Nietzsche on Conflict and Agon

1. Herman W. Siemens/James S. Pearson (eds.), Conflict and Contest in Nietzsche’s Philosophy. New York: Bloomsbury 2020, 302 pp., ISBN 978-1350163836.

2. Herman W. Siemens, Agonal Perspectives on Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Critical Transvaluation. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter 2021, 303 pp., ISBN 978-3110722284.

3. James S. Pearson, Nietzsche on Conflict, Struggle and War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2021, 296 pp., ISBN 978-1009030519.

The three books that are reviewed here, one anthology edited by Herman W. Siemens and James S. Pearson and two monographs by Siemens and Pearson, bring together many critical readings of some of the most debated writings and ideas of Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s agonistic writings are susceptible to being interpreted in short-sighted ways, as though Nietzsche were a war-monger and endorsed violence and destruction for their sakes. These interpretations often miss Nietzsche’s own warnings about how to read texts and against those who come to quick conclusions. The writers of the two monographs and the contributors to the anthology are sensitive to these warnings as they highlight important ideas in Nietzsche’s texts and shed light on these subjects, while keeping in sight the symbolic meanings of many of the terms Nietzsche uses. Some themes that stand out in the exploration of agon, conflict, struggle and war in Nietzsche in these three works are: power and power relations, resistance and power, aristocracy vs. democracy, emotive phenomena, love and agonistic friendship, catharsis, decadence and social disintegration, transformation, transvaluation and sublimation, and consciousness vs. unconsciousness.

1. Conflict and Contest in Nietzsche’s Philosophy is a collection of essays some of which are based on the conference “Nietzsche, Love and War” that took place in 2014. The collection is organized in four parts and consists of fourteen chapters. Each chapter highlights a different dimension of agonism in Nietzsche, and that will be the focus of the following review. In Chapter 1, Nietzsche on Productive Resistance, Herman W. Siemens brings out the notion of “active resistance” in Nietzsche’s agonistic philosophy. Resistance is a stimulant and Siemens exposes the underlying emotive phenomena in agonistics: the actual hindrance of one’s power by a resistance and the pain it creates can give one the feeling of power-pleasure (30). In this way the contest game oscillates between the pushing and pulling activities within the framework of constraints established by specific forms of contest. While there are degrees of separation between health and sickness, Siemens explains decadence in Nietzsche by way of resistance: décadence is the incapacity to resist (37). Since power is ascending and active in agonism, which runs on dynamically changing forms of active resistance, agonism would be resistant against décadence. In the following Chapter 2, Unity in Strife: Nietzsche, Heraclitus and Schopenhauer, Pearson focuses on such notions as conflict, unity and strife, as he draws stark contrasts between these two thinkers, who exercised much influence on the young Nietzsche, and shows what Nietzsche may have appropriated from their ideas. Heraclitus, unlike Schopenhauer, affirms the world as universal conflict (51); while unity exists through conflictual multiplicity for the former, unity subsists in complete independence of such multiplicity for the latter (53). While Heraclitus is an essentialist monist, Schopenhauer is a dualist. Nietzsche is neither a monist nor a dualist, and unity is not pre-given for him. There are only unities after things. Pearson pursues this subject and asks what kind of unity Nietzsche may endorse: unity based on power and relationality, what can be called “agonistic unity.” For Nietzsche, as Pearson rightly observes, hierarchies and unities are flexible and fluid and are not universally or eternally given. Although Nietzsche may seem closer to Heraclitus in thought, he rejects, per Pearson, that cosmic conflict is harmonious and law-governed (64). And while Nietzsche gradually distances his thinking from that of Schopenhauer, he may accept the idea of inner purposiveness (54 and 64).

