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Insufficient Entry and Consumer Search

  • Toshiki Matsuoka EMAIL logo
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 1. März 2022
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
Aus der Zeitschrift The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics Band 23 Heft 1

Abstract

This study considers a search market with an outside option and shows that entry may be insufficient. When a firm enters the search market, the price decreases, and consumers can search for more products, which increases the market demand and improves social welfare. However, firms do not internalize the effect, and insufficient entry can occur. Additionally, insufficient entry is likely to occur in a search market with low search costs and/or an attractive outside option, as these factors increase the socially optimal number of firms but decrease the firms’ profits.

Keywords: consumer search; free entry; insufficient entry
JEL Classification: D43; D83
Corresponding author: Toshiki Matsuoka, Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University, 2-1 Rokkodai, Nada, Kobe, Hyogo, 657-8501, Japan, E-mail:

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to the editor and two anonymous referees for their comments, which greatly improved this paper. I am also grateful to Tomomichi Mizuno, Takashi Shimizu, and Takashi Yanagawa for their helpful and valuable comments.

References

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Received: 2020-05-21
Accepted: 2022-02-07
Published Online: 2022-03-01

© 2022 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

Artikel in diesem Heft

  1. Frontmatter
  2. Research Articles
  3. Duty to Read vs Duty to Disclose Fine Print. Does the Market Structure Matter?
  4. Cobb-Douglas Preferences and Pollution in a Bilateral Oligopoly Market
  5. Epsilon-Efficiency in a Dynamic Partnership with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
  6. Management Turnover, Strategic Ambiguity and Supply Incentives
  7. Uninformed Bidding in Sequential Auctions
  8. Arrowian Social Equilibrium: Indecisiveness, Influence and Rational Social Choices under Majority Rule
  9. Family Ties and Corruption
  10. Social Efficiency of Entry in a Vertical Structure with Third Degree Price Discrimination
  11. Insufficient Entry and Consumer Search
  12. Quality Competition and Market-Share Leadership in Network Industries
  13. The Effects of Introducing Advertising in Pay TV: A Model of Asymmetric Competition between Pay TV and Free TV
  14. Redistributive Unemployment Benefit and Taxation
  15. Constrained Persuasion with Private Information
  16. A Dynamic Graph Model of Strategy Learning for Predicting Human Behavior in Repeated Games
  17. Relative Income Concerns, Dismissal, and the Use of Pay-for-Performance
  18. Delegation in Vertical Relationships: The Role of Reciprocity
  19. Step by Step Innovation without Mutually Exclusive Patenting: Implications for the Inverted U
  20. Data and Competitive Markets: Some Notes on Competition, Concentration and Welfare
  21. Notes
  22. Optimality of a Linear Decision Rule in Discrete Time AK Model
  23. Equilibrium Pricing under Concave Advertising Costs
https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2020-0087
Schlagwörter für diesen Artikel
consumer search; free entry; insufficient entry

Artikel in diesem Heft

  1. Frontmatter
  2. Research Articles
  3. Duty to Read vs Duty to Disclose Fine Print. Does the Market Structure Matter?
  4. Cobb-Douglas Preferences and Pollution in a Bilateral Oligopoly Market
  5. Epsilon-Efficiency in a Dynamic Partnership with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
  6. Management Turnover, Strategic Ambiguity and Supply Incentives
  7. Uninformed Bidding in Sequential Auctions
  8. Arrowian Social Equilibrium: Indecisiveness, Influence and Rational Social Choices under Majority Rule
  9. Family Ties and Corruption
  10. Social Efficiency of Entry in a Vertical Structure with Third Degree Price Discrimination
  11. Insufficient Entry and Consumer Search
  12. Quality Competition and Market-Share Leadership in Network Industries
  13. The Effects of Introducing Advertising in Pay TV: A Model of Asymmetric Competition between Pay TV and Free TV
  14. Redistributive Unemployment Benefit and Taxation
  15. Constrained Persuasion with Private Information
  16. A Dynamic Graph Model of Strategy Learning for Predicting Human Behavior in Repeated Games
  17. Relative Income Concerns, Dismissal, and the Use of Pay-for-Performance
  18. Delegation in Vertical Relationships: The Role of Reciprocity
  19. Step by Step Innovation without Mutually Exclusive Patenting: Implications for the Inverted U
  20. Data and Competitive Markets: Some Notes on Competition, Concentration and Welfare
  21. Notes
  22. Optimality of a Linear Decision Rule in Discrete Time AK Model
  23. Equilibrium Pricing under Concave Advertising Costs
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