Abstract
We develop and discuss a new institutional concept, “the tragedy of the uncommons,” to describe the inefficient use of resources that are both non-substitutable and transitory. This situation is not captured by the tragedy of the commons/anti-commons literature or other theories. We highlight the crucial and under-appreciated assumptions about value over time of the tragedy of the commons and anticommons. We also introduce the concepts of “under” and “over-ownership” to the bundle of rights theory of property clarifying weaknesses in the literature to help better understand how institutions can yield efficient resource preservation.
Acknowledgments
The authors acknowledge helpful comments from Bruce Benson, Steven Callander, and participants at the Association for Private Enterprise Education Annual Conference. All remaining errors are their own.
References
Anderson, T.L., and P. Hill. 1975. “The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West,” 18(1) Journal of Law and Economics 163–179.10.1086/466809Suche in Google Scholar
Anderson, T.L., and P. Hill. 1990. “The Race for Property Rights,” 33(1) Journal of Law and Economics 177–197.10.1086/467203Suche in Google Scholar
Anderson, T.L., and P. Hill. 2004. The Not so Wild, Wild West: Property Rights on the Frontier. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.10.1515/9781503624306Suche in Google Scholar
Andreoni, J. 1995. “Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?,” 85(4) American Economic Review 891–904.Suche in Google Scholar
Barzel, Y. 1997. Economic Analysis of Property Rights. New York: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511609398Suche in Google Scholar
Bergstrom, T., L. Blume, and H. Varian. 1986. “On the Private Provision of Public Goods,” 29 Journal of Public Economics 25–49.10.1016/0047-2727(86)90024-1Suche in Google Scholar
Brown, M. 2004. “Can the past and the Future Coexist?,” 8(3) The Independent Review 493–444.Suche in Google Scholar
Buchanan, J., and Y. Yoon. 2000. ““Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons,” 43(1) Journal of Law and Economics 1–13.10.1086/467445Suche in Google Scholar
Cheung, S. 1970. “The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-Exclusive Resource,” 13(1) Journal of Law and Economics 49–70.10.1086/466683Suche in Google Scholar
Coase, R. 1960. “The Problem of Social Cost,” 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1–44.10.1086/466560Suche in Google Scholar
Commons, J. 1893. The Distribution of Wealth, Vol. 3. New York and London: Macmillan and Company.Suche in Google Scholar
Epstein, R.A. 2011. “Bundle-Of-Rights Theory as a Bulwark against Statist Conceptions of Private Property,” 8(3) Econ Journal Watch 223–235.Suche in Google Scholar
Gordon, H. 1954. “The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery,” 62(2) Journal of Political Economy 124–142.10.1086/257497Suche in Google Scholar
Haddock, D.D. 2007. “Why Individuals Provide Public Goods,” in: T.L. Anderson, L.E. Huggins and T.M. Power, eds., Accounting for Mother Nature: Changing Demands for Her Bounty, Chap. 12. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 261–287.10.1515/9781503626751-014Suche in Google Scholar
Hardin, G. 1968. “The Tragedy of the Commons,” 162 Science 1243–1248.10.1126/science.162.3859.1243Suche in Google Scholar
Heller, M. 1997. “The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets,” 111 Harvard Law Review 621.10.2307/1342203Suche in Google Scholar
Honore, A. 1961. “Ownership,” 107 Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence 107–128.Suche in Google Scholar
Joffe, A. 2011. “Egypt’s Antiquities Fall Victim to the Mob,” https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703833204576114580200904212. The Wall Street Journal.Suche in Google Scholar
Knight, F. 1924. “Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Social Cost,” 38(4) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 582–606.10.2307/1884592Suche in Google Scholar
Leeson, P.T. 2007. “Trading with Bandits,” 50(2) Journal of Law and Economics 303–321.10.1086/511320Suche in Google Scholar
Leeson, P.T. 2012. “Ordeals,” 55(3) Journal of Law and Economics 691–714.10.1086/664010Suche in Google Scholar
Marx, L.M., and S.A. Matthews. 2000. “Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project,” 67 Review of Economic Studies 327–358.10.1111/1467-937X.00134Suche in Google Scholar
Old Fort Niagara website (2014): “History of Old Fort Niagara,” https://oldfortniagara.org/history.Suche in Google Scholar
Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. New York: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511807763Suche in Google Scholar
Paleontological Society (2013): “Code of Fossil Collecting,” www.apleosoc.org/pscode.htm.Suche in Google Scholar
Pigou, A. 1920. Economics of Welfare. London: Macmillan and Company.Suche in Google Scholar
Rocca, F.X. 2011. “While Pompeii Crumbles,” https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203731004576045682036807802. The Wall Street Journal.Suche in Google Scholar
Scott, A. 1955. “The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership,” 63(2) Journal of Political Economy 116–124.10.1086/257653Suche in Google Scholar
Stroup, R. 2003. Eco-Nomics: What Everyone Should Know about Economics and the Environment. Washington, DC: Cato Institute.Suche in Google Scholar
Stroup, R., and M. Brown. 2000. “Selling Artifacts,” 23(4) Regulation 4–6.Suche in Google Scholar
Tullock, G. 1971. “Public Decisions as Public Goods,” 79(4) Journal of Political Economy 913–918.10.1086/259799Suche in Google Scholar
Varian, H. 1990. Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach, New York: 2nd ed. W. W. Norton & Company.Suche in Google Scholar
Webster, D. 2009. “Dinosaur Wars: Who Owns America’s Fossils?,” 40(1) The Smithsonian 48–57.Suche in Google Scholar
Yandle, B. 1997. Common Sense and Common Law for the Environment: Creating Wealth in Hummingbird Economies. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.Suche in Google Scholar
© 2018 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- The Tragedy of the Uncommons
- Mere Preparation
- Binding and Non-Binding Contracts: A Theoretical Appraisal
- How Status Seeking may Prevent Coasean Bargaining
- Will Procurement Officials be Biased to Disregard Procurement Rules in Favor of a Low-priced, Albeit Defective, Bid?
- Does the Appeals Process Reduce the Occurrence of Legal Errors?
- Choosing Whether to Comply with a General Duty or with a Specification Standard
Artikel in diesem Heft
- The Tragedy of the Uncommons
- Mere Preparation
- Binding and Non-Binding Contracts: A Theoretical Appraisal
- How Status Seeking may Prevent Coasean Bargaining
- Will Procurement Officials be Biased to Disregard Procurement Rules in Favor of a Low-priced, Albeit Defective, Bid?
- Does the Appeals Process Reduce the Occurrence of Legal Errors?
- Choosing Whether to Comply with a General Duty or with a Specification Standard