Chapter 3, Competition and Democracy in Burckhardt and Nietzsche by Ritchie Robertson, starts with the evolution of re-interpretation of Greek culture by German thinkers and classicists from Johann Joachim Winckelmann to Jacob Burckhardt and traces the latter’s influence on the young Nietzsche. They were colleagues at the University of Basel, and there are many parallels between the two in their approaches to the agonistic culture of ancient Greeks: they both refer to Hesiod, especially on eris; they both emphasize the role of gymnasium/education in the culture of agon; they were both aware of the dark, aggressive side of agon; they were both critical of democracy and despotism (77–80); and they both explained the decline of the culture of agon in similar ways. Their divergence, however, can be explained by how Nietzsche later appropriated the spirit of agon into his works. Robertson then moves on to discussing cruelty and democracy in relation to agon, subjects that received much attention in agon literature and conferences of the last two or three decades. As for the last part of this article (86–8), on Nietzsche, Adam Smith and commercial competition, I do not see how this fits with agonism at all. The following chapter, Chapter 4, Competitive Ethos and Cultural Dynamic: The Principle of Agonism in Jacob Burckhardt and Friedrich Nietzsche, is a continuation of the same topic. Enrico Müller, however, presents the historical and cultural context of agonism in ancient Greece, as in the rise of the Greek city-state, its institutions, colonization, plastic power, and dynamic appropriation from other cultures. Müller also shows the parallels between Burckhardt and Nietzsche within the context of aristeia and eris. He also exposes, contra those who emphasize individualism in agon, the collective, cultural aspect of agonism and agon as cultural praxis (99), as agonistic practices were built on sensitive, fluid grounds. This is why many restrictive measures were taken such as ostracism against hubris (97).

Lawrence J. Hatab, in Chapter 5, Amor Agonis: Conflict and Love in Nietzsche and Homer, brings out an often-neglected aspect of agonism and also of Nietzsche’s works, namely, love. No doubt, there are different kinds of love and Nietzsche critiques all of them (108) and yet love is not missing in Nietzsche. His notion of love is that which embraces opposition and hostility; it is “love of an agonistic necessity” (110). And does such love exist in the Homeric world, Nietzsche’s early source of inspiration? And for Hatab, yes: contest and victory demanded a worthy opponent and among worthy equals there was “love” and “care” (115–6). Homeric heroes respected and admired each other, while being opponents. This is parallel, at the symbolic level, to Nietzsche’s notion of agonistic friendship and love. In the last chapter of this part, Chapter 6, Agonistic Communities: Love, War and Spheres of Activity, Christa Davis Acampora shows how agon organizes social relations (122). While contest assumes a dyadic structure, two opponents who fight against each other, there is a broader field of relations, a broader agonistic community that upholds such contest games, but its role is often forgotten. After discussing such topics as envy, management of conflict in agonistic institutions, and other measures to preserve the culture of agon, Acampora returns to those elements that make up the entirety of the institution of agon, including front-line participants, organizers (cult sites, judges, etc.), maintenance and re-distribution of agonistic values (such as celebration of the victor) in society. Among others, Nietzsche admired, as Acampora observes, the relationship between the individual and the community in the culture of agon.

Pleasure and displeasure dynamics, the role of pain and suffering in human life are significant aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy, and in Chapter 7, Nietzsche on the Pleasure of Agon and Enticements to War, Michael J. McNeal brings out many insights on this subject. First, Nietzsche rejects pleasure-oriented philosophies because they dismiss suffering and do not understand the dynamic relation between pleasure and pain. Second, for Nietzsche, pleasure results from overcoming obstacles and resistances (148), which entail pain, and which connects with growing. “The will to grow is the essence of pleasure” and “all becoming and growing involves pain” (Nachlass 1888, 14[101], KSA 13.278). Third, for Nietzsche pleasure and pain are ancillary to the “will to power.” All of these three points coalesce in agon and in the type of pleasure contest creates, as McNeal succinctly writes: “pleasure in contest that spurs healthy free spirits to overcome themselves through regimes of self-creation” (161). The following chapter, Chapter 8, Aidos, the Warrior-Pathos of Nietzsche’s Noble Philosopher, in Part III focuses yet on another human emotion, aidos or shame. As Florian Häubi remarks, shame is part of the warrior ethos of Homeric heros and reflects the status of oneself in relation to others as bearers of honor (167), what gods set as honorable corresponds to the order of rank that is inscribed into the soul of the hero. Häubi further explores what noble is and in what ways Socrates fails to uphold the noble culture of shame; hence the many critical remarks that Nietzsche makes against Socrates.

