Abstract
Surprisingly, formal proof on the optimality of a linear decision rule in the discrete time AK model with a CRRA utility function has not been established in the growth literature while that in the continuous time counterpart is well-established. This note fills such a gap: I provide a formal proof that consumption being linearly related to investment is a sufficient and necessary condition for Pareto optimality in the discrete time AK model.
Funding source: Yonsei University
Award Identifier / Grant number: 2021-11-0410
Acknowledgments
I thank the anonymous referee for helpful suggestions. I would like to appreciate Kyung-Woo Lee for his constructive comments for the earlier version of this paper. Seoyoon Jeong provided excellent research assistance. This research was supported by the Yonsei University and Yongwoon Scholarship Foundation (Yonsei-Yongwoon Research Grant No. 2021-11-0410). Any remaining errors are the author’s sole responsibility.
Appendix A. Proof for Necessary Condition
Suppose that
From the optimality condition (Eq. (3.1)),
Notice that this equation describes the sequence of
The next lemma would be useful for the proof:
Lemma 2
(Optimal consumption as a function of initial consumption). Let
Proof
Recursive substitution of the optimality condition (3.1) yields the above expression. □
Then
One can substitute the expression for
The next step is to verify that
Using the definition of ω,
Thus
Since
To further show that the above property holds for any t, I will use mathematical induction. Suppose that
Lemma 3
(Optimal rule for capital growth). Along the optimal path, the following should hold.
Proof
From Eq. (3.1),
Hence,
□
References
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© 2021 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- Duty to Read vs Duty to Disclose Fine Print. Does the Market Structure Matter?
- Cobb-Douglas Preferences and Pollution in a Bilateral Oligopoly Market
- Epsilon-Efficiency in a Dynamic Partnership with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
- Management Turnover, Strategic Ambiguity and Supply Incentives
- Uninformed Bidding in Sequential Auctions
- Arrowian Social Equilibrium: Indecisiveness, Influence and Rational Social Choices under Majority Rule
- Family Ties and Corruption
- Social Efficiency of Entry in a Vertical Structure with Third Degree Price Discrimination
- Insufficient Entry and Consumer Search
- Quality Competition and Market-Share Leadership in Network Industries
- The Effects of Introducing Advertising in Pay TV: A Model of Asymmetric Competition between Pay TV and Free TV
- Redistributive Unemployment Benefit and Taxation
- Constrained Persuasion with Private Information
- A Dynamic Graph Model of Strategy Learning for Predicting Human Behavior in Repeated Games
- Relative Income Concerns, Dismissal, and the Use of Pay-for-Performance
- Delegation in Vertical Relationships: The Role of Reciprocity
- Step by Step Innovation without Mutually Exclusive Patenting: Implications for the Inverted U
- Data and Competitive Markets: Some Notes on Competition, Concentration and Welfare
- Notes
- Optimality of a Linear Decision Rule in Discrete Time AK Model
- Equilibrium Pricing under Concave Advertising Costs
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- Duty to Read vs Duty to Disclose Fine Print. Does the Market Structure Matter?
- Cobb-Douglas Preferences and Pollution in a Bilateral Oligopoly Market
- Epsilon-Efficiency in a Dynamic Partnership with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
- Management Turnover, Strategic Ambiguity and Supply Incentives
- Uninformed Bidding in Sequential Auctions
- Arrowian Social Equilibrium: Indecisiveness, Influence and Rational Social Choices under Majority Rule
- Family Ties and Corruption
- Social Efficiency of Entry in a Vertical Structure with Third Degree Price Discrimination
- Insufficient Entry and Consumer Search
- Quality Competition and Market-Share Leadership in Network Industries
- The Effects of Introducing Advertising in Pay TV: A Model of Asymmetric Competition between Pay TV and Free TV
- Redistributive Unemployment Benefit and Taxation
- Constrained Persuasion with Private Information
- A Dynamic Graph Model of Strategy Learning for Predicting Human Behavior in Repeated Games
- Relative Income Concerns, Dismissal, and the Use of Pay-for-Performance
- Delegation in Vertical Relationships: The Role of Reciprocity
- Step by Step Innovation without Mutually Exclusive Patenting: Implications for the Inverted U
- Data and Competitive Markets: Some Notes on Competition, Concentration and Welfare
- Notes
- Optimality of a Linear Decision Rule in Discrete Time AK Model
- Equilibrium Pricing under Concave Advertising Costs