Apophatic Confrontation: von Balthasar’s Thought on Kenosis and Community as a Veiled Response to the “Trend” of Political Theology

1 Introduction: Political Theology as a “Trend of Modern Theology”

Although Hans Urs von Balthasar’s theological work does not explicitly aim to provide a political theory, contemporary political philosophers such as Giorgio Agamben and Roberto Esposito have drawn on his ideas to offer insights into political questions such as representation, the concept of community, and glory.^[1] By doing so, they illustrate the potential for theological discourse, even in its non-political guise, to contribute to political discourse. Thus, just as the Nouvelle Théologie sought to renew theological categories,^[2] this renewal of theological conceptualization can have a wider, indirect impact on political theology.

While Balthasar does touch upon political theology to a certain extent, it’s important to highlight that he never explicitly mentions the indispensable figure in the field of political theology, Carl Schmitt. However, this absence does not imply a lack of engagement with the concepts and ideas put forth by the German jurist. Aware that political theology is a “new trend of modern theology,”^[3] and concerned about the theocratic conceptions of the state and imperialist conceptions of the catholicity of the Church, Balthasar’s thought appears poised to contribute to this emerging trend. The theological concepts of kenosis and community, as developed by Balthasar, present fruitful avenues for contemplating the political domain. These notions stand in stark contrast to the two Schmittian theological–political focal points: sovereignty and representation. While kenosis effectively deconstructs and repositions the dominantly sovereign approach to politics, the concept of communion offers an alternative perspective on catholicity, transitioning from an imperialistic notion to an understanding of the community as a common participation of a shared gift.

In an endeavor to illuminate Balthasar’s engagement with political theology, and acknowledging the initial obscurity surrounding his political theological stance, I embark on a dual exploration. First, I delve into Balthasar’s references and ideas regarding political theology. This is of paramount importance as Balthasar’s discourse on political theology appears to have been sidelined within academic discussions, despite his occasional engagement with the topic. Second, I explore Balthasar’s concept of kenosis as a potential counterpoint to Schmitt’s theological–political construct of sovereignty. Additionally, I contrast his concept of communio with Schmitt’s imperialistic notion of the Church and, consequently, the political structure.^[4] Both kenosis and communio substantiate Balthasar’s potential impact on political theology. These particular concepts stand out as parallel alternatives to Schmitt’s ideas. They give rise to novel theological–political dialogues that divert attention from the plenipotentiary structure of sovereign power.

2 Balthasar and the Realm of Political Theology

Balthasar’s perspective recognizes the separate domain of the political by explicitly setting it apart from theological reductions. Political thought is not completely disregarded in his theology, but rather is understood to constitute a distinct order. This perspective is evident in his rejection of Marxism, his consideration of the social dimension of the church, and his frequent references to the concept of sovereignty when attributed to God.^[5]

While Balthasar’s primary focus is not on politics, he allocates a few lines to political theology. Balthasar’s scholarly acquaintance with the concept of political theology becomes evident, despite his omission of explicit references to Schmitt. His adept understanding of the implications associated with this term suggests his nuanced grasp of the intellectual contributions made by the German jurist.

In Theo-Drama I, Balthasar categorizes political theology as one of the trends of modern theology, which he claims to be a response to the reductions of rationalism in theology. He argues that while these trends may contain true and relevant aspects, they are inadequate in constructing a Christian theology.^[6] He explicitly upholds the notion of the negative sense of political theology, asserting that “negatively speaking, the Christian will be in a position to criticize every form of human community from the vantage point of an eschaton known to him and lived by him in faith.”^[7] At the same time, he rejects a positive approach to the political realm/sphere by arguing that, while politics is an inevitable concern within Christianity, the implementation of the Kingdom of God in the world is deemed impossible.^[8] It is not to say that Balthasar’s theology excludes politics altogether, but rather that the political is clearly subordinated to the theological, as the theological transcends the political and cannot be reduced to it.

Furthermore, in his critique of religious integralism, Balthasar references De Maistre, Bonald, and Donoso Cortés, who are the three key figures in Carl Schmitt’s proposal of political theology. Hence, the very intellectual foundations of Schmitt’s theological–political thought serve as the basis for integralism according to Balthasar’s critique.^[9] Indeed, in “Integralismus Heute,” a revised rendition of his critique on integralism, Balthasar designates it as “Modernismus-Integralismus,” semantically suggesting that modernism is nothing more than a form of integralism. Consequently, one can comprehend these contemporary trends identified by Balthasar, which he correlates with the critique of aggiornamento by Pope John XXIII in Pascendi, as a manifestation of what he conceives as integralism.^[10] In this regard, as Balthasar regards political theology as a prevalent trend within modern theology, it is plausible that his critique of integralism to some degree pertains to this very trend.

