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The Weak Hybrid Equilibria of an Exchange Economy with a Continuum of Agents and Externalities

  • Zhe Yang EMAIL logo
Published/Copyright: February 13, 2023

Abstract

Inspired by Zhao, J. 1996. “The Hybrid Equilibria and Core Selection in Exchange Economies with Externalities.” Journal of Mathematical Economics 26 (4): 387–407, Askoura, Y. 2011. “The Weak-Core of a Game in Normal Form with a Continuum of Players.” Journal of Mathematical Economics 47: 43–7, Askoura, Y. 2017. “On the Core of Normal Form Games with a Continuum of Players.” Mathematical Social Sciences 89: 32–42, Yang, Z. 2020. “The Weak α-core of Exchange Economies with a Continuum of Players and Pseudo-utilities.” Journal of Mathematical Economies 91: 43–50 and Yang, Z., and X. Zhang. 2021. “A Weak α-core Existence Theorem of Games with Nonordered Preferences and a Continuum of Agents.” Journal of Mathematical Economics 94: 102464, we establish an exchange economy with externalities and a continuum of agents. We define the weak hybrid equilibrium in this model and prove the existence theorem under the regular conditions. Furthermore, we analyze the relation between the set of hybrid equilibria and the set of competitive equilibria in an exchange economy without externalities and with a continuum of agents.

JEL Classification: C71; C72; D50; D51

Corresponding author: Zhe Yang, School of Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai, 200433, China; and Key Laboratory of Mathematical Economics (SUFE), Ministry of Education, Shanghai 200433, China, E-mail:

This study is supported by the Independent Scientific Research Project of Colleges for Shanghai University of Finance and Economics (Nos. 2014110323, 2021110348).


Funding source: Independent Scientific Research Project of Colleges for Shanghai University of Finance and Economics

Award Identifier / Grant number: 2014110323, 2021110348

Appendix: Proofs

Proof of Lemma 3.1

For any given p ∈ Δ, fD S (p) and p n ∈ Δ with p n p, the proof is obvious if

p S f ( t ) d μ ( t ) < p S w ( t ) d μ ( t ) .

Otherwise, since w ( t ) i n t R + L , t T and

p S f ( t ) d μ ( t ) = p S w ( t ) d μ ( t ) ,

we have

p S f ( t ) d μ ( t ) = p S w ( t ) d μ ( t ) > 0 ,

implying that there exists n1 > 0 such that for any n > n1,

p n S f ( t ) d μ ( t ) > 0 , p n S w ( t ) d μ ( t ) > 0 .

We next define f n L 1 S , R + L , n > n 1 , as follows:

  1. if

p n S f ( t ) d μ ( t ) p n S w ( t ) d μ ( t ) ,

then

f n ( t ) = f ( t ) , t S ;
  1. if

p n S f ( t ) d μ ( t ) > p n S w ( t ) d μ ( t ) ,

then

f n ( t ) = p n S w ( t ) d μ ( t ) p n S f ( t ) d μ ( t ) f ( t ) , t S .

Therefore, for any n > n1,

p n S f n ( t ) d μ ( t ) p n S w ( t ) d μ ( t ) ,

that is, f n D S  (p n ), ∀n > n1 and {f n } converges weakly to f. This completes the proof.

Proof of Lemma 3.2

Since S strongly hybrid blocks ( f ̄ , p ̄ ) L 1 T , R + L × Δ , it follows that there exist ɛ > 0 and g S D S ( p ̄ ) such that for any g N k S X N k S ,

u t , S g S ( t ) d μ ( t ) + N k S g N k S ( t ) d μ ( t ) , N k f ̄ ( t ) d μ ( t ) k k u t , N k f ̄ ( t ) d μ ( t ) k R > ε , t S .

Since y N k u ( t , y N k , x N k ) is nondecreasing for any fixed x N k R + L × ( r 0 1 ) , then if we select g N k S = 0 N k S , where 0 N k S is the almost everywhere null function, we have that

u t , S g S ( t ) d μ ( t ) , N k f ̄ ( t ) d μ ( t ) k k u t , N k f ̄ ( t ) d μ ( t ) k R > ε , t S .

