Abstract
We study the connection between risk aversion, the number of consumers, and the uniqueness of equilibrium. We consider an economy with two goods and I impatience types, where each type has additive separable preferences with HARA Bernoulli utility function,
Funding source: Fondazione Banco di Sardegna
Acknowledgement
We would like to acknowledge Alexis Akira Toda and an anonymous referee for their useful comments and critical remarks.
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Research funding: The first author was supported by INdAM. GNSAGA – Gruppo Nazionale per le Strutture Algebriche, Geometriche e le loro Applicazioni. Both authors were supported by STAGE – Funded by Fondazione di Sardegna.
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Author contribution: All the authors have accepted responsibility for the entire content of this submitted manuscript and approved submission.
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Conflict of interest statement: The authors declare no conflicts of interest regarding this article.
A.1 Derivation of Eq. (14)
Consumer i maximizes (see (1))
under the constraint
where
By monotonicity of preferences, the budget constraint is fulfilled as an equality. By substituting y = pe i + f i − px into the objective function, we turn the constrained maximization problem into the unconstrained problem of maximizing the following function
The necessary (and sufficient) condition is
By setting
By summing over consumers i = 1, …, I and denoting
A.2 Proofs of the Intermediate Results
Proof of Proposition 7
At an equilibrium price p, the function (14)
vanishes, or equivalently
By Eq. (15), we can write these products as
and rewrite the expression accordingly:
By expanding and rearranging, we immediately get
Note now that by the change of index u ≔ t + 1, one gets
where in the last equality we use
By inserting this last equality into the previous expression, one gets
and the proposition follows. □
Proof of Lemma 8
We work by induction on I ≥ 2 for all t such that 1 ≤ t ≤ I − 1. The base on the induction is immediate
Assume now, by the induction hypothesis, that
for each integer 1 ≤ t ≤ I − 2. By (16) and (17), Eq. (22) reads as
that we can rewrite as
which is strictly positive by the induction assumption. □
Proof of Lemma 9
For fixed (e, f, σ, I), the aggregate excess demand function (18) depends on the price p and the parameter ϵ. Let p0 be a regular equilibrium of the function of one variable
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Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- Collusion, Shading, and Optimal Organization Design
- Software Cracking and Degrees of Software Protection
- The R&D Investment Decision Game with Product Differentiation
- An Urban Configuration with Online Competition
- Double Implementation in Dominant Strategy Equilibria and Ex-Post Equilibria with Private Values
- Risk Aversion and Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Economies with Two Goods and Arbitrary Endowments
- On Iterated Nash Bargaining Solutions
- Inter-league Competition and the Optimal Broadcasting Revenue-Sharing Rule
- The Weak Hybrid Equilibria of an Exchange Economy with a Continuum of Agents and Externalities
- Choosing Sides in a Two-Sided Matching Market
- Notes
- On the Relation between Private Information and Non-Fundamental Volatility
- Cost-Reducing Technologies and Labor Supply in a Krugman-type Model where Consumption is Time-Constrained: Some New Results