Startseite Does the Appeals Process Reduce the Occurrence of Legal Errors?
Artikel
Lizenziert
Nicht lizenziert Erfordert eine Authentifizierung

Does the Appeals Process Reduce the Occurrence of Legal Errors?

  • Bertrand Chopard , Edwige Fain und Ludivine Roussey EMAIL logo
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 24. August 2017
Veröffentlichen auch Sie bei De Gruyter Brill

Abstract

This paper challenges the commonly held belief that the appeals process reduces the occurrence of legal errors. We show that, although the right to file an appeal or request adjudication offers an opportunity to correct mistakes made at trial, the final impact of the appeals process on the accuracy of judicial decisions is not always desirable because of its effects on the trial court decision-maker’s effort and on deterrence. In particular, we find that if (i) the trial court decision-maker is more concerned with legal errors than with her reputation, (ii) few potential offenders attribute high benefits to committing harmful acts and (iii) the additional effort exerted by the decision-maker has a stronger impact on wrongful acquittals than on wrongful convictions, then the implementation of an appeals process may spur a decision-maker to reduce her effort and may thus be detrimental to the quality of judicial output.

JEL Classification: K14; K4

Appendix

Proof A.

The second-order condition for a maximum is:

d2u(e)de2=c(e)((1q)σh+qz)d2(1F(b˜(e)))de2(α(e)β(e)+D((1q)σh+qz))+2d(1F(b˜(e)))de(α(e)β(e))+(1F(b˜(e)))α(e)+F(b˜(e))β(e)<0.

As c(e)>0, ((1q)σh+qz)>0, and (1F(b˜(e)))α(e)+F(b˜(e))β(e)>0, a sufficient condition for the second-order condition to hold is:

d2(1F(b˜(e)))de2(α(e)β(e)+D((1q)σh+qz))+2d(1F(b˜(e)))de(α(e)β(e))>0,

with d2(1F(b˜(e)))de2=f(b˜(e))p2s2(1q)2(α(e)+β(e))2+f(b˜(e))ps(1q)(α"(e)+β"(e)) (which is positive when f(b˜(e)) is negative or zero). ■

Proof B.

Consider α(e)=β(e)=ae, 0<a<e, and a cost of effort c(e)=ce.\ The private benefit of crime is uniformly distributed on [0,B] ,\ and σ=z=0. Using eq.(1), e=2sDa(1q)Bc. Next, by replacing e in eq. (4), we derive eq. (4) with respect to q.\ This derivative is positive if asD>8(1q)Bc, or BD.

Proof C.

The second-order condition for a maximum is:

(8)d2uC(e)de2=c(e)d2(1F(b˜(e)))de2((1q)σhα+qzα(e)(1q)σhβ+qzβ(e)+D)+2d(1F(b˜(e)))de((1q)σhα+qzα(e)(1q)σhβ+qzβ(e))+(1F(b˜(e)))(1q)σhα+qzα(e)+F(b˜(e))(1q)σhβ+qzβ(e)<0.

A sufficient condition for the second-order condition to hold is:

(9)d2(1F(b˜(e)))de2((1q)σhα+qzα(e)(1q)σhβ+qzβ(e)+D)+2d(1F(b˜(e)))de((1q)σhα+qzα(e)(1q)σhβ+qzβ(e))>0.

The sufficient condition eq. (9) is more likely to hold if d2(1F(b˜(e)))de2 is positive, that is, if f(b˜(e)) is negative or zero and if α(e)>β(e). However, even if these two conditions hold, the sufficient condition may fail if hβ is sufficiently large compared to hα. Thus, whether the second-order condition eq. (8) holds now depends not only on the sign and magnitude of the term α(e)β(e) and the shape of distribution f(.) but also on the magnitude of the cost difference for the two types of errors (hβhα).

Proof D.

According to the implicit function theorem, deCdq=d2uC(e,q)dedqd2uC(e,q)de2, where d2uC(e,q)dedq and d2uC(e,q)de2 are calculated such that duC(e,q)de=0. According to the analysis of the second-order condition (8), d2uC(e,q)de2 is more likely to be negative if f(b˜(e)) is negative or zero, α(e) is higher than β(e) and hβ is not too large compared to hα. Moreover, we have:

(10)d2uC(e,q)dedq=σhαz(1F(b˜(e)))α(e)+σhβzF(b˜(e))β(e)
+d1Fb˜(e)deσhαzα(e)σhβzβ(e)d1Fb˜(e)dq(1q)σhα+qzα(e)(1q)σhβ+qzβ(e)d2(1F(b˜(e)))dedq(1q)σhα+qzα(e)(1q)σhβ+qzβ(e)+D.

