The Effect of Family Background on Student Effort

Zoë Kuehn; Pedro Landeras

doi:10.1515/bejeap-2013-0150

Artikel

The Effect of Family Background on Student Effort

Zoë Kuehn und Pedro Landeras

Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 17. Mai 2014

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Aus der Zeitschrift The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy Band 14 Heft 4

Abstract

Students from more advantageous family backgrounds tend to perform better than those from less advantageous backgrounds. But it is not clear that these students exert more effort. We build a model of students, schools, and employers to study the interaction of family background and effort exerted by the student in the education process. Two factors turn out to be key in determining the relationship between effort and family background: (i) the student’s attitude toward risk and (ii) how the student’s marginal productivity of effort depends on her family background. We show that when the degree of risk aversion is relatively low (high) compared to the sensitivity of the marginal productivity of effort, students from more advantageous family backgrounds exert more (less) effort. Empirically, we find that if parental education was reduced from holding a university degree to incomplete compulsory education, primary and secondary school students would exert around 21–23% less effort (approximately equal to a reduction of 2 hours weekly in homework). For primary school students we also find that marginal productivities of effort are higher for those from less advantageous family backgrounds.

Keywords: student effort; family background; risk aversion; educational standards

JEL classification: I21; I28; D81

Acknowledgments

We wish to thank José Mara Pérez de Villarreal, Antonio Cabrales, Brindusa Anghel, Raquel Vegas, Ainhoa Aparicio Fenoll, Daniel Garca, Dolores de la Mata, Alberto López Sebastián, Katie Quilici, and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments. We would also like to thank the Consejería de Educación, Juventud y Deporte del Gobierno Regional de la Comunidad de Madrid for granting access to the data and allowing its unrestricted use.

Appendix

Table 6:

Equivalence of educational categories and years of schooling

CDI
Category	Mean years of schooling
University	16
Apprenticeship	12.5
Higher secondary education	12
Lower secondary education	8
Compulsory education not completed	5

Table 7:

Students by parental background: primary/secondary school

Education/occupation	High white collar	Low white collar	High blue collar	low blue collar
University	17,530/16,366	2,989/1,804	1,084/541	307/261
Apprenticeship	3,187/2,723	1,483/1,419	685/743	157/201
Higher secondary education	3,160/3,886	3,145/2,780	1,617/1,291	432/474
Lower secondary education	2,006/2,039	3,043/2,877	2,199/2,280	600/726
Compulsory education not completed	225/157	723/421	946/710	332/257

Table 8:

Summary statistics: primary school students, 2009/2010

Variable	Mean (St. D)	Variable	Mean (St.D)
Overall test score	100.9 (13.1) (Min 60 Max 121)
Score girls (N = 22,354)	100.7 (12.8) (Min 60 Max 121)	Highest occupation among parents:
Score boys (N = 23,496)	101.1 (13.5) (Min 60 Max 121)	High white collar	0.57 (0.50)
Girl	0.49 (0.50)	Low white collar	0.25 (0.43)
Age	12.13 (0.36) (Min: 11 Max: 14)	High blue collar	0.14 (0.35)
Repeating grades	0.13 (0.34)	Low blue collar	0.04 (0.20)
Disabled student	0.02 (0.15)	Lives with:
Student with special needs	0.05 (0.23)	Mother	0.07 (0.26)
Attending:		Mother and one sibling	0.04 (0.20)
Public school	0.51 (0.50)	Mother and more than one sibling	0.02 (0.13)
Private school	0.10 (0.31)	Mother and father	0.16 (0.36)
Charter school	0.38 (0.49)	Mother, father, one sibling	0.42 (0.49)
Born in:		Mother and father and more than one sibling	0.17 (0.37)
Spain	0.82 (0.38)	Different living arrangement	0.12 (0.33)
Spanish speaking Latin America	0.10 (0.29)	When returning from school, awaited by:
Morocco	0.01 (0.10)	Mother	0.52 (0.50)
Rumania	0.02 (0.15)	Father	0.10 (0.30)
China	0.005 (0.07)	Mother and father	0.17 (0.37)
Elsewhere	0.04 (0.20)	Others	0.15 (0.36)
Started school		Nobody	0.06 (0.24)
Before age 3	0.55 (0.50)	Homework habits:
Age 3–5	0.42 (0.49)	Weekly hours of homework	8.79 (5.95) (Min 0 Max 40)
Age 6	0.02 (0.14)	Help from mother	0.27 (0.45)
Age 7	0.01 (0.10)	Help from father	0.10 (0.30)
Highest education among parents:		Help from mother and father	0.23 (0.42)
University	0.48 (0.50)	Help from private teacher	0.05 (0.21)
Apprenticeship	0.12 (0.33)	Help from others	0.06 (0.25)
Upper secondary education	0.18 (0.39)	Help from nobody	0.28 (0.45)
Lower secondary education	0.17 (0.38)	No help from parents	0.17 (0.37)
Without compulsory education	0.05 (0.21)	A little help from parents	0.63 (0.48)
Years of schooling	12.95 (3.45) (Min 5 Max 16)	Quite some help from parents	0.15 (0.35)
Years of schooling mother	12.28 (3.69) (Min 5 Max 16)	Much help from parents	0.05 (0.21)
Years of schooling father	12.19 (3.71) (Min 5 Max 16)	All help from parents	0.008 (0.09)
Schools	1,222	Schools	1,222
Students	45,850	Students	45,850

