooperation suggests, Greece not only has strategic utility for the United States (military basing, norm compliance especially in NATO), but it also demonstrates normative alignment and political reliability, making it a low-risk, high-benefit alliance.

However, when formulating its positive and negative balancing policies toward Türkiye and Greece within the framework of all these cost–benefit trade-offs, it has become apparent that the Washington administration needs to be very careful, in its intra-alliance conflicts, not to force the antagonizing and antagonized party, in this case Türkiye, further out of the system. In this case, applying containment measures would risk further alienating the already fragmented international system, and thus be counterproductive. States like Türkiye could shift even further away from the ideologically liberal camp. It is for this reason that the US has adopted a strategic pragmatic approach.

Through the lens of Kai He’s framework, applied in this article, the US’ behavior has shown, on the one hand, negative balancing through containment and risk management of revisionist middle powers with illiberal tendencies, such as Türkiye. On the other hand, it has shown positive balancing through the expansion of strategic partnerships with normatively compliant countries, such as Greece. As challenges to the liberal international system have mounted, the United States has placed greater emphasis on the normative coherence of its alliances in addition to their geostrategic utility.

This study uses the dynamic and negative balancing model to explain the changes in the US policy of balance regarding its trilateral relationship with both Greece and Türkiye. It argues that the evolution of the international system from unipolar to multipolar, which saw the group of leading players expand to include no longer just the US, but especially also China and Russia, pushed the US to apply the dynamic balancing model. Greece and Türkiye are proof that such a policy model has been put into practice. For the US, Greece has turned out to be the most likely and strongest candidate to fill the vacuum created in the region by Türkiye’s rapprochement with China and Russia, and its simultaneous distancing from the US. The direction this policy of negative balance will take will depend on how both Greece and Türkiye pursue their own policy vis-à-vis the three states. China and Russia are perceived by the US as a threat to the order and stability of the international system; this is something that both Türkiye and Greece are well aware of.