Since {u (t, ⋅)|tT} is equi-continuous, it follows that there exists open neighborhoods O ( g S ) , O ( f ̄ ) of g S , f ̄ respectively such that for any h S O (g S ), any f O ( f ̄ ) and any tS,

u t , S h S ( t ) d μ ( t ) , N k f ( t ) d μ ( t ) k k u t , N k f ( t ) d μ ( t ) k R > u t , S g S ( t ) d μ ( t ) , N k f ̄ ( t ) d μ ( t ) k k u t , N k f ̄ ( t ) d μ ( t ) k R ε 2 > ε ε 2 > ε 2 .

By Lemma 3.1, D S is lower semicontinous. Then, there exists an open neighborhood O ( p ̄ ) of p ̄ such that

D S ( p ) O ( g S )

for any p O ( p ̄ ) . Thus, for any f O ( f ̄ ) and any p O ( p ̄ ) , there exists h S D S  (p′) ∩ O (g S ) for which

u t , S h S ( t ) d μ ( t ) , N k f ( t ) d μ ( t ) k k u t , N k f ( t ) d μ ( t ) k R > ε 2 , t S .

Since for any kR and any t N k , y N k u ( t , y N k , x N k ) is concave and nondecreasing for any fixed x N k R + L × ( r 0 1 ) , it follows that for any f O ( f ̄ ) and any p O ( p ̄ ) , there exists h S D S  (p′) such that for any g N k S X N k S and any tS,

u t , S h S ( t ) d μ ( t ) + N k S g N k S ( t ) d μ ( t ) , N k f ( t ) d μ ( t ) k k u t , N k f ( t ) d μ ( t ) k R u t , S h S ( t ) d μ ( t ) , N k f ( t ) d μ ( t ) k k u t , N k f ( t ) d μ ( t ) k R > ε 2 .

Therefore, every point of O ( f ̄ ) × O ( p ̄ ) can be strongly hybrid blocked by S. This completes the proof.

Proof of Lemma 3.3

By Step (d) of the proof of Lemma 3.2 in Yang (2020), it is similar to obtain that u ̂ k , j is continuous and concave. Moreover, by (H.5–2), it is easy to verify that

( y k , l ) l M k u ̂ k , j ( y k , l ) l M k , x k , l l M k k k

is nondecreasing for any ( x k , l l M k ) k k R + L × r k m r .

Proof of Lemma 3.4

We shall organize the proof by the following steps.

Step 1

Some notations.

Without loss of generality, we assume that

r ̄ = r 0 , N k = i = 1 n k S k , i , k R .

Then, for any kR, there exist M k = {1, … , m k } and { Q k , j T k | j M k } such that

Q k , j Q k , j = , j j , N k = j M k Q k , j , k R ,

and for any i ∈ {1, … , n k }, there exists BM k for which

S k , i = Q k , B = l B Q k , l .

Step 2

Converting into an exchange economy with finitely many agents.

We now consider an exchange economy

E ̂ = M ̂ , Ω ̂ , R + L , w ̂ q , u ̂ q q M ̂

with the following arguments.

  1. M ̂ = { ( k , j ) | j M k , k R } , Ω ̂ = { M k | k R }

  2. The space of commodities is R + L , and the space of prices is

Δ = p R + L | i = 1 L p i = 1 .
  1. For any q = ( k , j ) M ̂ , the initial endowment of q is defined by

w ̂ k , j = Q k , j w ( t ) d μ ( t ) .
  1. For any kR and any BM k , the feasible allocation set of the coalition B is defined by

X ̂ k , B = ( y i ) i B R + L × | B | | i B y i i B w ̂ k , i .
  1. For any kR and any BM k , the budget set of the coalition B is defined by

D ̂ k , B ( p ) = ( y i ) i B R + L × | B | | p i B y i p i B w ̂ k , i , p Δ .
  1. For any q = ( k , j ) M ̂ , the utility function of q is defined by

u ̂ k , j x r , l l M r r R = Q k , j u t , l M r x r , l r R d μ ( t ) .