Chapter 9, “You Will the Eternal Recurrence of War and Peace” (GS 285), is a close reading of aphorism GS 285. As Isabelle Wienand notes in this chapter, in his draft for The Gay Science (1882–87), Nietzsche did not include peace; he wrote: “you will the eternal war” (183). Although in much of his writings Nietzsche emphasizes conflict as a natural element of life, peace or what may stand for peace is not missing in his thought, as Wienand argues. Nietzsche is not a war-monger (181), as she rightly establishes. This is one significant aspect of Nietzsche’s agon philosophy: agon is a transfiguration of war, of “bad eris” into “good eris.” What we are left with then is the agonistic sustenance of what peace and war may mean in Nietzsche at the deeper registers of human life. As for the last part of this chapter, I do not see how Nietzsche could support the idea of “conquest of nature” that one finds in Bacon and Descartes. The “mastery of the self” does not mean conquest of nature. In the last chapter of this part, Chapter 10, Philosophy as Terrorism: The Notion of “Attentat”, Guillaume Métayer explores the themes of terror, violence, attack, explosion or explosiveness, and the symbol of dynamite in Nietzsche’s texts. They all fall under Nietzsche’s “war” terminology. One thing that stands out in this chapter is Métayer’s study of attack in Nietzsche and how it differs from other kinds of attacks, for instance, the kind one finds in Voltaire. Nietzsche’s attack is more radical, goes further into the roots, than Voltaire’s and is beyond good and evil. And all these “war” acts are about discharge (200) and release of emotions (201).

In the last part of this anthology, Nicolas Lema Habash examines Nietzsche’s ideas on language in Chapter 11, Agon and Politics in Nietzsche’s Early Writings on Language. What stands out in this chapter are some of the distinctions Habash makes: instinctual language vs. conscious language, language of knowledge vs. language of doxa, etc. Habash not only studies Nietzsche’s early writings on the subject but also shows what influenced the young Nietzsche on the formation of his ideas on language, such as Herder. Another area Habash works on is the relationship between language and consciousness. From the standpoint of instinctual or “naturalized” language, the development of consciousness is harmful to language (214); so is the conceptual language, because concepts have fixed meanings and are harmful to the “natural” language that is always becoming. Habash then connects these ideas on language to rhetoric and agonism, as he claims that Nietzsche puts emphasis on rhetoric because it sustains the “natural” and instinctual aspects of language (225). The next chapter, Chapter 12, Hyperbole and Conflict in the Slave Revolt in Morality by Frank Chouraqui, carries on the language analysis in Nietzsche but presents another aspect of language, namely, hyperbole. Chouraqui shows how the slave revolt, although “slaves” are weaker than “masters,” takes over the noble warrior class and becomes successful by way of the use of hyperbole. There are many interesting arguments here that expose the undercurrents of the slave revolt and how the transcendental, after-worldly value-scheme of slaves takes over the immanentist, this-worldly model of the warrior class. Chouraqui fills in the blanks that Nietzsche left open, because Nietzsche does not get into these details of master-slave relationship. Hyperbole becomes a tool in the hands of the slaves against which the masters cannot do much. In Chapter 13, Why War Imagery? Loving Life as an Experiment des Erkennenden in “Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft,” Jonathan Agins discusses the relationship between knowledge and war in Nietzsche’s philosophy and the new aesthetic values that Nietzsche sets where he uses war imagery and terminology. Art comes as antidote for the unbearable, “disgusting” aspects of knowledge, for instance, such knowledge that all things come to an end, at the bottom of all things lie chaos. Art functions as savior against the despair such knowledge induces, as Nietzsche presents in The Birth of Tragedy (1872). Agins, however, focuses on later works, like The Gay Science. The last chapter of this collection, Chapter 14, The Aphorism as the Site of Conflict in Friedrich Nietzsche and Ludwig Hohl by Alexander Sattler, presents the aphoristic genre as an agonistic arena. Many conflicts merge here: among meanings, among sounds, between the reader and the writer, between philosophy and poetry, among different value-systems, etc. As Sattler remarks, in aphorisms constant tension exists between concealment and revelation (265). Furthermore, Sattler makes many good points about the aphoristic genre. There is, however, one point where I disagree with Sattler. This is where he suggests that brevity is not a good criterion of the aphoristic genre, which goes against the nature of the genre where concise writing is of utmost importance. I would say that brevity is not the only criterion of the genre, but yet it is one of its crucial criteria. In the third section of the chapter, Sattler brings the Swiss writer Ludwig Hohl into the discussion and how he used the aphoristic genre, especially with regard to the function of fantasy in his works.

