Converting the Kantian Self: Radical Evil, Agency, and Conversion in Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason

Samuel Loncar

doi:10.1515/kant-2013-0023

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Converting the Kantian Self: Radical Evil, Agency, and Conversion in Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason

Samuel Loncar

Published/Copyright: September 1, 2013

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From the journal Kant-Studien Volume 104 Issue 3

Abstract: This article argues that Kant’s doctrine of radical evil and the doctrine of conversion which is its consequent reflect developments in Kant’s thinking about moral agency and his realization that his theory of freedom was inadequate to the problem of moral evil; that the changes Kant makes to accommodate evil result in a significant though subterranean shift in his concept of agency, resulting in two incompatible concepts, one explicit but inadequate, the other implicit yet necessary; and that the problems Kant encounters with radical evil and conversion and the concept of agency they push him towards provide an important link between Kant and German Idealism.

: radical evil; conversion; freedom; German Idealism

Published Online: 2013-09-01

Published in Print: 2013-09

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https://doi.org/10.1515/kant-2013-0023