Especially noteworthy is Balthasar’s exploration of political theology within the concise text “The Unity of Theology and Spirituality” (1969). There, he provides crucial insights that bolster his position on the subject of political theology:

“Political theology”, then, but no longer in the dimensions of the Constantinian era (which extends, inclusively, to the nationalism of modern times), where the sphere of “Church” coincides with the domain of “empire” and expands together with it (and by its methods of expansion); nor corresponding to the concept of the West and its tense political discussion between the “Christian nations”, in any event with their expansions into the rest of the world as colonial territory; but where the sphere Church must fall together with the sphere World, and in this postulate the center of Christian existence (as mission) is seen: at the intersection, then, of Is and Ought. And this Ought would now be free from over-hasty identification with the earthly “empire” (and its instruments of power and methods of government), and placed instead on the means of the mere gospel.^[11]

Balthasar claims that apart from theocracy and modern nationalism, there is a sense of political theology that cannot be disregarded and is, in fact, unavoidable in the intersection of what he calls the sphere of the World and the sphere of the Church. Furthermore, Balthasar discerns a stark incongruity between nationalism and the inherent universality embodied by the catholicity of the Church.^[12] Consequently, the formation of what could be termed “Christian nations” effectively diminishes the Church’s universality by relegating it to the realm of political discourse. For him, the bedrock of a genuine political theology is Christ. This notion is reinforced by his observation in this same text, where he highlights the significance of Jesus’ person for political theology:

The man Jesus was engaged in physical labor for thirty years before he became engaged in spiritual work for three years, to suffer at last the triduum mortis. The suffering, though it was the goal of his whole existence, was at the same time the crowning conclusion of an effort to realize the polis of God on earth; in this sense, Jesus’ life as a whole is political theology. … Anyone who is not focused from the very beginning on this total obedience to the Father’s ways with the Son should as a Christian keep his hands off of political theology.^[13]

Therefore, for Balthasar, an authentic political theology departs from the event of the death and resurrection of Christ. In his view, the configuration of political theology should take the passion and death of Jesus seriously. For Balthasar, the problem is not political theology itself, but rather a lack of understanding of the real form of Christ: self-abasement. Therefore, the potentiality of Balthasar’s thought as a political theology demands a prior understanding of his Christology.

Beyond the insightful content presented in “The Unity of Theology and Spirituality,” Balthasar also contends for the convergence of world history and salvation history.^[14] This unity prevents a complete separation of both theological and political discourses. In this vein, he claims that “the object of theology is so open that it must consider man, redeemed and claimed by God, in all his human relations.”^[15]

Therefore, without the aim of instrumentalizing theological thought, he considers theology capable of illuminating non-strictly theological issues, including the political realm. In other words, Balthasar’s theology, due to its object, is open to shedding light on the political. Hence, Balthasar’s thought can be approached through the lens of political theology. Balthasar’s stance on political theology resides within a delicate balance. While he resists the theological–political reduction of theology, he does not dismiss the concept of political theology outright. Instead, he endeavors to scrutinize and unveil its limitations and misrepresentations. His Christological emphasis offers a novel perspective, redefining previous formulations of political theology.

Despite Balthasar’s scarce yet clear reference to political theology in his work, the theopolitical dimension of Balthasar’s thought is a contentious issue in scholarly discourse, as political theorists utilize Balthasar’s ideas as a resource while theologians appear hesitant to engage in this transfer. In this respect, Esposito and Agamben incorporate Balthasar’s theology into their political genealogies. Esposito, on the one hand, interprets Balthasar’s thought within the Catholic concern of re-establishing the representative connection between political decision and the transcendental order.^[16] Conversely, Agamben views Balthasar’s magnum opus, Theological Aesthetics,^[17] as an intellectual adversary to his political genealogy. He criticizes Balthasar for framing the topic of glory in aesthetic terms rather than political ones. In essence, Agamben raises objections to Balthasar’s tendency to strip the concept of glory of its political dimensions.^[18]

Differently, Carol B. Cooper contends that there is no political theology in Balthasar’s work, but rather a limitation to political theology.^[19] While Cooper provides a compelling analysis by contrasting Balthasar’s thought with Schmitt’s political theology, and her analysis of love sheds light on significant aspects of Balthasar’s social thought, it fails to capture the sense of political theology that Balthasar associates with Christology already mentioned. Balthasar himself establishes a link between kenosis and communio. This is evident in his assertion that “Christ’s kenotic condition – as bread to be ‘eaten’ and wine poured out – appears to confer on the table guests an active and absorbing role. … There Christ actively incorporates the participants into his mystical body.”^[20] Furthermore, Balthasar’s attribution of a Trinitarian foundation to the concept of kenosis serves to strengthen its inherently communitarian sense.^[21]

Thus, Balthasar’s concept of communio, which lies at the heart of his vision of the Church as a community, becomes inseparable from his interpretation of kenosis. This doctrine indirectly reshapes the perception of sovereignty, thereby influencing the core essence and structure of the political realm. Similarly, Balthasar’s exploration of communio within ecclesiology challenges an imperialistic perspective of the Church and subtly engages with Schmitt’s concepts regarding Catholicism.