If σhα>z and σhβ>z, the first and second terms on the right-hand side of eq. (10) are negative. The third term is negative unless hβ is sufficiently large compared to hα. The fourth term is negative if α(e)>β(e), unless hβ is sufficiently large compared to hα. The last term is negative if f(b˜(e)) is negative or zero, unless hβ is sufficiently large compared to hα.

Proof E.

[E] The second-order condition is:

(11)d2uI(e)de2=c(e)((1q)σh+qz)d2(1F(b˜I(e)))de2α(e)+D+2d(1F(b˜I(e)))deα(e)+(1F(b˜I(e)))α(e)+γ(e)<0,

with d2(1F(b˜I(e)))de2=f(b˜I(e))p2s2(1q)2(α(e))2+f(b˜I(e))ps(1q)α"(e) (which is positive when f(b˜I(e)) is negative or zero). Thus, a sufficient condition for equation eq. (11) to hold is that f(b˜I(e)) is negative or zero.

Proof F.

According to the implicit function theorem, deIdq=d2uI(e,q)dedqd2uI(e,q)de2, where d2uI(e,q)dedq and d2uI(e,q)de2 are calculated such that duI(e,q)de=0. According to the analysis of the second-order condition (11), d2uI(e,q)de2 is negative. Moreover, we have:

d2uI(e,q)dedq=σhzd1Fb˜I(e)deα(e)+D+(1F(b˜I(e)))α(e)+γ(e)(1q)σh+qzd1Fb˜I(e)dqα(e)+d2(1F(b˜I(e)))dedqα(e)+D,

which is negative when σh>z and f(b˜I(e))0 (recall that f(b˜I(e)) is more likely to be negative when the second-order condition holds). Consequently, deIdq is negative (the trial court decision-maker free rides on the quality control function of the appeals process) when she is more concerned with legal errors than with her reputation and few individuals attribute high benefits to committing illegal acts.

Proof G.

The second-order condition is:

(12)d2uDJ(e)de2=c(e)d2(1F(b˜DJ(e)))de2(σhα(e)((1q)σh+qz)β(e)+D)+2d(1F(b˜DJ(e)))de(σhα(e)((1q)σh+qz)β(e))+σh(1F(b˜DJ(e)))α(e)+((1q)σh+qz)F(b˜DJ(e))β(e)<0,

and a sufficient condition for it to hold is:

(13)d2(1F(b˜DJ(e)))de2(σhα(e)((1q)σh+qz)β(e)+D)+2d(1F(b˜DJ(e)))de(σhα(e)((1q)σh+qz)β(e))>0,

with d2(1F(b˜DJ(e)))de2=f(b˜DJ(e))p2s2(α(e)+(1q)β(e))2+f(b˜DJ(e))ps(α"(e)+(1q)β"(e)) (which is positive when f(b˜DJ(e)) is negative or zero). The first term on the left-hand side of sufficient condition (13) is positive if f(b˜DJ(e)) is negative or zero, unless z is sufficiently large compared to σh (i.e., unless the reputation cost associated with a reversal is sufficiently high). The second term is positive if α(e)>β(e) , unless z is sufficiently large compared to σh. If f(b˜DJ(e)) is negative or zero, α(e) is higher than β(e) and σh>z, then sufficient condition (13) holds.

Proof H.

We use the implicit function theorem to analyze when deDJdq is likely to be negative, that is, when the trial court decision-maker may free ride on the quality control function of an appeals process. According to the implicit function theorem, deDJdq=d2uDJ(e,q)dedqd2uDJ(e,q)de2, where d2uDJ(e,q)dedq and d2uDJ(e,q)de2 are also calculated such that duDJ(e,q)de=0. According to the analysis of second-order condition (12), d2uDJ(e,q)de2 is more likely to be negative if f(b˜DJ(e)) is negative or zero, α(e) is higher than β(e) and σh>z. Moreover, we have:

(14)d2uDJ(e,q)dedq=σhzF(b˜DJ(e))β(e)d1Fb˜DJ(e)dqσhα(e)
(1q)σh+qzβ(e)d2(1F(b˜DJ(e)))dedqσhα(e)(1q)σh+qzβ(e)+Dσhzd1Fb˜DJ(e)deβ(e),

with d1Fb˜DJ(e)dq<0 and d2(1F(b˜DJ(e)))dedq>0 if f(b˜DJ(e)) is negative of zero. Thus, d2uDJ(e,q)dedq is more likely to be negative when f(b˜DJ(e)) is negative or zero and when α(e)>β(e), which is consistent with the second-order condition. Moreover, when σh>z, the second-order condition is also more likely to hold, and the first three terms on the right-hand side of eq. (14) are more likely to be negative. However, the last term on the right-hand side of eq. (14) is more likely to be positive.

Acknowledgements

We are deeply indebted to Tim Friehe, Andrew Hansen, and Matteo Rizzolli for their helpful suggestions on some crucial issues. We also wish to thank the participants of the First International Meeting on Law and Economics in Nanterre and two anonymous referees who provided very helpful comments. We are also grateful to Hal Balderston for his feedback. This article was previously circulated as “Appeals Process, Judicial Errors, and Crime Deterrence".

References

Daughety, A.F., and Reinganum J.F.. 2000. “Appealing Judgments,” 31 RAND Journal of Economics 502–525.10.2307/2600998Suche in Google Scholar

Garoupa, N., and Rizzolli M.. 2012. “Wrongful Convictions Do Lower Deterrence,” 168 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 224–231.10.1628/093245612800933988Suche in Google Scholar

Holmstrom, B. 1982. “Moral Hazard in Teams,” 13 The Bell Journal of Economics 324–340.10.2307/3003457Suche in Google Scholar

Iossa, E., and Palumbo G.. 2007. “Information Provision and Monitoring of the Decision-Maker in the Presence of an Appeal Process,” 163 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 657–682.10.1628/093245607783242954Suche in Google Scholar

Lando, H. 2006. “Does Wrongful Conviction Lower Deterrence?” 35 Journal of Legal Studies 327–338.10.1086/501095Suche in Google Scholar

Lando, H. and Mungan M.C.. 2015. “The Effect of Type-1 Error on Deterrence,” FSU College of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 687, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2441733.http://ssrn.com/abstract=2441733Suche in Google Scholar

Levy, G. 2005. “Careerist Judges,” 36 RAND Journal of Economics 275–297.Suche in Google Scholar

Oytana, Y. 2014. “The Judicial Expert in a Two-Tier Hierarchy,” 170 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 537–570.10.1628/093245614X14017020626304Suche in Google Scholar

Png, I.P.L. 1986. “Optimal Subsidies and Damages in the Presence of Judicial Error,” 6 International Review of Law and Economics 101–105.10.1016/0144-8188(86)90042-6Suche in Google Scholar

Polinsky, A.M., and Shavell S.. 2007. “Public Enforcement of Law,” in A.M. Polinsky and S. Shavell, eds. Handbook of Law and Economics. Oxford, UK: Elsevier.10.2139/ssrn.901512Suche in Google Scholar

Posner, R.A. 1972. Economic Analysis of Law. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company.Suche in Google Scholar

Posner, R.A. 1973. “An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration,” 2 Journal of Legal Studies 399–448.10.1086/467503Suche in Google Scholar

Rizzolli, M. 2010. “Why Public Prosecutors Cannot Appeal Acquittals,” 1 Studi e Note di Economia 81–101.Suche in Google Scholar

Rizzolli, M. and Saraceno M.. 2013. “Better That Ten Guilty Persons Escape: Punishment Costs Explain the Standard of Evidence,” 155 Public Choice 395–411.10.1007/s11127-011-9867-ySuche in Google Scholar

Shavell, S. 1995. “The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction,” 24 Journal of Legal Studies 379–426.10.1086/467963Suche in Google Scholar

Shavell, S. 2006. “The Appeals Process and Adjudicator Incentives,” 35 Journal of Legal Studies 1–29.10.1086/500095Suche in Google Scholar

Published Online: 2017-08-24

© 2018 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

Heruntergeladen am 19.11.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/rle-2014-0038/pdf?lang=de
Button zum nach oben scrollen