In conclusion for this review, all fourteen chapters bring out many insights on Nietzsche’s works especially on such topics as agon/contest, conflict, violence, terror, attack, love, community, language, rhetoric, hyperbole, aphorism, and fantasy. It takes its place in the continuation of research and debates on agon. I highly recommend this work for anyone who is interested in and/or does research on these topics.

2. Agonal Perspectives on Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Critical Transvaluation by Herman W. Siemens is a close examination of Nietzsche’s philosophy of agon, as it brings out its many aspects such as conflict, war, transference or transposition, envy, ambition, legislation and community. The book consists of nine chapters. In what follows I will focus on some of the high points of these chapters and the contested areas in the study of agonism in Nietzsche. As Siemens argues in Chapter 1, agonism does not promote any type of violence but rather violence within its own domain, as was the case in the ancient Greek practice of agon. It is not a struggle for annihilation; on the contrary, agonal affects are different than the affects of annihilation (30). There are many forms of conflict; agonism, however, is a unique form of conflict that transpires among active forces. Siemens discusses the dynamics of active and reactive forces, as he shows how reactivity destroys the spirit of agonism. There is also a discussion of envy in this chapter, where envy is moderated by sacrifice.

Chapter 2 examines the subject of agonal agency and the influences of Georg Curtius and Burckhardt on the formation of Nietzsche’s early reception of agon, as it shows how Nietzsche agrees and disagrees with their views. While Curtius and Nietzsche agree on the cruel aspect of agon (44), Burkhardt and Nietzsche depart from Curtius’ classical and idealized vision of ancient Greeks. On the other hand, both Burckhardt and Nietzsche emphasize the measured character of agon (45). The chapter brings up another crucial aspect of agonism, namely, the transformation of the destructive aspect of human existence (53), what may also be called “transfiguration” (Verklärung), a term that appears frequently in Nietzsche’s works. Siemens, however, does not use it in this context. What is at stake is not any type of transformation but rather transformation towards higher goals and states, which “transfiguration” stands for. This transformation connects not only with the affirmation of life, as Nietzsche understands it, but it also includes that which is “inhuman,” a point Siemens rightly highlights in Nietzsche’s critique of modern humanism (53). Another aspect of agonism, which is discussed here and appears elsewhere, is the “reciprocal limitation among equals” (57). The chapter ends with reflections on the agonal affects of envy, jealousy, and ambition. These affects lie at the core of agon’s emotive phenomena and are formed in the agonistic community as shared emotions. I do not agree with Siemens’ statement regarding their limited value (59). On the contrary, without such emotions, among other things, there would not be any agon. Envy of higher goals, to be the champion, to be like heroes and gods, ambition to be the best and to win for one’s glory and the glory of one’s city are the driving emotions of contestants. The last interesting discussion in this chapter is the relationship between measure and excess and how ancient Greeks dealt with “excessive,” hubristic acts. However, I cannot follow Siemens’ association between excess in agonism and the Dionysian excess Nietzsche discusses in The Birth of Tragedy. Dionysian excess is not hubristic; on the contrary, such ecstatic excesses took place within the cult domain of Dionysus and, as such, were not hubristic.

In Chapter 3, Siemens presents the main thesis of his book, as he considers “the agon as a dynamic principle regulating Nietzsche’s philosophical practice of critical transvaluation” (66). This part shows not only the model of confrontation for Nietzsche but also how he uses this model and how it manifests itself. Nietzsche’s agons confront values in a community of readers with the assumption that this community will too be agonistic. Such agonal engagements are dynamically reciprocal and open-ended; they are process-oriented rather than goal-oriented. And Nietzsche’s confrontations do not aim to establish any absolute victory, since there are no absolute, permanent victors in agon. Consistent with Nietzsche’s perspectivism, no one side possesses absolute truth. Furthermore, Siemens emphasizes the communal aspect of agonism in ancient Greece and the presence of such agonal community in Nietzsche. The chapter ends with a revisit to the theme of ambition in agonal affectivity and other emotions such as revenge within the context of transference of war and destruction.