3 Kenosis: Challenging the Sovereigntists Paradigm

According to Sigurd Lefsrud, the term kenosis comes from the Greek verb κενόω (“to make empty”), and it is found in Paul’s Epistle to the Philippians, where it refers to the mystery of Christ making himself powerless in obedience to the Father for the salvation of humanity.^[22] Lefsrud notes that the Pauline formulation of kenosis is introduced under a hymn structure, suggesting the surpassing of rational categories in favor of praise grammar. This hymn stresses divine love over human acts when it comes to salvation. In addition, Lefsrud discusses additional uses of this term in the New Testament and in patristic literature, such as Gregory of Nazianzus or Cyril of Alexandria, and concludes that the most developed thought on kenosis as a central concept of Christology can be found in Balthasar.^[23]

Embedded within the context of this kenotic tradition, certain scholarly interpretations have identified a kenotic element within Hegel’s philosophical system – an aspect acknowledged by Balthasar himself and underscored by Alex Dubilet.^[24] While Hegel’s exploration of kenosis, which Balthasar points out in order to emphasize a significant divergence, places Christology in the realm of reason during the “speculative Good Friday,” as Dubilet observes, it also bears a theological-political dimension.^[25] Thus, it is worth contemplating whether Balthasar’s framework might also hold implications for politics, despite his distinct development of kenosis that sets it apart from Hegel’s formulation.

In this context, contributions to kenotic theology from within the framework of Reformed theology, as exemplified by Calvin and Luther, or the theology of Karl Barth and his legacy, also serve as reference points in kenotic thought.^[26] This tradition differs substantively from Balthasar’s more Catholic approach. Balthasar’s theory of kenosis intentionally avoids being influenced by the postulates inherent in Reformed theology.^[27]

In contrast to purely theological perspectives, Gianni Vattimo proposes a social theory of secularization centered on the notion of kenosis.^[28] For Vattimo, Jesus’ incarnation serves as the archetype of secularization.^[29] While Vattimo’s interpretation diverges from Balthasar’s Christology,^[30] as Balthasar staunchly opposes a nihilistic interpretation of kenosis, Vattimo perceives it as potentially nihilistic, capable of destabilizing the constrained being of metaphysics.^[31] Balthasar, on the other hand, doesn’t discard a metaphysical framework; rather, he aims to direct it toward revelation in Christ.

The concept of kenosis is a significant component of Balthasar’s Theological Aesthetics and Theo-drama, albeit in a disseminated manner.^[32] While kenosis constitutes a fundamental aspect of Balthasar’s Christology, he introduces this theological motif by firmly rooting it in a Trinitarian framework. He posits that the initial “kenosis” of the Father occurs as an act of self-expropriation through the divine “generation” of the consubstantial Son. In this way, the Christological kenosis, referenced in the Philippian hymn, represents the third instance of kenosis according to Balthasar. Notably, the second kenosis, within Balthasar’s perspective, pertains to the covenant established between God and Israel.^[33] This Trinitarian underpinning of kenosis introduces an inherent communal dimension, wherein the self-expropriation leads to the emergence of the collective “we.”^[34] This concept establishes an indispensable link between kenosis and community, underscoring the inextricable connection between the two. Its importance to Balthasar’s proposal cannot be overstated.

In Mysterium Paschale, Balthasar offers a compendium of a Theologie der Drei Tage – the original title of the book – wherein he synthesizes how the concept of kenosis is enacted in the mystery of Christ’s death and resurrection, and how the Incarnation is ordered to the Passion.^[35] Christologically, kenosis holds a dual significance. First, it pertains to the “self-emptying of God” as manifested through Christ’s assumption of a finite form in the Incarnation, reflecting the likeness of the Father. Second, it encompasses the fullness of kenosis exemplified in the crucifixion. The self-abasement of God is fully realized in the death of Christ on the cross, thereby fulfilling the first sense of kenosis in the Passion. This is consistent with Paul’s formulation, where the self-emptying of Jesus’ taking human likeness has its full sense in the death of the cross.^[36]

For Balthasar, the heart of the Paschal Mystery is Holy Saturday.^[37] The descent into death reveals the immeasurability of God’s love, which remains incomprehensible to the intellect.^[38] This realization carries a crucial implication: the immeasurable nature of Christ’s genuine death necessitates an apophatic approach.^[39] In essence, kenosis aligns with a path of negation, rejecting conventional human notions of love – bound by limitations – and challenging the primacy of absolute power within the divine realm. Consequently, Balthasar’s perspective shifts God’s authentic nature from an embodiment of absolute power to one of absolute love.^[40]

This transformation yields three immediate outcomes. First, the essence of kenosis is rooted in love. The self-emptying of God finds significance not in rational understanding but in the realm of love. Second, love is reconceptualized as a self-renunciation on behalf of others. Third, the authentic manifestation of sovereignty consists of self-emptying through obedience until death.