Table 9:

Summary statistics: CDI secondary school students, 2009/2010

Variable	Mean (St. D)	Variable	Mean (St. D)
Overall test score	100.1 (13.2) (Min 68 Max 131)
Score girls (N = 20,869)	100.1 (13.3) (Min 68 Max 131)	Highest occupation among parents:
Score boys (N = 21,087)	100.1 (13.2) (Min 68 Max 131)	High white collar	0.60 (0.49)
Girl	0.50 (0.50)	Low white collar	0.22 (0.42)
Age	15.42 (0.68) (Min: 14 Max: 18)	High blue collar	0.13 (0.34)
Repeating grades	0.32 (0.46)	Low blue collar	0.05 (0.21)
Disabled student	0.02 (0.14)	Lives with:
Student with special needs	0.09 (0.28)	Mother	0.07 (0.26)
Attending:		Mother and one sibling	0.04 (0.21)
Public school	0.49 (0.50)	Mother and more than one sibling	0.02 (0.14)
Private school	0.11 (0.31)	Mother and father	0.15 (0.36)
Charter school	0.40 (0.49)	Mother, father, one sibling	0.43 (0.50)
Born in:		Mother and father and more than one sibling	0.16 (0.37)
Spain	0.82 (0.38)	Different living arrangement	0.11 (0.32)
Spanish speaking Latin America	0.10 (0.30)	When returning from school, awaited by:
Morocco	0.008 (0.09)	Mother	0.47 (0.50)
Rumania	0.02 (0.13)	Father	0.11 (0.31)
China	0.005 (0.07)	Mother and father	0.14 (0.35)
Elsewhere	0.05 (0.21)	Others	0.14 (0.35)
Started school		Nobody	0.14 (0.34)
Before age 3	0.47 (0.50)	Homework habits:
Age 3–5	0.50 (0.50)	Weekly hours of homework	9.64 (6.55) (Min 0 Max 40)
Age 6	0.02 (0.15)	Help from mother	0.17 (0.38)
Age 7	0.007 (0.08)	Help from father	0.08 (0.27)
Highest education among parents:		Help from mother and father	0.15 (0.36)
University	0.45 (0.50)	Help from private teacher	0.09 (0.29)
Apprenticeship	0.12 (0.33)	Help from others	0.08 (0.28)
Upper secondary education	0.20 (0.40)	Help from nobody	0.41 (0.49)
Lower secondary education	0.19 (0.39)	No help from parents	0.31 (0.46)
Without compulsory education	0.04 (0.19)	A little help from parents	0.54 (0.50)
Years of schooling	12.86 (3.37) (Min 5 Max 16)	Quite some help from parents	0.12 (0.33)
Years of schooling mother	12.03(3.63) (Min 5 Max 16)	Much help from parents	0.02 (0.14)
Years of schooling father	11.98 (3.69) (Min 5 Max 16)	All help from parents	0.004 (0.06)
Schools	755	Schools	755
Students	41,956	Students	41,956

Table 10:

School fixed effects regression for hours of homework – primary school students: robustness check

