Abstract
We say a model is continuous in utilities (resp., preferences) if small perturbations of utility functions (resp., preferences) generate small changes in the model’s outcomes. While similar, these two questions are different. They are only equivalent when the following two sets are isomorphic: the set of continuous mappings from preferences to the model’s outcomes, and the set of continuous mappings from utilities to the model’s outcomes. In this paper, we study the topology for preference spaces defined by such an isomorphism. This study is practically significant, as continuity analysis is predominantly conducted through utility functions, rather than the underlying preference space. Our findings enable researchers to extrapolate continuity in utility as indicative of continuity in underlying preferences.
Acknowledgments
I wish to thank Kim Border, Laura Doval, Federico Echenique, Mallesh Pai, Omer Tamuz, and participants of the LA theory fest for insightful discussions that helped shape this paper. All remaining errors are, of course, my own.
Appendix A: Proofs
We start with a well known result. Under the final topology, U is open in
Lemma 1.
U is open in
Proof.
(⇐) Let
(⇒) Let
We now start characterizing the open sets in
Lemma 2.
Let
Proof.
Pick any
We now use Lemma 2 to show that F is an open map. To do this, we show F maps the basis of
Lemma 3.
Let U be an element in the basis of
Proof.
Let U be an element in the basis of
Case 1: ∩
x∈A
I(x) ≠ ∅. We will show that
Case 2: ∩
x∈A
I(x) = ∅. Because ∩
x∈A
I(x) = ∅ there exists x
0, y
0 ∈ A such that I(x
0) ∩ I(y
0) = ∅. Let
As a consequence of the previous Lemma, F is an open map.[9] Consequently, if
Part of Lemma 3’s proof involves showing that although sets of the form B(≻, A) generate the basis of
Example 6.
Suppose X = {1, 2, 3}. The following set is an element of the basis of
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof.
Let
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2 and Proposition 1
Theorem 2.
The space
Proof.
We first show
We now argue that
Proposition 1.
Let
Proof.
We proceed in two steps. Recall that ≃ denotes the total indifference preference.
Step 1: if
We may alternatively proceed using limit arguments. Let 0 denote constant function 0. Clearly F(0) = ≃. Let
Step 2: if
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2 and Theorem 3
For our next lemma, we start by recalling notation we introduced in the main text. For all x ∈ X,
Lemma 4.
Let
Proof.
Let (x, y) ∈ X × X be such that x ≿ y. If x ≻ y, then the locally strict property holds vacuously. Assume then that x ∼ y. Then, let N be a neighborhood of (x, y). Then, there is an open set G = G 1 × G 2 ⊂ X × X such that (x, y) ∈ G ⊂ N. Assume that for all (z, z′) ∈ G 1 × G 2 we had z ∼ z′. Because x ∈ G 1, for any z′ ∈ G 2 we get x ∼ z′. Thus, G 2 ⊂ < x >. By analogous reasoning, G 1 ⊂ < y >. Then, G 1 ⊂ < y > and G 2 ⊂ < x >, contradicting that G is open. Hence, there must exist (z, z′) ∈ G such that z ≻ z′, completing the proof.□
Proposition 2.
If X is finite, then
Proof.
Part 1: If
X
is finite, then
Let ≻ be a preference that is locally strict. We start with two observations about ≻: first, ≻ ≠ ≃ and, second ≻ must contain an infinite number of distinct indifference classes. Indeed, assume that ≻ only contains finitely many distinct indifference classes (say, N indifference classes). Then we can pick a representative from each indifference class and label them in an increasing way: x
1 ≻ x
2 ≻ (…) ≻ x
N
. Then
Part 2: If
X
is infinite, then
Theorem 3.
The space
Proof.
Let
Case 1:
Case 2:
Therefore, we can always find neighborhoods of ≻ and
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© 2025 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- Voluntary Partnerships for Equally Sharing Contribution Costs
- Final Topology for Preference Spaces
- Restricted Bargaining Sets in a Club Economy
- Asymmetric Auctions with Discretely Distributed Valuations
- Income and Price Effects in Intertemporal Consumer Problems
- Memoryless-Strategy Equilibria of a N-Player War of Attrition Game with Complete Information
- The Role of Technology in an Endogenous Timing Game with Corporate Social Responsibility
- Heterogeneous-Agent Models in Asset Pricing: The Dynamic Programming Approach and Finite Difference Method
- Notes
- EX-Ante Information Heterogeneity in Global Games Models with Application to Team Production
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- Voluntary Partnerships for Equally Sharing Contribution Costs
- Final Topology for Preference Spaces
- Restricted Bargaining Sets in a Club Economy
- Asymmetric Auctions with Discretely Distributed Valuations
- Income and Price Effects in Intertemporal Consumer Problems
- Memoryless-Strategy Equilibria of a N-Player War of Attrition Game with Complete Information
- The Role of Technology in an Endogenous Timing Game with Corporate Social Responsibility
- Heterogeneous-Agent Models in Asset Pricing: The Dynamic Programming Approach and Finite Difference Method
- Notes
- EX-Ante Information Heterogeneity in Global Games Models with Application to Team Production