Balthasar redefines the power paradigm by employing the Christological framework. He asserts that power corresponds to the archetype of God’s form, emphasizing that God’s essence is love, a love that selflessly gives for the sake of all. This forms a paradigm in which power is exemplified through self-emptying, or kenosis. Yet, Balthasar diverges from Vattimo’s radical stance on kenosis, which could lead to nihilism. Instead, Balthasar perceives kenosis as an apophatic movement that unveils the authentic majesty of God.^[41] Consequently, Christ’s crucifixion, in Balthasar’s view, stands as a triumph, fully unveiling the theological essence of God.^[42]

Balthasar’s exploration of kenosis leads to the possibility of discerning a distinct paradigm of divine sovereignty through kenosis, paving the way for a reconsideration and reshaping of Schmitt’s political theology of sovereignty.^[43] This aligns with Balthasar’s position in Theo-Drama V, where he suggests that the potential for developing a repertoire for political theology emerges from the kenosis of Christ.^[44] This terse correlation hints at a plausible theopolitical interpretation of kenosis within Balthasar’s theological framework, albeit without further elaboration on his own.

While exploring the viability of a “politics of powerlessness”^[45] in Theo-Drama IV, Balthasar introduces a distinct formulation of the political theology of kenosis. Given that Balthasar himself defines kenosis as “powerlessness” within the same work, a clear and direct link is established between the concept of the “politics of powerlessness” and the idea of kenosis.^[46] This specific notion of a “politics of powerlessness” serves as the foundational pillar of the political theology of kenosis. While Balthasar does not extensively delve into the details of this concept, his theological framework lays the essential groundwork for delving into and exploring this theoretical avenue.

Balthasar’s exploration of kenosis, of politics of powerlessness, does not entail a rejection of sovereignty, but rather a reformulation of it. While there are post-modern approaches that reject sovereignty, such as Caputo’s notion of God without sovereignty or Agamben’s concept of the empty throne,^[47] Balthasar’s understanding of kenosis does not negate sovereignty, but rather liberates it from a reductionist understanding based on human will. When applied to Schmitt’s political theology, kenosis redefines the notion of the sovereign as one who decides on the exception, with the exceptionality being self-emptying absolute love that transcends human logic and disrupts human decisionism.^[48]

While Schmitt sees an analogy between the exceptionality of jurisprudence and miracles in theology, where sovereignty possesses the capability to decide on exceptions, serving as a paradigm for omnipotence understood as “unlimited authority” and the ability to “suspend the law,”^[49] Balthasar, on the other hand, redefines this exceptionality through the concept of kenosis, transcending sovereignty the logic of power. The genuine exception is not merely a decision exercising power over the law, but rather absolute love expressed as self-emptying. This absolute love, which is exceptional within God and becomes evident through the extraordinary nature of the death on the Cross, redefines the nature of the sovereign’s decisions. It is not merely an empty decision, but rather a manifestation of absolute love that shapes such decisions. The foundations of power are grounded in the principles of absolute love, rather than the other way around.

This perspective aligns with Balthasar’s brief reference to political theology, where he asserts that political theology should not be approached from a Pelagian perspective, but rather from the recognition that “the man Jesus was engaged in physical labor for thirty years before he became engaged in spiritual work for three years, to suffer at last the triduum mortis.”^[50] In other words, Balthasar indirectly critiques Schmitt’s proposal as Pelagian for bracketing the triduum mortis. Thus, according to Balthasar, if the theology of the three days encompasses the kenosis of God, then a Christological political theology should also be rooted in the articulation of sovereignty around kenosis. If sovereignty is conceptualized as self-emptying, surpassing the dichotomy between power and impotence, then the concept of omnipotence no longer serves as the primary analogical reference for sovereignty. Instead, sovereignty is contextualized within a dynamic of love and donation.^[51]

Just as Balthasar cautions against reducing God’s essence univocally to kenosis, a kenotic political theology cannot be reduced to a univocal understanding. Kenosis, rather than serving as a positive affirmation of God, constitutes a negative term that resists reductionist conceptualizations of the divine. As a result, kenosis allows for different political theologies.

In this theological–political discourse of kenosis, Vattimo’s interpretation of kenosis as secularization closely aligns with Balthasar’s perspective. However, there is a crucial difference between the two. Vattimo sees incarnation as leading to secularization, whereas Balthasar argues that the irruption of divinity in the secular redefines secularity but does not entail secularization. According to Balthasar, Jesus’ life was a holistic integration of the political and theological realms. In Balthasar’s view, Jesus’ labor, encompassing three years of spiritual work and the suffering endured during the triduum mortis, epitomizes his efforts to realize the polis of God on earth.^[52]

Balthasar posits that the incarnation of God imbues secular reality with profound meaning, as it eliminates the notion of a complete separation between the divine and human realms.^[53] Thus, Balthasar seems to suggest that the concept of res mixta, alluded to by Schmitt and foundational to political theology, is established through the Incarnation and the triduum mortis.^[54] Consequently, for Balthasar, an authentic political theology cannot disregard the Christological centrality of this concept in favor of a mere philosophical predication of divine attributes transferred to the juridical–political arena.