Chapter 4 addresses one of the central themes in Nietzsche’s works, namely, his critique of Socrates starting with his first published book, The Birth of Tragedy. Siemens rightly considers this book to be Nietzsche’s first transvaluation (90), as Nietzsche, in this work, establishes the opposition between aesthetic philosophical existence and the theoretical worldview of Socrates and challenges the subjugation of art to theoretical truth which is alleged to have the highest value. While Siemens touches upon some of the high points in Nietzsche’s critique of Socrates and his dialectical method and tries to show how Nietzsche escape the dilemma of being critical of discourse from within discourse, he fails to consider the broader context of art in Nietzsche which stands for all creativity. In other words, for Nietzsche “art” refers to all creative activity, as “the aesthetic justification of existence” signifies, whether it is discursive and linguistic, bodily, or occurs in a specific domain of art, as we traditionally understand it (plastic and visual arts, theater, music, etc.). No field of creativity is superior to another, simply because of the nature of their medium (despite Schopenhauer’s contrarian position that favors the musical arts). Although Siemens does not discuss this broader meaning of art in Nietzsche, he comes close to it when he states that Nietzsche confronts Socrates not within a theoretical discourse but rather within an artistic and agonistic cultural practice (104).

The problem of originality is explored in Chapter 5 within the context of agon. How can one attest for originality when there is no pure originality? Everything comes from everything else, even if they do not form a chain of causation, as metaphysicians claim. If there is no true originality, how can one speak of genius? Siemens starts this chapter with Kant’s ideas on the genius who is also self-legislating, as he discusses the distinction Kant makes between “passive imitation” and “creative succession” (114). For Siemens, Nietzsche breaks down this Kantian opposition by proposing the idea of an “agonal mimesis”: following a precedent does not preclude autonomy (119). In other words, one can continue with tradition and yet be agonistic at the same time, or carry on the tradition agonistically. This would be true if the tradition is agonistic to begin with. As Siemens notes, Kant’s idea of succession is displaced by an ideal of overcoming through mimesis in Nietzsche’s Untimely Meditations (1873–76). How agon comes to play a role in originality and transmission is presented at the end of the chapter when Siemens examines Plato’s agon with Homer, discusses agonal jealousy (or envy), and raises the problem of assimilation from the second Untimely Meditation.

In the following Chapter 6, Siemens builds on the idea of self-legislation and explores it from different angles in Nietzsche’s works. The chapter brings out many of Nietzsche’s positions on self-legislation, namely, that he is opposed to the heteronomy of self-legislation, moral universalism, and contemporary nihilism (170). Furthermore, Nietzsche considers law to be provisional, responsive to diversity, and not eternal or universal, and to be affirming the dynamic and pluralistic qualities of life (173). And laws are subject to interpretation and fulfilment. Chapter 7 continues with this discussion of what law is in Nietzsche. This chapter fleshes out many points, and one subject that stands out and needs more attention is the notion of immanent justice in Nietzsche’s works, which is also expressed as “lawfulness without a law” (208). Siemens discusses this topic in relation to taste and relates Balthasar Gracián’s ideas on taste to the agonistic community in Nietzsche. One meaning of taste here is shared value. Agonistic community shares values that appear in their interaction, playfulness and affectivity. There is also a section where the idea of fair play is discussed: “the idea of fair play was an invention of British public schools” (192). This cannot be true unless Siemens has a specific understanding of fairness. Homeric heroes played fairly; judges of contest games in ancient Greece had the reputation of fairness, as attested by Herodotus. Contestants swore to compete fairly, whether or not they upheld fairness at all times. Another point of contention here is the claim that agonal artists worked according to their own artistic standards (194). This is far from being the case in many artistic contests. In some singing contests, singers were given the script; they could improvise and be inventive in their performance but this did not mean that they created their own standards. On the contrary, they did not have the kind of freedom in creating their own standards, as Siemens claims. Siemens’ idea of modern freedom is alien to the ancient world. Furthermore, Siemens writes about the medial position in agonistic judgment, which emerges in the interaction of the entire agonistic community. This makes sense, and to say that the judges of contest held this medial position is not inconsistent. Judges were also part of the agonist community and had a special function in adjudicating with fairness in contestatory games. This does not diminish the role of spectators, which Siemens seems to be emphasizing. This chapter ends on a significant aspect of agonism, namely, agonal measure, which is discussed by way of Hannah Arendt, and reciprocal limitation.