	1–Log hours		2–Log hours		3–Log hours		4–Hours
Educational category parents:
Apprenticeship							0.160*	(0.095)
Higher secondary							–0.018	(0.086)
Lower secondary							–0.232**	(0.091)
Incomplete compulsory							–0.618***	(0.154)
Years parental schooling	0.012***	(0.004)
Years of father’s schooling			0.008*	(0.004)
Years of mother’s schooling			0.008*	(0.004)
Educational category father:
Apprenticeship					0.067**	(0.034)
Higher secondary					0.031	(0.034)
Lower secondary					0.019	(0.039)
Incomplete compulsory					–0.178***	(0.063)
Educational category mother:
Apprenticeship					–0.013	(0.037)
Higher secondary					–0.006	(0.033)
Lower secondary					–0.063	(0.039)
Incomplete compulsory					–0.115*	(0.065)
Occupational category parents:
Low white collar	–0.068**	(0.027)					–0.260***	(0.077)
High blue collar	–0.013	(0.037)					–0.204**	(0.098)
Low blue collar	–0.094	(0.062)					–0.403***	(0.152)
Occupational category father:
Low white collar			–0.044	(0.029)	–0.053*	(0.029)
High blue collar			0.002	(0.032)	–0.003	(0.032)
Low blue collar			–0.058	(0.055)	–0.067	(0.055)
Occupational category mother:
Low white collar			–0.030	(0.027)	–0.040	(0.027)
High blue collar			–0.080	(0.068)	–0.085	(0.068)
Low blue collar			0.027	(0.032)	0.026	(0.032)
Individual characteristics:
Has repeated grade	–0.524***	(0.171)	–0.541***	(0.162)	–0.531***	(0.163)	–0.287	(0.398)
Age	0.172	(0.162)	0.188	(0.149)	0.183	(0.150)	–0.554	(0.374)
With special needs	–0.583***	(0.075)	–0.563***	(0.082)	–0.549***	(0.082)	–1.372***	(0.151)
Disabled	–0.981***	(0.130)	–0.741***	(0.133)	–0.725***	(0.133)	–1.549***	(0.224)
Girl	0.035*	(0.020)	0.035*	(0.020)	0.036*	(0.020)	0.504***	(0.057)
Started school
Between 3 and 5	–0.029	(0.022)	–0.012	(0.021)	–0.013	(0.021)	–0.115**	(0.058)
Age 6	–0.151	(0.096)	–0.165	(0.105)	–0.156	(0.105)	–0.344	(0.225)
Age 7	–0.240*	(0.136)	–0.222	(0.144)	–0.206	(0.145)	–0.969***	(0.289)
Born in
Latin America	0.023	(0.045)	–0.010	(0.046)	–0.003	(0.045)	–0.234**	(0.116)
Romania	0.283***	(0.082)	0.196**	(0.083)	0.178**	(0.082)	1.177***	(0.213)
Morocco	0.403***	(0.139)	0.448***	(0.172)	0.494***	(0.171)	1.430***	(0.327)
China	0.132	(0.226)	0.226	(0.232)	0.245	(0.231)	1.143**	(0.480)
Elsewhere	–0.002	(0.054)	–0.016	(0.057)	–0.013	(0.057)	–0.015	(0.147)
Lives with:
Mother only	–0.116**	(0.046)	–0.080*	(0.048)	–0.080*	(0.048)	–0.378***	(0.116)
Mother and one sibling	0.013	(0.047)	0.025	(0.046)	0.024	(0.046)	–0.430***	(0.136)
Mother and more than one sibling	–0.001	(0.075)	–0.070	(0.087)	–0.063	(0.087)	–0.245	(0.210)
Mother and father only	–0.032	(0.030)	–0.011	(0.029)	–0.010	(0.029)	–0.004	(0.079)
Mother, father, and more than one sibling	–0.033	(0.029)	–0.027	(0.029)	–0.020	(0.029)	–0.131	(0.080)
Different living arrangement	–0.014	(0.036)	–0.011	(0.037)	–0.010	(0.037)	0.074	(0.097)
At home when returning from school:
Father	0.075**	(0.033)	0.060*	(0.035)	0.060*	(0.035)	–0.131	(0.096)
Mother and father	0.051*	(0.029)	0.033	(0.029)	0.034	(0.029)	0.015	(0.075)
Others	0.120***	(0.027)	0.091***	(0.028)	0.094***	(0.028)	–0.083	(0.082)
Nobody	0.063	(0.045)	0.045	(0.045)	0.048	(0.045)	–0.084	(0.128)
Homework help from:
Mother	0.097***	(0.030)	0.072**	(0.032)	0.071**	(0.032)	0.241***	(0.089)
Father	0.054	(0.036)	0.054	(0.037)	0.053	(0.037)	–0.027	(0.106)
Mother and father	0.102***	(0.032)	0.087***	(0.033)	0.086**	(0.033)	0.444***	(0.088)
Private teacher	0.167***	(0.048)	0.135***	(0.051)	0.135***	(0.051)	–0.018	(0.152)
Others	0.104**	(0.044)	0.123***	(0.046)	0.125***	(0.046)	0.236*	(0.137)
Homework help from parents:
A little	0.466***	(0.046)	0.412***	(0.046)	0.408***	(0.046)	0.536***	(0.089)
Quite some	0.407***	(0.053)	0.374***	(0.054)	0.369***	(0.054)	0.552***	(0.112)
Much	0.449***	(0.064)	0.385***	(0.065)	0.380***	(0.065)	0.852***	(0.176)
All	0.196	(0.156)	0.200	(0.160)	0.199	(0.160)	0.503	(0.373)
Constant	–0.895	(1.945)	–1.054	(1.790)	–0.772	(1.795)	15.070***	(4.485)
Observations	45,850		39,475		39,475		45,850
R-squared	0.026		0.021		0.022		0.020
Number of schools	1,222		1,221		1,221		1,222

^[1]

Table 11:

School fixed effects regression for hours of homework – secondary school students: robustness check

