Fictional Universal Realism
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Jeffrey Goodman
Abstract
Certain realists about properties and relations identify them with universals. Furthermore, some hold that for a wide range of meaningful predicates, the semantic contribution to the propositions expressed by the sentences in which those predicates figure is the universal expressed by the predicate. I here address ontological issues raised by predicates first introduced to us via works of fiction and whether the universal realist should accept that any such predicates express universals. After assessing arguments by Braun, D. (2015. “Wondering about Witches.” In Fictional Objects, edited by S. Brock, and , A. Everett, 71–113. Oxford: Oxford University Press) and Sawyer, S. (2015. “The Importance of Fictional Properties.” In Fictional Objects, edited by S. Brock, and A. Everett, 208–29. Oxford: Oxford University Press) for fictional universal anti-realism, I propose a novel, Kripke-inspired argument for the same conclusion. I ultimately defend the claim that while this argument presents the strongest case for fictional universal anti-realism, it is nonetheless unsound. I conclude that nothing stands in the way of accepting that some fictional predicates express fictional universals.
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Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Original Papers
- In Praise of Externalism? Spaulding, Dewey, and the Logic of Relations
- Relations in the Metaphysics of Science
- Fictional Universal Realism
- Grounding and the Existence of God
- Inquiry & Ordinary Truthmakers
- Haecceity Mereology
- Not Just Many Worlds but Many Universes? A Problem for the Many Worlds View of Quantum Mechanics
- The Ontological Distinction between Persons and Their Bodies
- A Mental-Physical-Self Topology: The Answer Gleaned From Modeling the Mind-Body Problem
- Encoding in Conceivability-Contexts: Zalta’s Theory of Intentionality versus Bourgeois-Gironde’s Notion of Quasi-encoding
- Presentism & Passage
- Metaphysical Compatibilism and the Ontology of Trans-World Personhood: A Neo-Lewisian Argument for the Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge (Determinism) and Metaphysical Free Will
- The Question of Transcendence and Constraint in a Panartifactual Account of Being, Knowing and Making
- Can Non-Causal Explanations Answer the Leibniz Question?
- Two Notes on Composition
- Can Causal Powers Cause Their Effects?
- A “Nouvelle Métaphysique Thomiste” or Simply Neo-Cayetanism?
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Original Papers
- In Praise of Externalism? Spaulding, Dewey, and the Logic of Relations
- Relations in the Metaphysics of Science
- Fictional Universal Realism
- Grounding and the Existence of God
- Inquiry & Ordinary Truthmakers
- Haecceity Mereology
- Not Just Many Worlds but Many Universes? A Problem for the Many Worlds View of Quantum Mechanics
- The Ontological Distinction between Persons and Their Bodies
- A Mental-Physical-Self Topology: The Answer Gleaned From Modeling the Mind-Body Problem
- Encoding in Conceivability-Contexts: Zalta’s Theory of Intentionality versus Bourgeois-Gironde’s Notion of Quasi-encoding
- Presentism & Passage
- Metaphysical Compatibilism and the Ontology of Trans-World Personhood: A Neo-Lewisian Argument for the Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge (Determinism) and Metaphysical Free Will
- The Question of Transcendence and Constraint in a Panartifactual Account of Being, Knowing and Making
- Can Non-Causal Explanations Answer the Leibniz Question?
- Two Notes on Composition
- Can Causal Powers Cause Their Effects?
- A “Nouvelle Métaphysique Thomiste” or Simply Neo-Cayetanism?