Chapter 8 raises some painful questions in Nietzsche scholarship: can Nietzsche’s philosophy be therapeutic despite his counter-therapeutic remarks and in what ways can his works be construed as having healing functions? After listing four therapeutic aspects of Nietzsche’s agonism, Siemens brings Freudian psychoanalysis into the picture here and makes some comparative points. Despite several similarities between Nietzsche and Freud, he brings up what seems to him to be a difference: while Freud and psychoanalysis rely on the power of consciousness, for Nietzsche consciousness is weak and fallible. I do not think there is any difference here: both Nietzsche and psychoanalysis (and Freud) uphold that the unconscious is primary and consciousness is weak and fallible. The fact that in therapy one can be healed when one becomes conscious of a problem (trauma, for instance) does not mean that consciousness has become bigger and more significant than the unconscious for that person. Reliance on the power of consciousness is simply part of the healing process in the psychoanalytic space and does not mean that consciousness is superior or more significant than unconsciousness. Therefore, there is no disagreement here between Nietzsche and Freud. A second painful question Siemens raises is whether Nietzsche’s transvaluation may be reactive, despite Nietzsche’s posture and claim otherwise. And here Siemens brings up the subject of repetition and examines in what ways repetition entails reactivity. As opposed to the problem of self-referential consequences in Nietzsche’s call for transvaluation, Siemens proposes “agonal transvaluation” which has the power of healing.

The last Chapter 9 revisits the problem of war and war-praxis in Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s war-praxis, for Siemens, preserves opposition rather than destroying it. Agonism needs opponents to make contest perpetual. As Siemens observes, Nietzsche’s agonistic war binds all together, preserves opponents and the dynamics of opposition (265–6). Siemens further considers Nietzsche’s agonistic war-praxis from the perspective of power relations, as it involves “a dynamic of reciprocal affirmation or empowerment and reciprocal limitation or disempowerment” (267). Through such dynamics mastery and self-mastery are achieved in the agonistic community. The chapter ends with an insightful observation on gegen which means “instead of” in the nineteenth-century German as well as “over” and “against,” as Siemens touches upon the limits of the agonal model.

In conclusion, the book brings out many important aspects of agon in Nietzsche. One main criticism I have of the book is the absence of the broader context of ancient Greek agonism, which one finds in ancient Greek mythology and religion. In ancient Greece contests took place in the sacred precincts of gods and were religions practices. Nietzsche was aware of this sacred context of agon. Siemens does discuss the role of gods occasionally, but he does not expand on this broad religious aspect of Greek agonism. Another problem which could have been avoided easily is repetition. There are several repetitions in the book; for instance, sections on war-praxis in Nietzsche, which appears in Chapters 1 and 9. Since the latter chapter is a comprehensive treatment of this subject, that sub-section in Chapter 1 is not needed. Similarly, agonal envy appears in Chapters 1 and 2. And there are a few others. The book could have been edited to take out and/or to consolidate these repetitive parts and thus made shorter. Despite these repetitions, the book raises many important questions in Nietzsche’s position on and creative appropriation of ancient Greek agonism, questions that are relevant to thought and culture today.

3. James S. Pearson’s Nietzsche on Conflict, Struggle and War offers many thought-provoking ideas and readings of Nietzsche on this controversial subject. The book is structured in two parts, Part I: Agon Versus War, and Part II: The Struggle for Organization, with two comprehensive chapters in each. I will examine each chapter as I highlight some of its salient points.