	1–Log hours		2–Log hours		–Log hours		4–Hours
Educational category parents:
Apprenticeship							–0.378***	(0.103)
Higher secondary							–0.169*	(0.093)
Lower secondary							–0.609***	(0.106)
Incomplete compulsory							–0.767***	(0.187)
Years parental schooling	0.010**	(0.005)
Years of father’s schooling			0.008*	(0.005)
Years of mother’s schooling			0.006	(0.005)
Educational category father:
Apprenticeship					0.024	(0.041)
Higher secondary					0.055	(0.034)
Lower secondary					–0.037	(0.043)
Incomplete compulsory					–0.118	(0.073)
Educational category mother:
Apprenticeship					–0.006	(0.041)
Higher secondary					–0.037	(0.037)
Lower secondary					–0.037	(0.043)
Incomplete compulsory					–0.090	(0.077)
Occupational category parents:
Low white collar	–0.041	(0.034)					–0.190**	(0.091)
High blue collar	0.005	(0.044)					–0.174	(0.115)
Low blue collar	–0.092	(0.071)					–0.023	(0.170)
Occupational category father:
Low white collar			–0.020	(0.034)	–0.030	(0.034)
High blue collar			–0.030	(0.038)	–0.033	(0.039)
Low blue collar			–0.075	(0.063)	–0.080	(0.063)
Occupational category mother:
Low white collar			0.003	(0.033)	–0.002	(0.033)
High blue collar			0.141*	(0.077)	0.137*	(0.077)
Low blue collar			0.038	(0.039)	0.036	(0.039)
Individual characteristics:
Has repeated grade	–0.291***	(0.087)	–0.314***	(0.094)	–0.314***	(0.094)	–1.027***	(0.163)
Age	–0.206***	(0.063)	–0.181***	(0.069)	–0.181***	(0.069)	–0.712***	(0.108)
With special needs	–0.084	(0.081)	–0.122	(0.092)	–0.121	(0.092)	–0.167	(0.214)
Disabled	0.032	(0.041)	0.028	(0.042)	0.029	(0.042)	0.006	(0.116)
Girl	0.266***	(0.024)	0.254***	(0.025)	0.255***	(0.025)	1.464***	(0.069)
Started school
Between 3 and 5	–0.001	(0.023)	0.008	(0.024)	0.007	(0.024)	–0.098	(0.064)
Age 6	–0.068	(0.097)	0.016	(0.109)	0.016	(0.110)	–0.032	(0.230)
Age 7	–0.060	(0.190)	0.138	(0.198)	0.147	(0.198)	–0.371	(0.354)
Born in
Latin America	–0.016	(0.047)	–0.061	(0.051)	–0.057	(0.051)	–0.600***	(0.124)
Romania	0.243**	(0.116)	0.275**	(0.118)	0.254**	(0.118)	1.592***	(0.273)
Morocco	0.179	(0.189)	0.068	(0.292)	0.104	(0.294)	1.587***	(0.423)
China	–0.712**	(0.296)	–0.860**	(0.335)	–0.854**	(0.336)	–0.028	(0.427)
Elsewhere	–0.027	(0.067)	–0.057	(0.077)	–0.055	(0.076)	–0.065	(0.160)
Lives with:
Mother only	–0.234***	(0.056)	–0.232***	(0.059)	–0.232***	(0.059)	–0.602***	(0.124)
Mother and one sibling	–0.066	(0.057)	–0.081	(0.059)	–0.081	(0.059)	–0.610***	(0.141)
Mother and more than one sibling	–0.038	(0.084)	–0.115	(0.098)	–0.113	(0.098)	–0.604***	(0.208)
Mother and father only	–0.026	(0.031)	–0.030	(0.032)	–0.030	(0.032)	0.039	(0.094)
Mother, father, and more than one sibling	–0.091***	(0.031)	–0.115***	(0.033)	–0.111***	(0.033)	–0.446***	(0.092)
Different living arrangement	–0.097**	(0.043)	–0.118**	(0.048)	–0.117**	(0.048)	–0.029	(0.105)
At home when returning from school:
Father	0.062*	(0.038)	0.070*	(0.040)	0.070*	(0.040)	–0.107	(0.102)
Mother and father	0.112***	(0.033)	0.124***	(0.033)	0.124***	(0.033)	0.154*	(0.093)
Others	0.041	(0.034)	0.041	(0.036)	0.043	(0.036)	–0.199**	(0.095)
Nobody	0.127***	(0.037)	0.105***	(0.038)	0.107***	(0.038)	–0.034	(0.104)
Homework help from:
Mother	0.165***	(0.031)	0.152***	(0.032)	0.152***	(0.032)	0.693***	(0.100)
Father	0.127***	(0.038)	0.079*	(0.042)	0.080*	(0.042)	0.611***	(0.126)
Mother and father	0.176***	(0.031)	0.168***	(0.033)	0.168***	(0.033)	1.163***	(0.106)
Private teacher	0.261***	(0.035)	0.252***	(0.037)	0.249***	(0.037)	0.638***	(0.119)
Others	0.222***	(0.038)	0.222***	(0.038)	0.222***	(0.038)	0.592***	(0.117)
Homework help from parents:
A little	0.463***	(0.032)	0.453***	(0.035)	0.451***	(0.035)	0.650***	(0.076)
Quite some	0.484***	(0.040)	0.474***	(0.043)	0.471***	(0.043)	0.984***	(0.117)
Much	0.432***	(0.079)	0.455***	(0.082)	0.453***	(0.082)	1.458***	(0.263)
All	–0.485	(0.306)	–0.102	(0.273)	–0.102	(0.273)	–1.270**	(0.556)
Constant	4.337***	(0.932)	3.938***	(1.035)	4.150***	(1.035)	19.810***	(1.618)
Observations	41,956		35,997		35,997		41,956
R-squared	0.039		0.040		0.040		0.063
Number of schools	755		754		754		755

