Abstract
Acts that are merely in preparation for the commission of a crime are not punished in many jurisdictions. This article provides a wrongful-imprisonment-cost-minimization based justification for this practice. It highlights that conceiving of sufficient proximity based on the trade-off between error-costs and deterrence-benefits may be a more useful alternative to conceptions that rely on physical or temporal proximity to define merely preparatory acts.
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Articles in the same Issue
- The Tragedy of the Uncommons
- Mere Preparation
- Binding and Non-Binding Contracts: A Theoretical Appraisal
- How Status Seeking may Prevent Coasean Bargaining
- Will Procurement Officials be Biased to Disregard Procurement Rules in Favor of a Low-priced, Albeit Defective, Bid?
- Does the Appeals Process Reduce the Occurrence of Legal Errors?
- Choosing Whether to Comply with a General Duty or with a Specification Standard
Articles in the same Issue
- The Tragedy of the Uncommons
- Mere Preparation
- Binding and Non-Binding Contracts: A Theoretical Appraisal
- How Status Seeking may Prevent Coasean Bargaining
- Will Procurement Officials be Biased to Disregard Procurement Rules in Favor of a Low-priced, Albeit Defective, Bid?
- Does the Appeals Process Reduce the Occurrence of Legal Errors?
- Choosing Whether to Comply with a General Duty or with a Specification Standard