Kenosis does not eliminate sovereignty, but rather completes its meaning through revelation in the figure of Christ and introduces a paradigm of dispossession of power. Likewise, kenosis does not cancel the concept of exception, but rather redefines it. Exception is not the suspension of the order in the first sense, but rather the fulfillment of the divine order, which is absolute love, going beyond human comprehension.^[55] According to Balthasar, the exceptionality lies in the mysterious event of the death of God,^[56] which fundamentally reshapes the understanding of God’s omnipotence and, in turn, the concept of sovereignty. Kenosis, as an apophatic approach to God, also places a limit on the conceptualization of the divine and its transfers of meaning, while allowing for a sense of secularity that not only does not eradicate God, but rather considers God as its center. Kenosis in Balthasar destabilizes Schmitt’s political theology, but does not invalidate it. Rather, it expands its horizons in a different direction, that of “politics of powerlessness.”

4 Communio: A Shared Gift Instead of an Imperial Heritage

Balthasar’s theological thought, encompassing his ecclesiology, offers valuable insights that have the potential to shed light on the complex interplay between theology and politics. In collaboration with esteemed theological scholars such as Henri de Lubac and Joseph Ratzinger, Balthasar co-founded the prominent journal Communio in 1972. Within the pages of “Communio: A Program,” Balthasar elucidates the expansive scope of intellectual reflection envisioned by the journal, serving as a comprehensive repository of his ecclesiological perspectives.^[57] While Balthasar’s ecclesiology is expounded upon in his major trilogy and elaborated upon in various articles,^[58] “Communio: A Program,” holds particular significance as it establishes a theopolitical differentiation between the church as an authentic community and other human communities that, in his view, are unable to supplant the foundational role of the church.

As a contextual note, it is crucial to recognize that Balthasar’s understanding of communio is intricately woven into a larger theological discourse, a discourse that can be traced back to Henri de Lubac’s reintroduction of the concept of the corpus mysticum, which designates the church as a mystical body.^[59] Similarly, just as the concept of corpus mysticum gives rise to theopolitical discourses, as Ernst Kantorowicz demonstrates in his work The King’s Two Bodies, drawing on de Lubac’s ideas,^[60] Balthasar’s notion of communio cannot wholly disregard theopolitical narratives. In this regard, Balthasar indirectly sheds light on political communities and apophatically confronts Schmitt’s political ecclesiology.

In Communio, Balthasar argues that the community of Christians is founded on the love of God, which is manifested and bestowed in Christ. The community, according to Balthasar is not self-founded, has a Christological dimension. He emphasizes that while the community of Christians is constituted by a “group,” this community is meant to be universal and open to the whole world, which poses a problem, as Balthasar points out, because this aspiration “could never be completed.” Therefore, both the differentiation grounded in the predestined and the reprobate, and the reliance on an abstract universality centered around the concept of the “kingdom of God,” fail to adequately address the community. To genuinely address it, universality must be realized in tangible, concrete terms.^[61]

Balthasar’s development of the idea of Catholicity as universality can be viewed as a tacit response to Schmitt’s work “Roman Catholicism and Political Form” (1923) and “The Visibility of the Church: A Scholastic Consideration” (1917).^[62] In his piece “Communio: A Program,” Balthasar emphasizes the notion of Catholicity as open to all, rather than being understood in imperialistic terms. Prior to Balthasar’s ecclesiological proposal, as argued by Montserrat Herrero, Schmitt developed a political theology of representation based on the visibility of the Church through the Incarnation of Christ, which makes God visible to humanity.^[63] Balthasar’s theological aesthetics align closely with this approach, as he considers the Church as a mediation of the form of Christ and the Incarnation as the fullest manifestation of God.^[64]

Nonetheless, despite Schmitt’s shift away from the sovereign’s decision, his political theology of representation still resides within the framework of sovereignty.^[65] Schmitt’s notion involves the representation of Christ as a transcendent figure, from above, serving as the foundational source of power for the Church. In contrast, Balthasar’s concept of representation entails a relinquishment of power to embrace the other, differing from Schmitt’s portrayal of Christ as one who “reigning, ruling and conquering”^[66] in his representation of the Church. As a result, while the principle of kenosis aligns with Balthasar’s vision of community, Schmitt’s political theology of representation remains somewhat entwined with the broader concept of political theology rooted in sovereignty.

Unlike Schmitt, Balthasar espouses an incommensurability between the church and the state, rejecting any possible correlation between the two. This stands in contrast to Schmitt’s theological–political idea of representation. Balthasar posits several aspects that highlight this contrast. First, Balthasar asserts that there can be no possible correlation between the church and the state, as they exhibit structural disanalogy, and therefore, the theopolitical discourse cannot be based on correlations. Second, he argues that if the community is given, it implies dispossession of it, and universality means not closing the divine scope of communion due to human reasons. Third, Balthasar underscores that the concept of community as being given necessitates a paradigm of weakness and dispossession, where the foundation of the community is based on love/agape, in contrast to an imperialist notion. Human love, being limited, is incapable of universality, whereas divine love enables universality. Fourth, Balthasar highlights the eucharist as a figure of the community, implying the consecution of incarnation and a kenotic event. Fifth, he posits that the community as given requires engagement with the given, which involves dialogue. Finally, Balthasar argues that the human community is incapable of communion, and thus for an authentic community, the givenness through God’s agape in the cross is necessary. This idea is also present in Theo-Drama V, where Balthasar relates the polis with agape, following Augustine, and this agape with kenosis. The kenotic form of the polis theou shapes the form of the political, and not vice versa.^[67]