^[2]

Table 12:

School fixed effects regression for log test score – primary school students: robustness

	Girls		Boys		Natives		Immigrants
Hours of homework	0.007***	(0.001)	0.004***	(0.000)	0.005***	(0.000)	0.009***	(0.001)
Hours of homework²	–0.000***	(0.000)	–0.000***	(0.000)	–0.000***	(0.000)	–0.000***	(0.000)
Educational category parents:
Apprenticeship	–0.019***	(0.006)	–0.004	(0.006)	–0.018***	(0.005)	0.017	(0.013)
Upper secondary	–0.011*	(0.005)	–0.016***	(0.005)	–0.016***	(0.004)	–0.004	(0.008)
Lower secondary	–0.015**	(0.006)	–0.018***	(0.006)	–0.023***	(0.005)	0.006	(0.010)
Incomplete compulsory	–0.048***	(0.009)	–0.032***	(0.010)	–0.048***	(0.008)	–0.024**	(0.011)
Occupational category parents:
Low white collar	–0.025***	(0.005)	–0.023**	(0.005)	–0.025***	(0.004)	–0.002	(0.008)
High blue collar	–0.023***	(0.007)	–0.047***	(0.006)	–0.038***	(0.005)	–0.013	(0.009)
Low blue collar	–0.044***	(0.010)	–0.031***	(0.010)	–0.042***	(0.009)	–0.007	(0.013)
Interaction:
Hwk * Apprenticeship	0.001	(0.001)	0.000	(0.001)	0.001**	(0.001)	–0.002	(0.002)
Hwk * Upper secondary	0.000	(0.001)	0.001	(0.001)	0.001	(0.001)	0.001	(0.001)
Hwk *Lower secondary	–0.001	(0.001)	0.001	(0.001)	0.000	(0.001)	–0.001	(0.002)
Hwk * Incomplete compulsory	0.002	(0.002)	0.000	(0.002)	0.002	(0.002)	–0.000	(0.002)
Hwk * Low white collar	0.001	(0.001)	0.001	(0.001)	0.001*	(0.001)	–0.002	(0.001)
Hwk * High blue collar	0.001	(0.001)	0.004***	(0.001)	0.002**	(0.001)	0.000	(0.001)
Hwk * Low blue collar	0.003**	(0.002)	0.001	(0.002)	0.002*	(0.001)	–0.001	(0.002)
Hwk²* Apprenticeship	–0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)
Hwk²* Upper secondary	0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)
Hwk²* Lower secondary	0.000**	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)
Hwk²* Incomplete compulsory	–0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)
Hwk²* Low white collar	0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)
Hwk²* High blue collar	0.000	(0.000)	–0.000**	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)
Hwk²* Low blue collar	–0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)
Homework help from:
Mother	–0.014***	(0.003)	–0.014***	(0.003)	–0.016***	(0.002)	–0.017**	(0.008)
Father	–0.011***	(0.004)	–0.002	(0.003)	–0.006**	(0.003)	–0.006	(0.010)
Mother and father	–0.004	(0.003)	–0.003	(0.003)	–0.005**	(0.002)	–0.007	(0.007)
Private teacher	–0.064***	(0.004)	–0.066***	(0.004)	–0.069***	(0.003)	–0.047***	(0.007)
Others	–0.016***	(0.003)	–0.016***	(0.003)	–0.019***	(0.003)	–0.013***	(0.005)
