Abstract
This paper presents a simple theoretical model to analyze the relationship between hate groups and hate crimes. This paper focuses on two important roles of hate groups; as providers of membership benefits for group members and as a coordination device for leadership. This paper shows that this interaction implies the possibility of multiple equilibria of the crime rate. This result explains why hate crimes and extreme criminal activities vary across communities and over time, and why a social shock such as 9/11 resulted in a rapid increase of hate crimes. Moreover, if hate groups work as coordination devices, the existence of hate groups may increase hate crimes. This result supports recent empirical results analyzing relationships between hate groups and hate crimes.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the editor-in-chief Francesco Parisi, an anonymous referee and Koichi Suga for their helpful comments and suggestions.
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© 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Articles
- On Plaintiff Preferences Regarding Methods of Compensating Lawyers
- Product Market Competition’s Effect on Earnings Management When Audit Quality Is Endogenous: Theory and Evidence
- A Rule of Reason Approach for Passive Minority Interests within the European Union
- Rawls, Taxation and Calabresi & Melamed’s Rules
- Reducing Ethical Misconduct of Attorneys with Mandatory Ethics Training: A Dynamic Panel Approach
- The Effects of Hate Groups on Hate Crimes
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Articles
- On Plaintiff Preferences Regarding Methods of Compensating Lawyers
- Product Market Competition’s Effect on Earnings Management When Audit Quality Is Endogenous: Theory and Evidence
- A Rule of Reason Approach for Passive Minority Interests within the European Union
- Rawls, Taxation and Calabresi & Melamed’s Rules
- Reducing Ethical Misconduct of Attorneys with Mandatory Ethics Training: A Dynamic Panel Approach
- The Effects of Hate Groups on Hate Crimes