Abstract: In Kant’s writings there is no worked out theory of values. Nonetheless,he has given some hints as to what such a Kantian theory of value might look like. I argue for the claim that his theory should be classified as a version of a fitting-attitude theory of value that is nowadays advocated by several philosophers. Values are, according to Kant, dependent on proper pro-attitudes (Kant’s term for pro-attitudes is Wohlgefallen). In order for a pro-attitude to be apt, the pro-attitude must be explained by reasons that are grounded in properties the attitude is about. One problem for this view is the so-called “wrong kinds of reasons problem”. According to my view, this problem can be solved by delivering distinct definitions of aptness for first- and second-order pro-attitudes. I try to show that Kant has hinted at this solution for the “wrong kinds of reasons problem”.
© De Gruyter
Articles in the same Issue
- Titelseiten
- Zum Tod von Fumiyasu Ishikawa
- Kant and the Explanatory Role of Experience
- The Court of Reason in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason
- Kants Werttheorie? Versuch einer Rekonstruktion
- Converting the Kantian Self: Radical Evil, Agency, and Conversion in Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason
- Zu Eckart Försters Die 25 Jahre der Philosophie. Eine systematische Rekonstruktion
- Bericht über die japanische Edition von Kants Gesammelten Schriften
- Buchbesprechungen
Articles in the same Issue
- Titelseiten
- Zum Tod von Fumiyasu Ishikawa
- Kant and the Explanatory Role of Experience
- The Court of Reason in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason
- Kants Werttheorie? Versuch einer Rekonstruktion
- Converting the Kantian Self: Radical Evil, Agency, and Conversion in Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason
- Zu Eckart Försters Die 25 Jahre der Philosophie. Eine systematische Rekonstruktion
- Bericht über die japanische Edition von Kants Gesammelten Schriften
- Buchbesprechungen