Cassirer’s path to the “symbolic animal”

The English translation of Jean Lassègue’s book represents a further confirmation of the internationalization of the study of Cassirer’s philosophy. In a context of renewed interest, Lassègue’s study stands out for specific innovative features that merit a comprehensive examination.

As the title of the monograph expresses, its topic is the turn operated in Cassirer’s philosophy. At the core of this turn stands a modification in the Kantian conception of transcendental philosophy. Rather than an inquiry into the subjective conditions of knowledge, Cassirer’s philosphy adopts a completely semiotic point of view. Thus, Cassirer’s mature project is articulated as an analysis of the multifaceted dimensions of symbolization. The orientation towards the object of knowledge leaves its place to an “inquiry regarding sense, meaning and the symbol” (p. viii). Through this modification, moreover, the primary focus on scientific knowledge is replaced by a study of diverse modalities of objectification displayed in human culture. In particular, the originality of Lassègue’s approach comes from his elaboration of a unique conceptual apparatus. This hermeneutical framework allows the author to place the problem of semiotic mediation in the foreground, producing an innovate reading of Cassirer’s works.

The structure of the book corresponds to the two elements that the author seeks to compare. Thus, the first part of the book deals with the foundations of Cassirer’s epistemology, whereas the second part focuses on semiotics. The interpretation of semiotic mediation is subservient to conclusions derived from the analysis of Cassirer’s epistemological theory. In this sense, Lassègue’s reconstructive method is developmental, it unfolds a “perspective which would enable to account for its [Cassirer’s project] evolution without seeing contradictions” (p. xi).

As for the first part, the one devoted to Cassirer’s early epistemological doctrine, its objective is to present Cassirer’s original take on the transcendental program. Although, as is frequently asserted, Cassirer belongs to the neo-Kantian tradition, the specific context in which his reflection is inserted demands fundamental modifications of the basic assumptions of this tradition (Luft 2015: 18). As Lassègue explains, Cassirer was a privileged witness of the paradigm shift in nineteenth-century science. Eventually, he came to recognize that any attempt to philosophize about scientific knowledge has to deal with the emergence of two groundbreaking scientific theories: Felix Klein’s Erlangen Program in geometry and Albert Einstein’s theory of relativity in physics. A basic commitment of Cassirer’s philosophical teachers, Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp, was that philosophy must take as its starting point the so-called fact of science (Cohen 2015 [1883]: 103–104; Natorp 2015 [1912]: 182). However, due to the aforementioned scientific revolution, it became necessary for Cassirer “to understand by “construction of meaning” not the conditions of objectivity or of the “fact of science,” but to see in variations of meaning the conditions of its possible invariance through time” (p. 6). The fact of science must be understood considering its historicity. In addition, these revolutions show a coexistence of multiple and equally valid ways of constituting the object of knowledge. In this sense, Lassègue affirms it is not necessary to resort to Aby Warburg’s intervention to explain Cassirer’s characteristic broadening of scope in the 1920s (p. 6). The very situation of the natural sciences offered sufficient grounds for a revision of his neo-Kantian heritage.

Along with the reconstruction of the scientific context of Cassirer’s philosophical theory, this first part of Lassègue’s book includes a reconstruction of Cassirer’s own view on the development of modern science from Galileo onwards. Cassirer’s account resorts to the contrast between two modes of scientific concept formation to explain the passage from ancient science to modern science, highlighting the contrast between a science dependent on the concept of substance and another that interprets scientific concepts in terms of functions. In fact, this specific thesis does not play a minor role in Lassègue’s argument, since the elaboration of the concept of symbol is inscribed in this history of modern sciences. Lassègue emphasizes that this is the story anti-Aristotelianism. Nevertheless, despite Cassirer’s general orientation towards the natural sciences, when we turn to Renaissance thought the departure from Aristotelianism comes from the study of signs. Although the concept of function will acquire a distinctive epistemological role, the effect of the functional viewpoint was felt only during the seventeenth century (p. 31). Its origins, however, are to be found not in mathematics but in the study of language, that is, in the scrutiny of concepts like natural sentiment or humor. For it is in these concepts that we find an incipient recognition of “the active role played by the subject in the elaboration of new styles that institute new relationships to reality” (p. 34). Here, we must emphasize the word “active.”

The Renaissance is the first station in the modern development of the concept of symbol. The subsequent station in this history is represented by the science of Galileo and Descartes (p. 45). For them, the symbolic represents the mathematical space in which they study the relationships that ideal objects have with each other, and the laws of this relationship. On the other hand, although there are important indications that for Descartes the creative character of language is a fundamental property of the human being, Lassègue points out that “during the Classical period and particularly with Descartes, allusions to the role of language in the development of knowledge are rare” (p. 53).