Homework help from parents:
A little	–0.014***	(0.002)	–0.021***	(0.002)	–0.017***	(0.002)	–0.017***	(0.004)
Quite some	–0.045***	(0.003)	–0.048***	(0.003)	–0.047***	(0.002)	–0.041***	(0.005)
Much	–0.057***	(0.004)	–0.063***	(0.004)	–0.063***	(0.003)	–0.048***	(0.007)
All	–0.077***	(0.010)	–0.091***	(0.009)	–0.091***	(0.008)	–0.061***	(0.013)
Started school
Between 3 and 5	–0.008***	(0.001)	–0.002*	(0.001)	–0.005***	(0.001)	–0.001	(0.003)
Age 6	–0.025***	(0.006)	–0.026***	(0.006)	–0.043***	(0.007)	–0.015**	(0.006)
Age 7	–0.056***	(0.009)	–0.042***	(0.008)	–0.049***	(0.012)	–0.052***	(0.007)
Born in
Latin America	–0.026***	(0.003)	–0.021***	(0.003)			0.007	(0.008)
Romania	0.004	(0.006)	0.013**	(0.006)			0.037***	(0.009)
Morocco	–0.021**	(0.010)	–0.025***	(0.009)
China	0.020*	(0.011)	–0.013	(0.015)			0.031**	(0.012)
Elsewhere	–0.006*	(0.004)	–0.004	(0.004)			0.031***	(0.008)
Individual characteristics:
With special needs	–0.149***	(0.005)	–0.149***	(0.005)	–0.147***	(0.006)	–0.157***	(0.005)
Disabled	–0.206***	(0.008)	–0.201***	(0.006)	–0.197***	(0.006)	–0.218***	(0.010)
Girl					–0.008***	(0.001)	–0.006*	(0.003)
Has repeated grade	–0.111***	(0.013)	–0.106***	(0.011)	–0.125***	(0.011)	–0.069***	(0.013)
Age	0.039***	(0.012)	0.027***	(0.010)	0.037***	(0.010)	0.017	(0.012)
At home when returning from school:
Father	–0.006**	(0.002)	–0.002	(0.002)	–0.003*	(0.002)	–0.007*	(0.004)
Mother and father	–0.004**	(0.002)	0.002	(0.002)	–0.001	(0.001)	–0.002	(0.004)
Others	0.001	(0.002)	0.004**	(0.002)	0.002	(0.001)	0.003	(0.004)
Nobody	–0.003	(0.003)	–0.003	(0.003)	–0.004	(0.002)	0.001	(0.005)
Lives with:
Mother only	–0.028***	(0.003)	–0.035***	(0.003)	–0.030***	(0.002)	–0.035***	(0.006)
Mother and one sibling	–0.005	(0.003)	–0.014***	(0.004)	–0.006**	(0.003)	–0.016**	(0.007)
Mother and more than one sibling	–0.018***	(0.005)	–0.016***	(0.006)	–0.016***	(0.004)	–0.021**	(0.009)
Mother and father only	–0.008***	(0.002)	–0.014***	(0.002)	–0.009***	(0.002)	–0.021***	(0.004)
Mother, father, and more than one sibling	–0.005***	(0.002)	–0.003*	(0.002)	–0.004***	(0.001)	–0.005	(0.004)
Different living arrangement	–0.012***	(0.002)	–0.011***	(0.002)	–0.012***	(0.002)	–0.011***	(0.004)
Interaction terms: Homework help by motherand/or father
with educational and occupational backgroundrespectively	yes		yes		yes		yes
Constant	4.177***	(0.145)	4.343***	(0.123)	4.228***	(0.123)	4.378***	(0.145)
Observations	22,354		23,496		37,734		8,116
R-squared	0.373		0.377		0.329		0.426
Number of schools	1,212		1,215		1,222		1,141

