Presentism & Passage
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Paul R. Daniels
Abstract
According to the presentist, only the present moment exists and, as time passes, what’s present changes. However some argue that, if only one moment exists, the presentist cannot explain the passage of time. While the presentist historically appeals to surrogates—proxies which exist in the present but play the role of non-existent past times—to evade this sort of worry, the appeal to surrogates has come under renewed attack from Lisa Leininger. But hope is not lost for the presentist. I argue that presentists do have the resources available to address the underlying issue Leininger articulates. Moreover, there’s disagreement amongst presentists about which version of presentism is best. For instance, David Ingram has recently argued that thisness presentism is preferable to other versions of presentism because it’s able to handle certain problems other versions of presentism cannot. However, I argue that this assessment is premature. More specifically, I argue that Ingram’s response to an objection from Lisa Leininger fails to address the core issue she raises. Consequently, I argue that presentists shouldn’t embrace thisness presentism just yet. In this way, my aims here are to: sharpen Leininger’s objection, highlight tenable presentist replies to it, and advance the discussion about which version of presentism should be favoured.
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Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Original Papers
- In Praise of Externalism? Spaulding, Dewey, and the Logic of Relations
- Relations in the Metaphysics of Science
- Fictional Universal Realism
- Grounding and the Existence of God
- Inquiry & Ordinary Truthmakers
- Haecceity Mereology
- Not Just Many Worlds but Many Universes? A Problem for the Many Worlds View of Quantum Mechanics
- The Ontological Distinction between Persons and Their Bodies
- A Mental-Physical-Self Topology: The Answer Gleaned From Modeling the Mind-Body Problem
- Encoding in Conceivability-Contexts: Zalta’s Theory of Intentionality versus Bourgeois-Gironde’s Notion of Quasi-encoding
- Presentism & Passage
- Metaphysical Compatibilism and the Ontology of Trans-World Personhood: A Neo-Lewisian Argument for the Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge (Determinism) and Metaphysical Free Will
- The Question of Transcendence and Constraint in a Panartifactual Account of Being, Knowing and Making
- Can Non-Causal Explanations Answer the Leibniz Question?
- Two Notes on Composition
- Can Causal Powers Cause Their Effects?
- A “Nouvelle Métaphysique Thomiste” or Simply Neo-Cayetanism?
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Original Papers
- In Praise of Externalism? Spaulding, Dewey, and the Logic of Relations
- Relations in the Metaphysics of Science
- Fictional Universal Realism
- Grounding and the Existence of God
- Inquiry & Ordinary Truthmakers
- Haecceity Mereology
- Not Just Many Worlds but Many Universes? A Problem for the Many Worlds View of Quantum Mechanics
- The Ontological Distinction between Persons and Their Bodies
- A Mental-Physical-Self Topology: The Answer Gleaned From Modeling the Mind-Body Problem
- Encoding in Conceivability-Contexts: Zalta’s Theory of Intentionality versus Bourgeois-Gironde’s Notion of Quasi-encoding
- Presentism & Passage
- Metaphysical Compatibilism and the Ontology of Trans-World Personhood: A Neo-Lewisian Argument for the Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge (Determinism) and Metaphysical Free Will
- The Question of Transcendence and Constraint in a Panartifactual Account of Being, Knowing and Making
- Can Non-Causal Explanations Answer the Leibniz Question?
- Two Notes on Composition
- Can Causal Powers Cause Their Effects?
- A “Nouvelle Métaphysique Thomiste” or Simply Neo-Cayetanism?