Chapter 1, Reasons for War, presents Nietzsche’s ideas on war and contest especially from the standpoint of violence, drives, and discharge. Nietzsche uses the term “war” in many different ways throughout his writings, as the author observes, and his use of the term may have been influenced by Heraclitus, especially in his early writings. The task then is to uncover the symbol of “war.” Nowhere, in my view, does Nietzsche endorse, or could endorse, political war, although he does speak of its impact on culture and culture-making. That the early Nietzsche endorses “belligerent explosion of violently destructive conflict on account of their beneficial effect on culture” (49) is highly contestable. What kinds of benefits could such explosions bring about in the short and the long term? Even if the Nietzsche under discussion here were to uphold such a position, it can be proven to be wrong. What stands out in this chapter is the author’s introduction and discussion of drives and transference. For cultures to thrive there needs to be a healthy equilibrium of drives, a point Nietzsche often makes and the author emphasizes, an agonistic equilibrium in which all drives are sustained, and destructive drives are controlled through discharge, channeling, and transference. Nietzsche emphasizes the role of the poetic genius in his early works for such care of drives, as in Homer’s Contest (1872), which the author discusses (53). The poetic genius enables such a move away from all-out-destruction to transfiguration into agon. What follows these parts in Chapter 1 is an extensive discussion of catharsis, as the author explores not only Nietzsche’s texts but also related literature on the subject. Discharge or release is one way of handling the destructive drives, a subject that has gained prominence in psychoanalysis.

It is clear from many of Nietzsche’s writings that “the beast must come out.” However, unlike what the author suggests, referring to the quote from GM I, that Nietzsche supports the necessity of unrestrained violent contention (60), overall, he does not endorse out of context expressions of destruction. In the passage quoted, Nietzsche is exposing the noble sentiments and the “active” disposition of “master morality.” These are traits that the free-spirited nobles have. What is more valuable for Nietzsche is “the refined cruelty,” expressions of agonal, destructive instincts in their proper place, the way ancient agonists fought under the auspices of their gods within cult domains. In short, hors de concours violence does not serve culture-makers. Nietzsche was aware of that and, therefore, invested his thought in agon, violence within the cult domain as in ancient Greece or enframed violence in general.

In Chapter 2, Bounding Nietzsche’s Agon, Pearson pursues Nietzsche’s thoughts on agonal conflict, as he includes Curtius and Burckhardt in this discussion of agon. One theme that stands out is destruction. What is the place of violence and destruction in agonal conflicts? What are the constraints of conflict in agon? Although this subject is explored in terms of the species of conflict, the author ignores the sacred, religious aspect of agon in ancient Greece, which created these constraints for the agonist. And they were internalized through their ritual practices. Agonal conflict is not necessarily non-destructive, despite the author’s claim (74), but rather destructive trends and actions are restrained under the rituals established in these domains of the religious cult.

The second prominent theme is power and the will to power in conflict and struggle. No doubt, whether it is agonal struggle or struggle for annihilation, they are both expressions of the will to power (90); what needs to be brought into discussion here is Nietzsche’s introduction of “active” and “reactive” forces and forms of power in his power philosophy in his later works, as in On the Genealogy of Morality (1887). How can we approach this aporia of power in agon in general and in the light of our age today which is post-aristocratic? Ancient Greece promoted the culture of competition but only for limited circles, aristocrats, especially in its early stages. Class or blood aristocracy has declined in our age and this opens up the field to a broader participation in contests. It is only now that we can have the chance for a broader agon with those who have the talent, the formation and the desire to compete with their more or less equals in their respective fields. I do not think that agon is limited to aristocrats, old or new, but rather to those agonists who are qualified for the struggle regardless of their birthrights. This is a point of contention among Nietzsche readers. And Nietzsche, in his later readings of agon, moves away from his earlier aristocratic tendencies, as the author observes (107), to a new aristocracy based on new values and character-formation.

Another theme of this chapter that is important is the role of emotions in the equilibrium of agonistic forces. Some of these emotions are honor, not only honor in victory but also in struggle, shame (much has been written on the culture of shame among heroes), and hubris which was aimed to prevent the predominance of a permanent victor. Hubristic contestants were ostracized, and ostracism was one way of dealing with the superiority complex of victors. However, this was not the only way to prevent hubris in ancient Greek agon: there were measures taken, rituals observed before such drastic measures were applied. On a final note, the “limiting role of religion” (130) is a misleading phrase; it was Greek religion, with its cults and gods, that made agon possible; it created the game and its rules as well as its limits.