Regarding the incommensurability between the Church and the state, Balthasar’s insights into the church as a community, particularly in its connection with the political realm, serve as a redefinition of a conceivable political theology of representation. In redefining it, Balthasar dedicates two concise articles to critique integralism within the Church, as he believes it jeopardizes the aforementioned universality. The first article focuses on metaphors that, in his view, politicize and superficialize Christology, such as the use of “caudillo” (leader) for spiritual purposes.^[68] In his later revised text on integralism, he provides a more structured argumentation by identifying three main forms of integralism: that of power, tradition, and reason. According to Balthasar, these three manifestations of integralism, each in its distinct variation – be it through the political propaganda of religious institutions, the nostalgic attachment to the past, or the elevation of reason above the mysteries of faith – distort and diminish the Christological essence of the Church as a genuine community. He underscores that reducing the profound mystery of Christ to these aspects inadequately represents the universal nature of the Church.^[69]

Considering the tension in the Church between its intended universality and its impossibility, Balthasar suggests that the concept of communio provides a theological, not only human, locus for engaging with it. Balthasar notes that the word communio plays a central role in the New Testament and defines it as “community formed by God’s Spirit in Christ, who essentially lived and rose from the dead for all men.”^[70] In other words, the community emerges from the kenotic event.

Moreover, Balthasar deconstructs the concept of communion from a philological perspective. He notes that “communion,” which derives from the Latin words “together” and “moenia” (wall), can mean a common fortification, but also a shared accomplishment, task, or administration, which in turn can imply mutual satisfaction, gift, or grace (mun: to munus). Balthasar argues that this second etymology reveals that people who enter into a community do so not by virtue of a social contract or private initiative, but because they are already part of a community by virtue of the shared gift.^[71] Esposito also suggests this second etymology as constitutive of community from a more political standpoint.^[72] This convergence illustrates how Balthasar’s reflection on community extends beyond ecclesiology and bears political implications.

Balthasar engages with the Greco-Roman concept of community, wherein participation in the logos, or free reason, imparts unity to the particular. Nevertheless, he rejects the ancient solution as insufficient for providing a real encounter with the Logos when seeking the grounding for the community. He also finds the Hegelian model invalid, as it forces individual subjects to reject their definitive character in the process of becoming according to the Hegelian spirit.^[73] Indeed, for Balthasar, Hegel is perhaps the most consummate integralist, arguing that the Hegelian system, while assigning Christianity a significant role, ultimately grants the final word to human reason, leaving no room for mystery and, consequently, excluding the concept of community as a gift.^[74]

Similarly, he dismisses the liberal solution of a consortium of free people, as this unity lacks a solid foundation. Nonetheless, Balthasar’s critique of liberalism distinguishes itself from the Schmittian critique. In Balthasar’s perspective, the various forms of the political community, whether they align with liberalism or deviate from it, are unable to fully realize the communal aspirations they aim to achieve, resulting in their ultimate failure. In this vein, Balthasar also draws a crucial distinction between communion and communism when elucidating the human community: communion is rooted in Christ as its reference, while communism views community as the “complete achievement of self-realization by the world idea and humanity.”^[75] However, Balthasar regards communism as an ideal program that fails to recognize the unreality of the principle of community in the present time.

For the Swiss theologian, the lacuna between the realization and impossibility of community confers a special place to theology in pondering this concept. He argues that the community established by God rests on the grace of Jesus Christ’s abasement, humility, and acceptance of poverty in utter loving dedication, while the community to be constructed by human efforts can never be achieved without the use of force, if it can ever be achieved at all. Balthasar emphasizes that belongingness to the community is granted by God, and thus, even ex-communion is educative and temporal, as the community is not established by human free will, but rather bestowed as a gift from God through Christ. In these lines, Balthasar maintains that even apostasy does not ultimately enable one to escape communion, as the act of renouncing it does not result in being abandoned by God.^[76]

Accordingly, Balthasar argues that the church as a community is based on four presuppositions, which he deems essential. These presuppositions include God’s trinitarian being, which represents God’s absolute communion with himself; God’s self-communication to humans through Jesus; Jesus’ eucharistic self-communication during his Last Supper and in the communion of those who participate in the meal sacramentally and the communion with the Holy Spirit, which situates the scope of this community as limitless, mirroring the divine nature. Balthasar further emphasizes that the bond of unity within this community goes beyond particular experiences and is intricately related to self-sacrificing love (agape), particularly exemplified in the Cross. He posits that agape, as the basis of communion, is not a human achievement, but a divine gift that is bestowed upon humanity. This underscores the transcendent nature of communion, which surpasses human limitations and is rooted in God’s love.^[77]

Arguing against Pelagianism, he posits that the possibility of horizontal community or communion among human beings is contingent upon its roots in the vertical community, which is communion with God. This vertical community, characterized by divine agape, is primordial and accessible through the sacramental meal.