^[3]

Table 13:

School fixed effects regression for log test score – primary school students: robustness continued

	Test score below 25%		Test score above 75%		No homework help		Without repeaters disabled, specialneeds students
Hours of homework	0.003***	(0.001)	0.000*	(0.000)	0.001	(0.001)	0.005***	(0.000)
Hours of homework²	–0.000***	(0.000)	–0.000*	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)	–0.000***	(0.000)
Educational category parents:
Apprenticeship	0.005	(0.007)	–0.005**	(0.002)	–0.043***	(0.013)	–0.020***	(0.005)
Upper secondary	0.002	(0.005)	–0.001	(0.002)	–0.051***	(0.011)	–0.020***	(0.004)
Lower secondary	0.004	(0.005)	–0.004*	(0.002)	–0.041***	(0.012)	–0.028***	(0.005)
Incomplete compulsory	–0.015**	(0.007)	–0.013**	(0.006)	–0.068***	(0.018)	–0.043***	(0.010)
Occupational category parents:
Low white collar	–0.003	(0.005)	–0.003	(0.002)	–0.015	(0.011)	–0.026***	(0.004)
High blue collar	–0.009*	(0.005)	–0.001	(0.003)	–0.039***	(0.013)	–0.040***	(0.005)
Low blue collar	–0.015*	(0.008)	–0.001	(0.006)	–0.076***	(0.020)	–0.047***	(0.009)
Interaction:
Hwk * Apprenticeship	0.001	(0.001)	0.000	(0.000)	0.005**	(0.002)	0.002**	(0.001)
Hwk * Upper secondary	0.001	(0.001)	–0.000	(0.000)	0.007***	(0.002)	0.001*	(0.001)
Hwk * Lower secondary	–0.001	(0.001)	0.000	(0.000)	0.005**	(0.002)	0.001*	(0.001)
Hwk * Incomplete compulsory	0.001	(0.001)	0.001	(0.001)	0.006*	(0.003)	0.001	(0.002)
Hwk * Low white collar	0.000	(0.001)	–0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.002)	0.001*	(0.001)
Hwk * High blue collar	0.001	(0.001)	–0.000	(0.000)	0.002	(0.002)	0.002***	(0.001)
Hwk * Low blue collar	–0.001	(0.002)	0.001	(0.001)	0.005	(0.004)	0.004**	(0.001)
Hwk²* Apprenticeship	–0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)	–0.000**	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)
Hwk²* Upper secondary	–0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	–0.000***	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)
Hwk²* Lower secondary	0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)	–0.000**	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)
Hwk²* Incomplete compulsory	–0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)
Hwk²* Low white collar	–0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)
Hwk²* High blue collar	–0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)
Hwk²* Low blue collar	0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)
Homework help from:
Mother	0.001	(0.005)	–0.003***	(0.001)			–0.015***	(0.002)
Father	0.008	(0.006)	–0.002	(0.001)			–0.008***	(0.003)
Mother and father	0.000	(0.004)	–0.001	(0.001)			–0.005**	(0.002)
Private teacher	–0.007**	(0.004)	–0.017***	(0.002)			–0.081***	(0.003)
Others	0.000	(0.004)	–0.005***	(0.001)			–0.018***	(0.003)
Homework help from parents:
A little	0.002	(0.003)	–0.004***	(0.001)			–0.020***	(0.002)
Quite some	–0.003	(0.004)	–0.008***	(0.001)			–0.052***	(0.002)
Much	–0.012**	(0.005)	–0.010***	(0.002)			–0.068***	(0.003)
All	–0.027***	(0.007)	–0.004	(0.005)			–0.069***	(0.009)
Started school
between 3 and 5	0.001	(0.002)	–0.001*	(0.001)	–0.002	(0.003)	–0.005***	(0.001)
age 6	–0.006	(0.005)	–0.008**	(0.003)	–0.028**	(0.012)	–0.036***	(0.005)
age 7	–0.026***	(0.006)	–0.009	(0.007)	–0.059***	(0.017)	–0.053***	(0.008)
Born in
Latin America	–0.009***	(0.003)	–0.003**	(0.001)	–0.024***	(0.006)	–0.032***	(0.003)
Romania	0.009*	(0.005)	0.000	(0.002)	0.026***	(0.009)	0.000	(0.005)
Morocco	–0.018**	(0.007)	0.001	(0.004)	–0.010	(0.016)	–0.010	(0.010)
China	–0.010	(0.011)	–0.004	(0.004)	0.001	(0.020)	0.020**	(0.009)
Elsewhere	0.000	(0.004)	0.002	(0.001)	0.009	(0.007)	–0.009***	(0.003)
Individual characteristics:
With special needs	–0.090***	(0.003)	–0.017***	(0.004)	–0.159***	(0.011)
Disabled	–0.128***	(0.004)	0.003	(0.007)	–0.229***	(0.016)
Girl	0.004**	(0.002)	–0.002***	(0.000)	–0.015***	(0.003)	–0.009***	(0.001)
Has repeated grade	–0.023**	(0.008)	–0.004	(0.006)	–0.080***	(0.023)
Age	0.004	(0.008)	–0.002	(0.005)	–0.000	(0.021)	0.064***	(0.012)
At home when returning from school:
Father	–0.002	(0.003)	–0.002**	(0.001)	0.001	(0.005)	–0.005***	(0.002)
Mother and father	–0.005*	(0.003)	–0.000	(0.001)	0.002	(0.004)	–0.000	(0.001)
Others	0.006**	(0.003)	0.001	(0.001)	0.000	(0.004)	0.000	(0.001)
Nobody	0.005	(0.004)	–0.002**	(0.001)	–0.006	(0.005)	–0.004**	(0.002)
Lives with:
Mother only	–0.015***	(0.003)	–0.004***	(0.001)	–0.034***	(0.007)	–0.031***	(0.002)
Mother and one sibling	0.001	(0.004)	–0.003**	(0.001)	–0.013**	(0.007)	–0.011***	(0.003)
Mother and more than one sibling	–0.006	(0.007)	–0.006***	(0.002)	–0.028**	(0.013)	–0.018***	(0.004)
Mother and father only	–0.012***	(0.003)	–0.001	(0.001)	–0.014***	(0.004)	–0.008***	(0.001)
Mother, father, and more than one sibling	–0.001	(0.003)	–0.000	(0.001)	–0.008**	(0.004)	–0.004***	(0.001)
Different living arrangement	–0.010***	(0.003)	–0.002***	(0.001)	–0.016***	(0.005)	–0.011***	(0.002)
Interaction terms: Homework help by motherand/or father
with educational and occupational background respectively	yes		yes		no		yes
Constant	4.380***	(0.092)	4.780***	(0.060)	4.698***	(0.258)	3.908***	(0.139)
Observations	10,600		12,168		6,289		38,191
R-squared	0.285		0.043		0.364		0.144
Number of schools	1,172		1,141		1,159		1,220

^[4]

Table 14:

School fixed effects regression for log test score – secondary school students: robustness