In Chapter 3, Conflictual Unity in the Untimely Meditations, Pearson presents two central problems in agon: the problem of hierarchy and the problem of the elite genius. It must be noted that hierarchy is not only external among agonists, but, most importantly, it is internal. This is why the higher self and the lower self become important subjects, as discussed by the author (160). In terms of the macro-universe of agon’s hierarchy in ancient Greece, we cannot exclude judges, umpires, trainers, priests, heroes and gods of agon and their crucial roles in the preservation of the culture of agon. Agon takes place in a hierarchical universe and egalitarianism is incompatible with it. What kind of role does the genius play in the culture of agon? Genius would be the victor of agon. One good example is Sophocles who won the tragedy contest against Aeschylus and became the genius of drama. The author notes that sacrifice for elite genius is compatible with agon. Agreed, as long as agon is not an exclusive club and does not shut itself off to agonists who are capable of struggle and contest. In conjunction with sacrifice, what is also needed is to accept loss and defeat and to see defeat as part of self-formation and self-overcoming. In other words, in agon, unlike in wars, sacrifice does not have to be permanent. A losing agonist now can be a victor in the next round. In fact, sometimes a victor may lose in the next round and could be the one to be sacrificed. There are no permanent geniuses in agon.

In his discussion of disintegration in Chapter 4, Organizational Struggle in the Later Nietzsche, Pearson remarks that according to Nietzsche it is caused by racial mixing (185). However complicated the notion of race may be, as the author explores this in another passage, this is far from being correct. For Nietzsche, whether for agon or modern culture, there are many reasons for disintegration and the loss of unity, which spans from the death of God, logo-centricity, and depreciation of creativity and plastic powers to egalitarianism and ascetic idealism, just to name a few, as well as philistine education, this last one noted by the author (186). On the other hand, Nietzsche is not categorically opposed to racial or cultural mixing, but he is opposed only to those haphazard, eclectic forms, as he points out in the second Untimely Meditation. He would be naive not to know that cultures have always mixed, including his beloved Homeric Greeks who became literate through Phoenicians and learned how to build temples from their eastern neighbors. The author is blind not to consider that great works came out of mixings of cultures, even as per Nietzsche’s own standards. The problem for Nietzsche is not mixing as such, but “how” mixing occurs. It is Nietzsche’s contention that democracy, one problem of modernity, enables eclectic mixing where all is equal, and for nihilism, another problem of modernity, anything goes. The author lists the elements of collective disintegration succinctly: the problem of rank and file (no recognition of what is higher, for instance), taming of the individual, no struggle or resistance, anarchy of elements, and democracy (194). The second half of Chapter 4 approaches the subject of struggle from the standpoint of organic life and its functions such as exclusion, excretion, separation and rejection. After showing how Nietzsche rejects teleological and mechanistic notions of nature, life and struggle and his emphasis on power and power relations, the author considers Nietzsche’s teachings on drives and sublimation. The chapter revisits the subject of disintegration and examines the political implications of Nietzsche’s agonal teachings.

The book is an in-depth study of Nietzsche’s ideas on struggle and its varieties such as wars and contests. The author demonstrates their connection to power, the will to power, and to fundamental human drives. One problem drive is destruction. The book amply shows how destructive urges manifest themselves in different areas of culture. The discussion of class and aristocracy in Nietzsche is another controversial subject of the book. The author raises many questions on their relevance to today’s society that is post-aristocratic. Finally, the subject of disintegration should be a concern for Nietzsche readers interested in culture and cultural transformation.

In conclusion to the review of all three books, they continue the debate on agon in Nietzsche, a subject which was incorporated by many thinkers in the twentieth century, but which was not explored closely until more recent times when an anthology, Nietzsche, Power and Politics, edited by Herman W. Siemens and Vasti Roodt came out in 2008, and Christa Davis Acampora and Yunus Tuncel published monographs on the subject in 2013.^[1] The relevance of the subject of agon and the importance of these works for our times cannot be overstated. First, they expose Nietzsche’s spirit and how it was formed (including how it was influenced by ancient Greek culture). Second, they bring to light many stylistic aspects of Nietzsche’s writings. Nietzsche likes to attack, but his attacks are contextual, they are agonistic; therefore, his texts can be viewed as platforms for contest. Third, agonism and its functions play and should play a crucial role in culture-making and these works have much to offer in that realm. One such function is the sublimation of destructive and violent urges and instincts, an important subject in psychoanalysis which was informed by Nietzsche. All in all, these three books reviewed here offer many insights and interpretations of Nietzsche’s works, which will benefit readers of scholars in their research on the subject.