Abstract
This paper challenges the commonly held belief that the appeals process reduces the occurrence of legal errors. We show that, although the right to file an appeal or request adjudication offers an opportunity to correct mistakes made at trial, the final impact of the appeals process on the accuracy of judicial decisions is not always desirable because of its effects on the trial court decision-maker’s effort and on deterrence. In particular, we find that if (i) the trial court decision-maker is more concerned with legal errors than with her reputation, (ii) few potential offenders attribute high benefits to committing harmful acts and (iii) the additional effort exerted by the decision-maker has a stronger impact on wrongful acquittals than on wrongful convictions, then the implementation of an appeals process may spur a decision-maker to reduce her effort and may thus be detrimental to the quality of judicial output.
Appendix
Proof A.
The second-order condition for a maximum is:
As
with
Proof B.
Consider
Proof C.
The second-order condition for a maximum is:
A sufficient condition for the second-order condition to hold is:
The sufficient condition eq. (9) is more likely to hold if
Proof D.
According to the implicit function theorem,
If
Proof E.
[E] The second-order condition is:
with
Proof F.
According to the implicit function theorem,
which is negative when
Proof G.
The second-order condition is:
and a sufficient condition for it to hold is:
with
Proof H.
We use the implicit function theorem to analyze when
with
Acknowledgements
We are deeply indebted to Tim Friehe, Andrew Hansen, and Matteo Rizzolli for their helpful suggestions on some crucial issues. We also wish to thank the participants of the First International Meeting on Law and Economics in Nanterre and two anonymous referees who provided very helpful comments. We are also grateful to Hal Balderston for his feedback. This article was previously circulated as “Appeals Process, Judicial Errors, and Crime Deterrence".
References
Daughety, A.F., and Reinganum J.F.. 2000. “Appealing Judgments,” 31 RAND Journal of Economics 502–525.10.2307/2600998Suche in Google Scholar
Garoupa, N., and Rizzolli M.. 2012. “Wrongful Convictions Do Lower Deterrence,” 168 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 224–231.10.1628/093245612800933988Suche in Google Scholar
Holmstrom, B. 1982. “Moral Hazard in Teams,” 13 The Bell Journal of Economics 324–340.10.2307/3003457Suche in Google Scholar
Iossa, E., and Palumbo G.. 2007. “Information Provision and Monitoring of the Decision-Maker in the Presence of an Appeal Process,” 163 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 657–682.10.1628/093245607783242954Suche in Google Scholar
Lando, H. 2006. “Does Wrongful Conviction Lower Deterrence?” 35 Journal of Legal Studies 327–338.10.1086/501095Suche in Google Scholar
Lando, H. and Mungan M.C.. 2015. “The Effect of Type-1 Error on Deterrence,” FSU College of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 687, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2441733.http://ssrn.com/abstract=2441733Suche in Google Scholar
Levy, G. 2005. “Careerist Judges,” 36 RAND Journal of Economics 275–297.Suche in Google Scholar
Oytana, Y. 2014. “The Judicial Expert in a Two-Tier Hierarchy,” 170 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 537–570.10.1628/093245614X14017020626304Suche in Google Scholar
Png, I.P.L. 1986. “Optimal Subsidies and Damages in the Presence of Judicial Error,” 6 International Review of Law and Economics 101–105.10.1016/0144-8188(86)90042-6Suche in Google Scholar
Polinsky, A.M., and Shavell S.. 2007. “Public Enforcement of Law,” in A.M. Polinsky and S. Shavell, eds. Handbook of Law and Economics. Oxford, UK: Elsevier.10.2139/ssrn.901512Suche in Google Scholar
Posner, R.A. 1972. Economic Analysis of Law. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company.Suche in Google Scholar
Posner, R.A. 1973. “An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration,” 2 Journal of Legal Studies 399–448.10.1086/467503Suche in Google Scholar
Rizzolli, M. 2010. “Why Public Prosecutors Cannot Appeal Acquittals,” 1 Studi e Note di Economia 81–101.Suche in Google Scholar
Rizzolli, M. and Saraceno M.. 2013. “Better That Ten Guilty Persons Escape: Punishment Costs Explain the Standard of Evidence,” 155 Public Choice 395–411.10.1007/s11127-011-9867-ySuche in Google Scholar
Shavell, S. 1995. “The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction,” 24 Journal of Legal Studies 379–426.10.1086/467963Suche in Google Scholar
Shavell, S. 2006. “The Appeals Process and Adjudicator Incentives,” 35 Journal of Legal Studies 1–29.10.1086/500095Suche in Google Scholar
© 2018 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- The Tragedy of the Uncommons
- Mere Preparation
- Binding and Non-Binding Contracts: A Theoretical Appraisal
- How Status Seeking may Prevent Coasean Bargaining
- Will Procurement Officials be Biased to Disregard Procurement Rules in Favor of a Low-priced, Albeit Defective, Bid?
- Does the Appeals Process Reduce the Occurrence of Legal Errors?
- Choosing Whether to Comply with a General Duty or with a Specification Standard
Artikel in diesem Heft
- The Tragedy of the Uncommons
- Mere Preparation
- Binding and Non-Binding Contracts: A Theoretical Appraisal
- How Status Seeking may Prevent Coasean Bargaining
- Will Procurement Officials be Biased to Disregard Procurement Rules in Favor of a Low-priced, Albeit Defective, Bid?
- Does the Appeals Process Reduce the Occurrence of Legal Errors?
- Choosing Whether to Comply with a General Duty or with a Specification Standard