Balthasar emphasizes that the foundation of community is not solely based on rational virtue,^[78] but rather demands a response due to its given character. It necessitates the absence of enemies, as God, through the Crucified, has reconciled all conflicts. Consequently, the concept of loving one’s enemies becomes irrelevant, as the other can no longer be seen as an enemy to be loved. This stands in contrast to Schmitt’s approach, which suggests that the notion of loving one’s enemies does not apply to the “public enemy.”^[79] Balthasar, on the other hand, eradicates the possibility of an enemy altogether.

Finally, Balthasar discusses the conditions of hospitality for the Church in its communitarian dimension, although not explicitly framing it as such. He argues that Christians must not abandon others or approach individuals of other religions with a sense of superiority.^[80] Instead, it demands reverence and understanding of the other, prompting authentic discussions without prejudices. In addition, Balthasar argues that this type of community requires a stance of non-indifference toward the other, but rather “the courage to penetrate into another’s best defended fortress and, in the knowledge that it is, fundamentally, already conquered and surrendered, to contact its very center.”^[81] He further asserts that to truly embody the catholic and universal nature of the church, one must be capable of engaging in dialogue, which demands exposing oneself to risks and building community from a position of weakness, rather than relying solely on one’s own strength. This emphasizes the need for vulnerability in fostering an authentic community.

Balthasar’s development of community offers insights into Schmitt’s theological–political representation of power. While Schmitt and Balthasar propose different foundations for the power of the Church in comparison to other political forms, Balthasar highlights the incomparability of the Church, whereas Schmitt associates it with Roman imperialism. Balthasar draws on references to various political forms to highlight their dissimilarity, while Schmitt views the Church as inheriting Roman law and Empire.^[82]

This disparity between Balthasar’s and Schmitt’s approaches gives rise to two implications. First, for Schmitt, the Church is structurally akin to the state due to its juridical form, which enables the political theology of representation. In contrast, Balthasar argues against such correlation and the reduction of the dramatic tension of Christianity to the political realm, warning of the dangers that arise from such reduction by citing the example of messianic political models.^[83] Nevertheless, he does not reject the juridical aspect of theology, but understands the law, and therefore the juridical as a “law of grace,” that is, within the paradigm of gift.^[84] To put it differently, divine law is not suspended by divinity in exceptionality; rather, it is brought to its ultimate realization. The law of power becomes intertwined with the divine essence: absolute love, which constitutes the true state of grace. Thus, in the exceptional act of divine self-emptying, the law is not suspended but rather established. Jurisprudence does not reign as a prevailing system within God’s actions; instead, it emerges as a gift stemming from God’s self-emptying.

Second, both Schmitt and Balthasar emphasize the universality of the Church. Nevertheless, Schmitt perceives this universality, viewed through the prism of Roman imperialism, as a manifestation of imperium that stands in opposition to all other power structures. In contrast, Balthasar unequivocally dismisses the Greco-Roman model of community as inadequate. He contends that the Church does not inherit Roman universalism, and he asserts that any endeavor by a human community to achieve universality is ultimately doomed to falter. Balthasar asserts that the particular denomination of Roman, which seems to contradict the universality of the Church, is meant to be overcome. This provides a negative correction to Schmitt’s political theology: the particular Roman character is not a primordial identity of the Christian universal community of the Church.^[85]

Differently, Balthasar’s universalism is rooted in the gift character of a community, with its boundaries determined by the divine Trinity through the incarnation of Christ and his perpetual presence in the Eucharist. No human being has the right to exclude anyone from communion, and any exclusion should be temporary and educative. Thus, while Schmitt’s concept of universality involves the exercise of imperialistic power, Balthasar’s is characterized by epistemological humility in recognizing the given nature of the community through the image of the Eucharist, which aligns more with kenosis than the exertion of power. Instead of divine authoritarianism, Balthasar envisions a community founded on kenosis, distancing from the imperialistic conception of Catholicism and emphasizing the notion of community as a communion of gifts through divine agape.

It holds great importance that Schmitt rejects the notion of the corpus mysticum as an insufficient representation of the Church, arguing that this metaphor fails to fully account for the incarnation of Christ.^[86] However, De Lubac and Kantorowicz demonstrate that the image was primarily employed to refer to the Eucharist, which is intrinsically related to incarnation. Kantorowicz further emphasizes the legal terminology that characterizes the formulation of the Eucharist as corpus mysticum, a point reinforced by Herrero’s observation that the term sacramentum originally referred to the “military oath” in Roman Law.^[87] Thus, Schmitt’s rejection of the image of corpus mysticum leads him to prioritize representation and divine authority over the concept of community as a given. In contrast, Balthasar argues that the givenness of the community disrupts human barriers, rendering it truly universal.

