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Jenseits von Affektivismus und Intellektualismus

Kants kompatibilistische Theorie der Achtung
  • Jörg Noller
Published/Copyright: July 16, 2022

Abstract

In recent times, Kant’s theory of the moral feeling of respect has increasingly come to the centre of Kant research. His diverse and seemingly contradictory characterisations of this feeling in particular have led to continued controversial discussion. While a number of scholars try to understand the special role of respect in Kant by isolating this feeling from its conceptual context or solely referring to its role as moral motivation, I will concentrate on the systemic position of respect within the framework of Kant’s theory of the autonomy of reason. Furthermore, I will try to elucidate the different characterisations of respect given by Kant, referring not only to his ethics, but also to his general theory of transcendental idealism. Examining the special place of respect within Kant’s transcendental idealism, I will plead for a compatibilist reading of respect, according to which the “intellectualist” as well as the “affectivist” view both hold true. This is motivated by interpreting respect as a volitional structure featuring rational as well as emotional dimensions.

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Published Online: 2022-07-16
Published in Print: 2022-07-26

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