For a different assessment of the role of signs within knowledge we will have to wait for Leibniz’s reflections which were informed by antecedents in the Renaissance. For Leibniz, “knowledge through signs becomes, thereby, not a resembling while passive image of reality, but rather an effective participation in its constitution” (p. 57, italics in the original). Thus, in symbolic knowledge, “reality … manifests directly within knowledge as order and connection between elements arranged in series” (p. 58, italics in the original). This ordering makes certainty possible by guaranteeing the connection between signs in the process of knowledge. A further sense of symbolic is associated with Goethe’s morphology (p. 87). Symbolic knowledge reveals that knowing does not represent a mere copying of reality. As a counterpart, concept formation is no longer understood in terms of a process of abstraction. True concepts are no longer representations by common notes. They are functional rules for the production of the object of knowledge according to a serial principle. This characterization of the scientific concept as a function concept is the central historiographical lesson as well as the most important systematic performance of Cassirer’s philosophy. On the other hand, we can see in this story the gestation of an idea that has become a foundation of contemporary thought, namely, that human thought is essentially symbolic.^[1]

The second part of Lassègue’s monograph is entitled “Semiotics.” As in the previous part, the first chapter discusses Cassirer’s “semiotic situation.” The problem of symbolism in science is a model for understanding the general discussion of symbolic mediation. As mentioned, the project of a transcendental philosophy is broadened by considering various modes of objectification. These modes present an irreducible plurality and they develop themselves according to their own dynamics. Therefore, a philosophy that accounts for this plurality becomes a philosophy of culture in a broad sense. As Lassègue explains, it deals with these plurality of modes by addressing “their dissemination, their endurance, and their sometimes hidden links” (p. 91). It is in this context that the turn in Lassegue’s conceptual framework is clearly delineated.

Lassègue articulates his reading through two distinctions that are not explicit in Cassirer’s work (p. 99). The first of them is the distinction between signification and sense. Here, the author employs these widely used concepts in an idiosyncratic way. He claims that, even though Cassirer presents sense and signification as interchangeable terms, the introduction of a distinction is necessary (p. 98). Accordingly, Lassègue presents his distinction in the following way: “There is therefore a signification that is internal to a particular symbolic form, a signification which is requited through the usage of a particular symbolism and a sense, more diffuse, which stems from what is exterior to the form in question” (p. 98). Thus, the plane of signification corresponds to the internal development of forms. From the point of view of signification, each form presents a unique normative ideal for the meaningful constitution of reality. Each symbolic form articulates reality according to its own principles of legislation. On the contrary, sense refers to an external dimension, that is, to the relationship of forms between themselves. As normative ideals, each form operates as if it is the only possible modality for articulating reality. Forms overlap opening the possibility for sense, that is, the reciprocal action or mutual modification between forms. These actions produce confluences and altercation. Thus, Lassègue counterposes signification and sense in terms of immanence and horizon of forms (p. 109). Moreover, in view of this duality between immanence and horizon, we come to understand that the dynamics of forms present both an internal and an external dimension.

The other distinction Lassègue introduces is between positive and productive knowledge. Positive knowledge pertains to science and involves the progressive recognition of the fact that knowledge is mediated through signs. Thus, the history of science is the history of the gradual “divorce from immediateness” (p. 100). Productive knowledge belongs to philosophy since it is through philosophy “that it is possible to distinguish different modes of knowledge in function of the type of attitude which they develop with respect to signs” (p. 101). This is a knowledge of the plurality of forms, their conflict, and the idealistic aspiration for the harmony that puts an end to such conflict. In this way, the author tries to grasp the idea according to which philosophy is not a symbolic form. Philosophy is rather the consciousness of symbolic forms as modes of constituting reality, i.e., as “instituting powers that enable different modes of meaning production by inducing distinct semiotic perspectives on a symbolic material” (p. 103).

Chapter four discusses in detail the problematic concept of symbolic form. Cassirer does not offer a strict definition of this concept. Lassègue presents symbolic forms as “instituting powers that enable different modes of meaning production by inducing distinct semiotic perspectives on a symbolic material” (p. 103). In the previous chapters, the problem of the development of science allowed Lassègue to advance an explanation of the transformation of transcendental philosophy in terms of semiotic mediation. It is only through the elaboration of symbolic forms in terms of sense and meaning that the transformation of transcendental philosophy is brought to completion. This move to semiotics represents the abandonment of the concept of transcendental subjectivity.