For Balthasar, the Eucharist is a sacramental figure for love as agape, and thus, the foundation of community is unconditional love.^[88] Consequently, there are no enemies in this community, as enmity is resolved through the love-agape of the cross. In contrast, Schmitt develops his political theology of representation within the friend/enemy paradigm, where the Church is distinguished from its enemies, which could be liberalism, Marxism, or Protestantism. Thus, in the ambivalence pointed out by Derrida in the concept of hostis, as both guest and enemy,^[89] Balthasar indirectly proposes a hermeneutic of hospitality, being open from the heart to the other. In contrast, Schmitt focuses on the hostility of the Church toward other institutions. In this sense, Balthasar’s ecclesiology corrects Schmitt’s representation, asserting that there is no Christ mediating the Church without love agape, and there is no communion without a Good Friday. The splendor of the representation is not in the Roman juridical form or the Incarnation of Christ completely separated from his death.

Both Schmitt and Balthasar develop ecclesiologies in political terms, acknowledging Jesus’ incarnation as the mediation and representation of God. However, Balthasar diverges from imperialistic representations of power and instead situates the communion of a community in a gift that is given. This departs from the potential hostility that the imperial form might generate, which Schmitt recognizes as unavoidable,^[90] and instead introduces a dynamic of hospitality by welcoming the gift. Furthermore, Balthasar emphasizes the impossibility of making a correlation between the state and the church. If there is a political theology of community and representation in Balthasar’s thought, it is always in an apophatic sense, characterized by the negation of such a correlation. This aligns with Balthasar’s position in Theo-Drama I, where he suggests that political theology is only possible in a negative way.^[91]

5 Conclusion: Balthasar’s Apophatic Political Theology

While Balthasar’s theological–political thought remains controversial, his ideas can be scrutinized through the perspective of political theology. He delves into significant concepts like sovereignty and the state, and he also acknowledges an unexplored dimension of political theology linked to Christ’s incarnation.

As Balthasar contends that comprehending the incarnation of Christ requires consideration of the paschal mystery, his political theology becomes intrinsically tied to the kenosis of Good Friday and Holy Saturday. In so doing, Balthasar distances himself from any affirmative theological–political formulations, seeking to avoid imperialistic and theocratic conceptions. In simpler terms, he believes that the theological realm can illuminate and rectify reductionist political assertions, such as communism or liberalism, as he specifically points, redirecting their focus toward a deeper understanding. For Balthasar, political forms are always subordinate to the Christological form, and not the other way around.

Balthasar’s theological thought is a form of negative political theology, which challenges more cataphatic theopolitical approaches. The term “negative” or “apophatic” is employed in political theology to denote figures or concepts that are not part of the theological–political discourse but confront theological–political concepts and make a negative contribution to the discourse. Scholars like David Newheiser, Anna Rowlands, or Montserrat Herrero have used the concept of negative political theology, drawing inspiration from the triple via of Pseudo-Dionysius for naming God.^[92]

Only in this negative and Christological sense, the possibility of theological–political thought in Balthasar can be stated. Just as the idea of kenosis corrects the notion of sovereignty, the Church as a primordial community rectifies the utopian aspirations of the state. For Balthasar, the correction that Christology may bring to political ideas does not deny the concept of sovereignty or the legitimacy of the political community. Instead, it refines them by revealing, on one hand, the limited nature of the political realm and, on the other hand, by offering deeper understanding of political concepts such as sovereignty and community, which ultimately are at the basis of these political doctrines.

In this negative stance, Balthasar’s Christology reveals that the idea of sovereignty does not reside in the exercise of absolute power but in love-absolute kenosis. On the other hand, the idea of community acquires a deeper sense when considered in terms of its character as a gift and participation in the gift, founded on agape. This Christological “rectification” grants a deeper foundation to the idea of community, with friendship and hospitality at its core, rather than enmity toward other political structures as a central aspect of its definition.

This plausible negative sense of political theology in Balthasar is palpable in the impossibility of establishing direct correlations with the divine. The political community is not analogous in its mission or scope to the ecclesial community, and likewise, the concept of political sovereignty is insufficient to account for divine sovereignty, which is revealed in the form of Christ. This impossibility of establishing theological–political correlations, as emphasized by Balthasar, situates the realm of political theology in a different place than the idea of structural analogy present in Schmitt.^[93] While for Balthasar the political is inadequate in understanding the divine, the theological surpasses any political conceptualization, shedding light upon it.

In Balthasar’s view, political theology is feasible due to the incarnation of Christ, which represents the irruption of the divine into the secular. The irruption of Christ into the secular enables the realization of the city of God on earth. This assertion does not imply for Balthasar an affirmative political theology but rather emphasizes the primacy of the theological over the political. It points to the life of Jesus, with his thirty years of physical labor culminating in the triduum mortis, as the authentic form of political theology.

Similar to Schmitt’s perspective, political theology for Balthasar is plausible thanks to the existence of a res mixta, which in Balthasar’s view is realized in the person of Jesus. Although Balthasar’s thought emphasizes a clear distinction between the secular and the divine, it is in the person of Christ where they become perfectly united. For him, this unity enables the possibility of any kind of theopolitical discourse. In contrast to Schmitt’s framework, which is influenced by the theory of secularization, Balthasar avoids secularization. He believes that the theological aspect, embodied by Christ, cannot be fully secularized: the theological element surpasses any attempt to reduce it to secularism.