By Lemma 3.3, the exchange economy E ̂ satisfies the conditions of Theorem 2.1. Then, there exist x r , l * l M r r R R + L × r = 1 r 0 m r and p* ∈ Δ such that

k = 1 r 0 l = 1 m k x k , l * k = 1 r 0 l = 1 m k w ̂ k , l ;
  1. for any kR and any BM k , there exists no y k , l l B D ̂ k , B ( p * ) such that for any z k , l l M k B X ̂ k , M k B and any jB,

u ̂ k , j y k , l l B , z k , l l M k B , x k , l * l M k k k > u ̂ k , j x r , l * l M r r R .

Step 3

Completing the proof.

We define f * L 1 T , R + L by

f * = f Q 1,1 x 1,1 * f Q 1 , m 1 x 1 , m 1 * f Q k , 1 x k , 1 * f Q k , m k x k , m k * f Q r 0 , 1 x r 0 , 1 * f Q r 0 , m r 0 x r 0 , m r 0 * .

Obviously, for any kR,

N k f * ( t ) d μ ( t ) = l M k Q k , l f * ( t ) d μ ( t ) = l M k x k , l * μ ( Q k , l ) μ ( Q k , l ) = l M k x k , l * .

By the result (a) of Step 2, we have

T f * ( t ) d μ ( t ) = k = 1 r 0 N k f * ( t ) d μ ( t ) = k = 1 r 0 l = 1 m k Q k , l f * ( t ) d μ ( t ) = k = 1 r 0 l = 1 m k x k , l * k = 1 r 0 l = 1 m k w ̂ k , l = k = 1 r 0 l = 1 m k Q k , l w ( t ) d μ ( t ) = k = 1 r 0 N k w ( t ) d μ ( t ) = T w ( t ) d μ ( t ) .

Furthermore, by way of contradiction, we suppose that some Sk,i can strongly hybrid block (f*, p*). Then, there exists BM k such that Sk,i = Qk,B. Moreover, there exist ɛ > 0 and g S k , i D k , S k , i ( p * ) such that for any h N k S k , i X k , N k S k , i ,

u t , S k , i g S k , i ( t ) d μ ( t ) + N k S k , i h N k S k , i ( t ) d μ ( t ) , N r f * ( t ) d μ ( t ) r k u t , N r f * ( t ) d μ ( t ) r R > ε , t S k , i .

From g S k , i D k , S k , i ( p * ) , it follows that

p * S k , i g S k , i ( t ) d μ ( t ) p * S k , i w ( t ) d μ ( t ) , p * l B Q k , l g S k , i ( t ) d μ ( t ) p * l B Q k , l w ( t ) d μ ( t ) , p * l B y k , l ( g S k , i ) p * l B w ̂ k , l ( t ) ,

where y k , l ( g S k , i ) R + L , l B is defined by

y k , l ( g S k , i ) = Q k , l g S k , i ( t ) d μ ( t ) , l B .

Thus, y k , l ( g S k , i ) l B D ̂ k , B ( p * ) and

l B y k , l ( g S k , i ) = S k , i g S k , i ( t ) d μ ( t ) .

For any z k , M k B = z k , l l M k B X ̂ k , M k B , we have

l M k B z k , l l M k B w ̂ k , l , l M k B Q k , l h Q k , l z k , l ( t ) d μ ( t ) l M k B Q k , l w ( t ) d μ ( t ) , Q k , M k B h N k Q k , B z k , M k B ( t ) d μ ( t ) Q k , M k B w ( t ) d μ ( t ) , N k S k , i h N k S k , i z k , M k B ( t ) d μ ( t ) N k S k , i w ( t ) d μ ( t ) ,

where h N k S k , i z k , M k B L 1 N k S k , i , R + L is defined by

h N k S k , i z k , M k B ( t ) = h Q k , l z k , l ( t ) , t Q k , l , l M k B .

Thus, h N k S k , i z k , M k B X N k S k , i and for any z k , M k B X ̂ k , M k B , we have that

N k S k , i h N k S k , i z k , M k B ( t ) d μ ( t ) = l M k B Q k , l h Q k , l z k , l ( t ) μ ( t ) = l M k B z k , l .