There is yet another original feature of Lassègue’s interpretation. Lassègue distinguishes between sense and signification to explain the autonomy of forms, the inherent conflict between symbolic forms, and the problem of their teleological structure. Lassègue’s distinctions allow us to account for the dynamism of forms, one of the most complex themes in Cassirer’s philosophy in general. Although Cassirer, on more than one occasion, expressed this teleology in terms of a self-knowledge of the spirit. Lassègue prefers to follow a different line of reasoning: this self-knowledge should not be interpreted as a progress in the self-revelation of transcendental subjectivity, but as “the exploration of semiotic modes of expression such as they manifest in symbolic forms conceived above all as a public material” (p. 111). Symbolic forms are considered modes of human sociality, directions or perspectives through which human beings produce realms of signification. These directions are individuated according to a specific relation of three semiotic operators: expression, evocation, and objectification. Lassègue’s point here is to disarticulate the biunivocal connection between transcategorial operations and symbolic forms as it could have been stated in the original project of the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. There, each symbolic form (language, myth and science) would be determined by the exclusive predominance of one of those forms of semiosis. On the contrary, each of the symbolic forms should be characterized by a specific articulation between the three semiotic operators.

The last chapter of the book is devoted to the detailed reconstruction of how each symbolic form presents a concrete and unique articulation of the aforementioned operators of semiosis. As noted, Lassègue denies the possibility of a neat classification that subsumes each symbolic form under a specific semiotic operation. He claims, for instance, that “although the power of Expression is usually recognized in Myth, Ritual and Language only, it is also at work in Science and in Technology which are both nurtured by symbolic pregnances in a more concealed way” (p. 121). A detailed analysis of the meticulous reconstruction offered by Lassègue exceeds the scope of this review. But the central characteristics of each of these operators can be briefly appraised.

The first operator is called expression. This operator is related with what Cassirer calls symbolic pregnancy. It is a peculiar “on a blending of idiomatic meaning and performativity” (p. 121). This concept of pregnancy represents a rejection of empiricist and intellectualist interpretations of perception. Each perception is already informed. The central characteristic of the expressive instance is then the absence of scission between subject and object, between subjective interpretation and sensible material, or between activity and meaning. As such, the expressive function is a basic mode of objectification prior to the articulation of the plurality of symbolic forms. As Lassègue explains, these multiplicity of forms stems from different modes of relation towards primitive expressivity (p. 127).

The second operator is called evocation. As Lassègue explains, the role of evocation is directly connected with sense, i.e., with the horizon open to symbolic forms. While the diversification of modes of expression accounts for the cohesiveness of forms, evocation depicts their capability of going beyond the level of idiomatic expression. Lassègue calls evocation an operation of “propagation” (p. 156). Evocation represents the possibility of an expansion of the expressivity of symbolic pregnance to different fields. It accounts for the possibility of symbolic forms to interact between each other.

The last semiotic operator is called objectification. Objectification represents the recognition of the purely arbitrary dimension of signs (p. 174). In the different symbolic forms, this operator presents itself in a paradoxical manner. Although arbitrary, a semiotic construction should not be interpreted as the result of a construction by the subject but as objective in nature. The association of science with the operator of objectification stems precisely from the fact that in modern science this character proper to symbolism is fully recognized. But, as the author shows, there are also levels of objectification present in each of the other symbolic forms.

Overall, Lassègue’s book presents an instructive approach to Cassirer’s transformation. He convincingly argues that the philosophy of symbolic forms represents a transformation of transcendental philosophy demanded by transcendental philosophy itself. In addition, the author has no qualms about entering into complex and contentious arguments. Here, the reader will find a profound philosophical treatment of questions that have vexed the interpreters of Cassirer’s work.

The first of these is the place of language in the system of symbolic forms. Lassègue argues not only that language, in Cassirer’s specific sense, cannot officiate as a fundamental symbolic form but also shows why we may be tempted to sustain this reading hypothesis. The second issue concerns the opposition between a transcendental subjectivity and a semiotic approach which emphasizes the social dimension in the constitution of reality. With respect to this problem, the teleological dimension in the progression of symbolic forms remains to be considered. In fact the author considers that here we find one of the consequences of Cassirer’s transformation, i.e., from a teleological position to a position that emphasizes the autonomy and plurality of forms. This aspect is important for the author insofar as it justifies certain political commitments attributed to Cassirer: “Cassirer’s philosophy can thus make it possible to renew the idea of an intellectual cosmopolitanism whose limits end where the problem of cultural variability as the road to universality ceases to constitute the very subject of social life” (p. 186). However, the idea of a teleology of culture culminating in science is never abandoned by Cassirer himself. For only science reveals the true freedom of the spirit as the creative power behind the constitution of the world.

Leaving behind this contentious point, Lassègue’s book presents a philosophical challenge to the reader by opening up various aspects of Cassirer’s theory that more often than not remain implicit or hidden. The book explains clearly and distinctly how and why Cassirer’s philosophy is articulated as a philosophy of symbolic forms. In this sense, I believe that its reading will be useful both to those interested in understanding Cassirer’s philosophical work and to those who are interested in understanding the fact that the human being must be considered as a symbolic animal.