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Irrelevance of the Strategic Variable in the Case of Relative Performance Maximization

  • Robert Philipowski EMAIL logo
Published/Copyright: September 19, 2017
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
From the journal The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics Volume 19 Issue 1

Abstract

We study games with two possibilities for the strategic variable and find that contrary to the Nash equilibrium the evolutionarily stable equilibrium – provided it uniquely exists – does not depend on which possibility is chosen. Our result generalizes recent findings of Satoh, Tanaka and Wagener who studied this issue in various special cases.

Keywords: games with two possibilities for the strategic variable; relative performance; evolutionarily stable strategy
JEL Classification: C72

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank an anonymous referee whose critical comments led to a considerable improvement of the paper.

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Published Online: 2017-09-19

© 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

Articles in the same Issue

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  2. Privatizing Multi-subsidiary Public Firm in Location Model
  3. Efficient Combinatorial Allocations: Individual Rationality versus Stability
  4. On Decay Centrality
  5. Sequential Auctions with Decreasing Reserve Prices
  6. The core of a strategic game
  7. Targeted Advertising on Competing Platforms
  8. Representation in Multi-Issue Delegated Bargaining
  9. Endogenous Mergers in Markets with Vertically Differentiated Products
  10. Standards of Proof and Civil Litigation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
  11. Retained Earnings, Interest Rates and Lending Relationship
  12. Uniform Price Auctions with Asymmetric Bidders
  13. Conformity and Influence
  14. Sellouts, Beliefs, and Bandwagon Behavior
  15. Notes
  16. Eco-Firms and the Sequential Adoption of Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility in the Managerial Delegation
  17. Vertical Contract and Competition Intensity in Hotelling’s Model
  18. Constrained Allocation of Projects to Heterogeneous Workers with Preferences over Peers
  19. Irrelevance of the Strategic Variable in the Case of Relative Performance Maximization
  20. Critical Efficiencies as Upward Pricing Pressure with Feedback Effects
  21. On the Openness of Unique Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium
  22. Forecast Dispersion in Finite-Player Forecasting Games
https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2017-0012
Keywords for this article
games with two possibilities for the strategic variable; relative performance; evolutionarily stable strategy

Articles in the same Issue

  1. Articles
  2. Privatizing Multi-subsidiary Public Firm in Location Model
  3. Efficient Combinatorial Allocations: Individual Rationality versus Stability
  4. On Decay Centrality
  5. Sequential Auctions with Decreasing Reserve Prices
  6. The core of a strategic game
  7. Targeted Advertising on Competing Platforms
  8. Representation in Multi-Issue Delegated Bargaining
  9. Endogenous Mergers in Markets with Vertically Differentiated Products
  10. Standards of Proof and Civil Litigation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
  11. Retained Earnings, Interest Rates and Lending Relationship
  12. Uniform Price Auctions with Asymmetric Bidders
  13. Conformity and Influence
  14. Sellouts, Beliefs, and Bandwagon Behavior
  15. Notes
  16. Eco-Firms and the Sequential Adoption of Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility in the Managerial Delegation
  17. Vertical Contract and Competition Intensity in Hotelling’s Model
  18. Constrained Allocation of Projects to Heterogeneous Workers with Preferences over Peers
  19. Irrelevance of the Strategic Variable in the Case of Relative Performance Maximization
  20. Critical Efficiencies as Upward Pricing Pressure with Feedback Effects
  21. On the Openness of Unique Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium
  22. Forecast Dispersion in Finite-Player Forecasting Games
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