Double Implementation in Dominant Strategy Equilibria and Ex-Post Equilibria with Private Values
-
Makoto Hagiwara
Abstract
We consider the implementation problem for incomplete information and private values. We investigate double implementability of social choice functions in dominant strategy equilibria and ex-post equilibria. We define a new strategic axiom that implies “strategy-proofness” and that is implied by “secure strategy-proofness,” but the converse of these relationships does not hold. We call it “weak secure-strategy-proofness.” We show that a social choice function is doubly implementable if and only if it is weakly securely-strategy-proof.
Funding source: Japan Society for the Promotion of Science
Award Identifier / Grant number: JP17J01520
Award Identifier / Grant number: JP20K22110
Funding source: JSPS Overseas Challenge Program for Young Researchers
Award Identifier / Grant number: 201780041
Acknowledgments
This paper won the Kanematsu Prize from the Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration of Kobe University in 2019. I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers, three anonymous referees of the Kanematsu Prize, Ryo Kawasaki, William Thomson, Takuma Wakayama, and Takehiko Yamato for their invaluable advice and suggestions. I also thank Acelya Altuntas, Yu Awaya, Emiko Fukuda, Eun Jeong Heo, Tomomi Matsui, Yuki Tamura, Shigehiro Serizawa, Akiyoshi Shioura, Rodrigo A. Velez, and Jun Wako, as well as participants at study groups (University of Rochester, 2017, 2018), the 29th International Conference on Game Theory (Stony Brook University, 2018), and a workshop (Kansai University, 2018) for helpful comments. I thank Wiley Editing Services (https://wileyeditingservices.com) for English language editing.
-
Research funding: This work was partially supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers JP17J01520 and JP20K22110, and JSPS Overseas Challenge Program for Young Researchers Grant Number 201780041.
References
Abdulkadiroğlu, A., and T. Sönmez. 2003. “School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach.” American Economic Review 93 (3): 729–47.10.1257/000282803322157061Suche in Google Scholar
Bergemann, D., and S. Morris. 2005. “Robust Mechanism Design.” Econometrica 73 (6): 1771–813. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00638.x.Suche in Google Scholar
Bergemann, D., and S. Morris. 2007. “Belief Free Incomplete Information Games.” In Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1629. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1015247.10.2139/ssrn.1015247Suche in Google Scholar
Bergemann, D., and S. Morris. 2008. “Ex Post Implementation.” Games and Economic Behavior 63 (2): 527–66. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.10.006.Suche in Google Scholar
Chen, Y., Y. Liang, and T. Sönmez. 2016. “School Choice under Complete Information: An Experimental Study.” Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design 1 (1): 45–82. https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2016.12.002.Suche in Google Scholar
Chen, Y., and T. Sönmez. 2006. “School Choice: An Experimental Study.” Journal of Economic Theory 127 (1): 202–31. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.10.006.Suche in Google Scholar
Dasgupta, P., P. Hammond, and E. Maskin. 1979. “The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility.” The Review of Economic Studies 46 (2): 185–216. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297045.Suche in Google Scholar
Fujinaka, Y., and T. Wakayama. 2011. “Secure Implementation in Shapley–Scarf Housing Markets.” Economic Theory 48 (1): 147–69. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0538-x.Suche in Google Scholar
Gale, D., and L. S. Shapley. 1962. “College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage.” The American Mathematical Monthly 69 (1): 9–15. https://doi.org/10.2307/2312726.Suche in Google Scholar
Gibbard, A. 1973. “Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result.” Econometrica 41 (4): 587–601. https://doi.org/10.2307/1914083.Suche in Google Scholar
Moulin, H. 1980. “On Strategy-Proofness and Single Peakedness.” Public Choice 35 (4): 437–55. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00128122.Suche in Google Scholar
Repullo, R. 1985. “Implementation in Dominant Strategies under Complete and Incomplete Information.” The Review of Economic Studies 52 (2): 223–9. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297618.Suche in Google Scholar
Saijo, T., T. Sjöström, and T. Yamato. 2003. “Secure Implementation: Strategy-Proof Mechanisms Reconsidered,” Available at: https://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/publications/dp/03e019.pdf.Suche in Google Scholar
Saijo, T., T. Sjöström, and T. Yamato. 2007. “Secure Implementation.” Theoretical Economics 2 (3): 203–29.Suche in Google Scholar
Saran, R. 2016. “Bounded Depths of Rationality and Implementation with Complete Information.” Journal of Economic Theory 165: 517–64. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.06.002.Suche in Google Scholar
Shapley, L., and H. Scarf. 1974. “On Cores and Indivisibility.” Journal of Mathematical Economics 1 (1): 23–37. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(74)90033-0.Suche in Google Scholar
Vickrey, W. 1961. “Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders.” The Journal of Finance 16 (1): 8–37. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x.Suche in Google Scholar
© 2022 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- Collusion, Shading, and Optimal Organization Design
- Software Cracking and Degrees of Software Protection
- The R&D Investment Decision Game with Product Differentiation
- An Urban Configuration with Online Competition
- Double Implementation in Dominant Strategy Equilibria and Ex-Post Equilibria with Private Values
- Risk Aversion and Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Economies with Two Goods and Arbitrary Endowments
- On Iterated Nash Bargaining Solutions
- Inter-league Competition and the Optimal Broadcasting Revenue-Sharing Rule
- The Weak Hybrid Equilibria of an Exchange Economy with a Continuum of Agents and Externalities
- Choosing Sides in a Two-Sided Matching Market
- Notes
- On the Relation between Private Information and Non-Fundamental Volatility
- Cost-Reducing Technologies and Labor Supply in a Krugman-type Model where Consumption is Time-Constrained: Some New Results
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- Collusion, Shading, and Optimal Organization Design
- Software Cracking and Degrees of Software Protection
- The R&D Investment Decision Game with Product Differentiation
- An Urban Configuration with Online Competition
- Double Implementation in Dominant Strategy Equilibria and Ex-Post Equilibria with Private Values
- Risk Aversion and Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Economies with Two Goods and Arbitrary Endowments
- On Iterated Nash Bargaining Solutions
- Inter-league Competition and the Optimal Broadcasting Revenue-Sharing Rule
- The Weak Hybrid Equilibria of an Exchange Economy with a Continuum of Agents and Externalities
- Choosing Sides in a Two-Sided Matching Market
- Notes
- On the Relation between Private Information and Non-Fundamental Volatility
- Cost-Reducing Technologies and Labor Supply in a Krugman-type Model where Consumption is Time-Constrained: Some New Results
