The results obtained rely on Deviations GMM estimators that remove fixed effects, and identification comes from changes in training requirements within jurisdictions. Specifically, changes in MCLE requirements in ethics training ocurred 25 times within 14 individual jurisdictions, and changes in minimum MPRE score occred 6 times. Given that there are few changes in MPRE requirements within the data, the absence of a significant effect may be a consequence of an absence of power and other reasons as discussed in Subsection 2.4. Of the 25 instances in which MCLE requirements were changed, 8 occurred within jurisdictions that changed requirements only once throughout the duration of the panel. Mean charges before and after the single change are reported in Table 5.

In five of the eight jurisdictions that changed the number of required MCLE hours in ethics training, mean charges before and after the change move in expected directions (see Figure 1). For instance, an increase in 0.67 hours in Delaware led to a reduction of 5.86 charges. The three jurisdictions that move in unexpected directions (Missouri, Montana, and New Jersey) might be explained by other effects that the regression analysis attempts to address. In particular, all regression results show a positive and significant effect of number of attorneys on charges. While Alaskan charges of attorney misconduct may have digressed slightly following an increase in MCLE credit-hours, the number of Alaskan attorneys increased. This same pattern is exhibited by Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, Utah, and Wyoming.

Figure 1:

Development in the Logarithm of Charges by States with Changed MCLE Requirements (Group 0) and with Unchanged MCLE Requirements (mean) (Group 1).

There are 17 instances which the number of credit hours changes more than once within a jursidiction over the panel period (Table 6). Eleven of the changes in credit hours move charges in the expected direction, four move in an unexpected direction, and one does not change (Mississippi 2012). Illinois 2012 is unobserved because data is unavailable.

Sample MCLE Ethics Course Descriptions

Sample MPRE Questions

1. An attorney represented the wife in an acrimonious divorce proceeding involving issues of property division and child custody. After one day of trial, the husband, through his lawyer, made a settlement offer. The proposed settlement required that the wife’s attorney agree not to represent the wife in any subsequent proceeding, brought by either party, to modify or enforce the provisions of the decree. The wife wanted to accept the offer, and her attorney reasonably believed that it was in the wife’s best interest to do so because the settlement offer was better than any potential award to the wife resulting from the case going to judgment. Consequently, the attorney recommended to the wife that she accept the offer. Was it proper for the wife’s attorney to recommend that the wife accept the settlement offer?

(A) No, because the attorney did not obtain the wife’s informed consent to the conflict of interest created by the proposed settlement.

(B) No, because the proposed settlement restricted the attorney’s right to represent the wife in the future.

(C) Yes, because the restriction on the attorney was limited to subsequent proceedings in the same matter.

(D) Yes, because the attorney reasonably believed that it was in the wife’s best interest to accept the proposed settlement.

2. An experienced oil and gas developer asked an attorney to represent him in a suit to establish the developer’s ownership of certain oil and gas royalties. The developer did not have available the necessary funds to pay the attorney’s reasonable hourly rate for undertaking the case and proposed instead that, if he prevailed in the lawsuit, he would pay the attorney 20 % of the first year’s royalties recovered in the suit. Twenty percent of the first year’s royalties would likely exceed the amount that the attorney would have received from charging his regular hourly rate. The attorney accepted the proposal. Is the attorney subject to discipline?

(A) Yes, because the agreement gave the attorney a proprietary interest in the developer’s cause of action.

(B) Yes, because the fee was likely to exceed the amount that the attorney would have received from charging his regular hourly rate.

(C) No, because the developer rather than the attorney proposed the fee arrangement.

(D) No, because the attorney may contract with the developer for a reasonable contingent fee.

3. An attorney represented a plaintiff in a civil suit against a defendant, who was also represented by a lawyer. In the course of developing the plaintiff’s case, the attorney discovered evidence that she reasonably believed showed that the defendant had committed a crime. The attorney felt that the defendant’s crime should be reported to local prosecutorial authorities. After full disclosure, the plaintiff consented to the attorney’s doing so. Without advising the defendant’s lawyer, the attorney informed the local prosecutor of her findings, but she sought no advantage in the civil suit from her actions. The defendant was subsequently indicted, tried, and acquitted of the offense. Was the attorney’s disclosure to prosecutorial authorities proper?

(A) Yes, because the attorney reasonably believed that the defendant had committed a crime.

(B) Yes, because the attorney was required to report unprivileged knowledge of criminal conduct.

(C) No, because the attorney did not know that the defendant had committed a crime.

(D) No, because the plaintiff’s civil suit against the defendant was still pending.