Abstract: This article argues that Kant’s doctrine of radical evil and the doctrine of conversion which is its consequent reflect developments in Kant’s thinking about moral agency and his realization that his theory of freedom was inadequate to the problem of moral evil; that the changes Kant makes to accommodate evil result in a significant though subterranean shift in his concept of agency, resulting in two incompatible concepts, one explicit but inadequate, the other implicit yet necessary; and that the problems Kant encounters with radical evil and conversion and the concept of agency they push him towards provide an important link between Kant and German Idealism.
© De Gruyter
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Titelseiten
- Zum Tod von Fumiyasu Ishikawa
- Kant and the Explanatory Role of Experience
- The Court of Reason in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason
- Kants Werttheorie? Versuch einer Rekonstruktion
- Converting the Kantian Self: Radical Evil, Agency, and Conversion in Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason
- Zu Eckart Försters Die 25 Jahre der Philosophie. Eine systematische Rekonstruktion
- Bericht über die japanische Edition von Kants Gesammelten Schriften
- Buchbesprechungen
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Titelseiten
- Zum Tod von Fumiyasu Ishikawa
- Kant and the Explanatory Role of Experience
- The Court of Reason in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason
- Kants Werttheorie? Versuch einer Rekonstruktion
- Converting the Kantian Self: Radical Evil, Agency, and Conversion in Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason
- Zu Eckart Försters Die 25 Jahre der Philosophie. Eine systematische Rekonstruktion
- Bericht über die japanische Edition von Kants Gesammelten Schriften
- Buchbesprechungen