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Does Evasion Invalidate the Welfare Sufficiency of the ETI?

  • Christian Gillitzer EMAIL logo und Joel Slemrod
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 16. August 2016

Abstract

In an influential article, Raj Chetty (2009, “Is the Taxable Income Elasticity Sufficient to Calculate Deadweight Loss? The Implications of Evasion and Avoidance.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 1 (2):31–52) argues that in the presence of tax evasion the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) is no longer a sufficient statistic for the marginal efficiency cost of funds (MECF). We show that, under Chetty’s (2009, “Is the Taxable Income Elasticity Sufficient to Calculate Deadweight Loss? The Implications of Evasion and Avoidance.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 1 (2):31–52) risk-neutrality assumption, correctly measuring the standard MECF only requires adding detected evasion inclusive of penalties. In the more general case of risk aversion, it further requires amending the formula to address the private risk-bearing cost of tax evasion.

Acknowledgment

We would like to thank Shlomo Yitzhaki for helpful comments. Opinions expressed are those of the author, and should not be attributed to the Reserve Bank of Australia

References

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Published Online: 2016-8-16
Published in Print: 2016-10-1

©2016 by De Gruyter

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