Hence, we have that y k , l ( g S k , i ) l B D ̂ k , B ( p * ) and for any z k , l M k B = z k , M k B X ̂ k , M k B and any jB,

u ̂ k , j y k , l ( g S k , i ) l B , z k , M k B , x r , l * l M r r k u ̂ k , j x r , l * l M r r R = Q k , j u t , l B y k , l ( g S k , i ) + l M k B z k , l , l M r x r , l * r k d μ ( t ) Q k , j u t , l M r x r , l * r R d μ ( t ) = Q k , j u t , S k , i g S k , i ( t ) d μ ( t ) + N k S k , i h N k S k , i z k , M k B ( t ) d μ ( t ) , N r f * ( t ) d μ ( t ) r k d μ ( t ) Q k , j u t , N r f * ( t ) d μ ( t ) r R d μ ( t ) > μ ( Q k , j ) ε > 0 .

This contradicts the fact that for any kR and any BM k , there exists no y k , l l B D ̂ k , B ( p * ) such that for any z k , l l M k B X ̂ k , M k B and any jB,

u ̂ k , j y k , l l B , z k , M k B , x r , l * l M r r k u ̂ k , j x r , l * l M r r R > 0 .

The proof is completed.

Proof of Lemma 3.5

For any f ∈ Θ, by (H.2), we have that for any tT,

0 f ( t ) μ ( { t } ) T f ( a ) d μ ( a ) T w ( a ) d μ ( a ) , 0 f ( t ) T w ( a ) d μ ( a ) ϕ ( t ) .

Let

A = x R + L : x T w ( a ) d μ ( a ) ϕ ( t ) ,

which is nonempty and compact in R + L . Then, Θ ⊂ L1 (T, A), where L1 (T, A) is the space of equivalence classes of A− valued Bochner integrable functions f: TA. By Yannelis (), L1 (T, A) is nonempty and weakly compact. Hence, Θ is also nonempty and weakly compact. This completes the proof.

Proof of Theorem 4.1

Let ( f * , p * ) L 1 T , R + L × Δ be a competitive equilibrium of E . We have that

T f * ( t ) d μ ( t ) T w ( t ) d μ ( t ) ;

for any tT, f*(t) ∈ D t  (p*) and

u ( t , f * ( t ) ) = max x D t ( p * ) u ( t , x ) .

Suppose that (f*, p*) is not a hybrid equilibrium of E . Then, there exist kR, S T k and g S D S  (p*) for which

u ( t , g S ( t ) ) > u ( t , f * ( t ) ) , t S .

Thus, g S (t)∉D t  (p*), ∀tS, implying that

p * g S ( t ) > p * w ( t ) , t S , p * S g S ( t ) d μ ( t ) > p * S w ( t ) d μ ( t ) .

We get that g S D S  (p*). It is a contradiction. This completes the proof.

Proof of Theorem 4.2

Let ( f * , p * ) L 1 T , R + L × Δ be a hybrid equilibrium of E . Then, we have that

T f * ( t ) d μ ( t ) T w ( t ) d μ ( t ) ;

for any kR and any S T k , there exists no g S D S  (p*) for which

u ( t , g S ( t ) ) > u ( t , f * ( t ) ) , t S .

It yields that for any tT,

u ( t , f * ( t ) ) max x D t ( p * ) u ( t , x ) .

We next prove that f*(t) ∈ D t  (p*) for any tT.

Since, for any tT, there exists a sequence x t n of R + L such that x t n f * ( t ) and

u t , x t n > u ( t , f * ( t ) ) ,

implying that x t n D t ( p * ) , that is,

p * x t n > p * w ( t ) .

As n → + , we have

p * f * ( t ) p * w ( t ) , t T .

Since

T f * ( t ) d μ ( t ) T w ( t ) d μ ( t ) ,

it follows that

p * T f * ( t ) d μ ( t ) p * T w ( t ) d μ ( t ) .

Then, we must obtain that

p * f * ( t ) = p * w ( t ) , t T ,

that is, f*(t) ∈ D t  (p*), ∀tT. This completes the proof.

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Received: 2021-08-10
Accepted: 2023-02-01
Published Online: 2023-02-13

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