Haecceity Mereology
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Ruoyu Zhang
Abstract
Haecceities are non-qualitative properties for individuation but the current theories about haecceities are still to be much more explored. This paper aims to develop a “haecceity mereology” – that is, an ontological system that understands substances as mereological combinations of haecceities and qualitative properties. In this way, the view developed is an alternative to Paul’s (2002. “Logical Parts.” Noûs 36 (4): 578–96; 2006. “Coincidence as Overlap.” Noûs 40 (4): 623–59) mereological approach. Three rules are proposed: (1) If S is a substance, then there is one and only one haecceity which is S’s qualitative part; (2) For all the fusions with the same haecceity, at most only one of those fusions is a substance; (3) When all the relevant elements are abundant, every element must overlap at least one substance. This is the first ontology of haecceities in the recent literature and would be a model for systematic metaphysics.
Acknowledgments
The author Ruoyu Zhang would like to thank Matthew Tugby, Stephen Mumford and Ben Curtis for their helpful comments.
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Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Original Papers
- In Praise of Externalism? Spaulding, Dewey, and the Logic of Relations
- Relations in the Metaphysics of Science
- Fictional Universal Realism
- Grounding and the Existence of God
- Inquiry & Ordinary Truthmakers
- Haecceity Mereology
- Not Just Many Worlds but Many Universes? A Problem for the Many Worlds View of Quantum Mechanics
- The Ontological Distinction between Persons and Their Bodies
- A Mental-Physical-Self Topology: The Answer Gleaned From Modeling the Mind-Body Problem
- Encoding in Conceivability-Contexts: Zalta’s Theory of Intentionality versus Bourgeois-Gironde’s Notion of Quasi-encoding
- Presentism & Passage
- Metaphysical Compatibilism and the Ontology of Trans-World Personhood: A Neo-Lewisian Argument for the Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge (Determinism) and Metaphysical Free Will
- The Question of Transcendence and Constraint in a Panartifactual Account of Being, Knowing and Making
- Can Non-Causal Explanations Answer the Leibniz Question?
- Two Notes on Composition
- Can Causal Powers Cause Their Effects?
- A “Nouvelle Métaphysique Thomiste” or Simply Neo-Cayetanism?
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Original Papers
- In Praise of Externalism? Spaulding, Dewey, and the Logic of Relations
- Relations in the Metaphysics of Science
- Fictional Universal Realism
- Grounding and the Existence of God
- Inquiry & Ordinary Truthmakers
- Haecceity Mereology
- Not Just Many Worlds but Many Universes? A Problem for the Many Worlds View of Quantum Mechanics
- The Ontological Distinction between Persons and Their Bodies
- A Mental-Physical-Self Topology: The Answer Gleaned From Modeling the Mind-Body Problem
- Encoding in Conceivability-Contexts: Zalta’s Theory of Intentionality versus Bourgeois-Gironde’s Notion of Quasi-encoding
- Presentism & Passage
- Metaphysical Compatibilism and the Ontology of Trans-World Personhood: A Neo-Lewisian Argument for the Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge (Determinism) and Metaphysical Free Will
- The Question of Transcendence and Constraint in a Panartifactual Account of Being, Knowing and Making
- Can Non-Causal Explanations Answer the Leibniz Question?
- Two Notes on Composition
- Can Causal Powers Cause Their Effects?
- A “Nouvelle Métaphysique Thomiste” or Simply Neo-Cayetanism?