	Girls		Boys		Natives		Immigrants
Hours of homework	–0.000	(0.001)	–0.001	(0.001)	–0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.001)
Hours of homework²	0.000	(0.000)	0.000*	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)
Educational category parents:
Apprenticeship	–0.025***	(0.007)	0.003	(0.007)	–0.011*	(0.005)	0.010	(0.011)
Upper secondary	–0.000	(0.006)	0.001	(0.005)	–0.001	(0.005)	0.009	(0.008)
Lower secondary	–0.007	(0.007)	–0.002	(0.006)	–0.003	(0.005)	0.000	(0.011)
Incomplete compulsory	–0.007	(0.009)	–0.004	(0.010)	–0.015*	(0.009)	0.016	(0.011)
Occupational category parents:
Low white collar	0.002	(0.006)	–0.000	(0.005)	–0.004	(0.004)	0.004	(0.008)
High blue collar	0.003	(0.007)	–0.005	(0.007)	0.003	(0.006)	–0.015*	(0.009)
Low blue collar	0.006	(0.009)	–0.011	(0.009)	0.002	(0.008)	–0.009	(0.010)
Interaction:
Hwk * Apprenticeship	0.002*	(0.001)	–0.001	(0.001)	0.001	(0.001)	–0.001	(0.002)
Hwk * Upper secondary	–0.001	(0.001)	0.000	(0.001)	0.000	(0.001)	–0.002	(0.001)
Hwk * Lower secondary	0.000	(0.001)	0.001	(0.001)	0.000	(0.001)	–0.000	(0.002)
Hwk * Incomplete compulsory	–0.000	(0.002)	0.000	(0.002)	0.002	(0.001)	–0.004*	(0.002)
Hwk * Low white collar	0.001	(0.001)	–0.000	(0.001)	0.001	(0.001)	–0.000	(0.001)
Hwk * High blue collar	–0.000	(0.001)	0.001	(0.001)	–0.000	(0.001)	0.003*	(0.002)
Hwk * Low blue collar	–0.002	(0.001)	0.002	(0.002)	0.000	(0.001)	–0.000	(0.002)
Hwk²* Apprenticeship	–0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)
Hwk²* Upper secondary	0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)
Hwk²* Lower secondary	0.000	(0.000)	–0.000*	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)
Hwk²* Incomplete compulsory	0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)	0.000**	(0.000)
Hwk²* Low white collar	–0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)
Hwk²* High blue collar	–0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)
Hwk²* Low blue collar	0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)
Homework help from:
Mother	–0.004	(0.004)	–0.002	(0.004)	–0.002	(0.003)	–0.011	(0.009)
Father	0.007	(0.005)	0.000	(0.004)	0.003	(0.003)	–0.001	(0.011)
Mother and father	0.004	(0.003)	0.001	(0.003)	0.002	(0.002)	–0.005	(0.008)
Private teacher	0.001	(0.003)	–0.000	(0.003)	0.001	(0.002)	–0.009	(0.006)
Others	0.007**	(0.003)	–0.004	(0.003)	0.002	(0.003)	0.002	(0.005)
Homework help from parents:
A little	–0.002	(0.002)	0.001	(0.002)	–0.000	(0.002)	–0.002	(0.004)
Quite some	–0.001	(0.003)	0.000	(0.003)	0.001	(0.002)	–0.004	(0.005)
Much	0.000	(0.006)	–0.006	(0.006)	–0.009*	(0.005)	0.015*	(0.009)
All	0.001	(0.015)	0.023*	(0.012)	0.001	(0.011)	0.039**	(0.017)
Started school
between 3 and 5	0.001	(0.002)	–0.002	(0.002)	–0.001	(0.001)	0.003	(0.004)
age 6	0.004	(0.006)	0.003	(0.005)	0.011	(0.007)	–0.000	(0.005)
age 7	–0.008	(0.010)	–0.006	(0.008)	0.044***	(0.014)	–0.008	(0.008)
Born in
Latin America	–0.002	(0.003)	0.003	(0.003)			–0.008	(0.008)
Romania	–0.002	(0.006)	–0.002	(0.007)			–0.007	(0.009)
Morocco	0.014	(0.010)	–0.004	(0.009)
China	–0.003	(0.012)	–0.007	(0.011)			–0.010	(0.012)
Elsewhere	0.004	(0.004)	–0.005	(0.004)			–0.006	(0.008)
Individual characteristics:
With special needs	–0.190***	(0.007)	–0.183***	(0.006)	–0.187***	(0.005)	–0.186***	(0.011)
Disabled	–0.143***	(0.003)	–0.144***	(0.003)	–0.143***	(0.003)	–0.147***	(0.005)
Girl					–0.000	(0.001)	0.001	(0.003)
Has repeated grade	0.004	(0.004)	–0.006	(0.004)	0.002	(0.004)	–0.006	(0.006)
Age	–0.005*	(0.003)	0.005*	(0.003)	–0.002	(0.003)	0.003	(0.004)
At home when returning from school:
Father	0.002	(0.003)	–0.002	(0.003)	–0.002	(0.002)	0.009**	(0.005)
Mother and father	–0.004*	(0.002)	–0.000	(0.002)	–0.003*	(0.002)	0.002	(0.005)
Others	0.001	(0.002)	–0.001	(0.003)	0.001	(0.002)	–0.002	(0.004)
Nobody	–0.001	(0.002)	0.001	(0.002)	–0.001	(0.002)	0.003	(0.004)
Lives with:
Mother only	0.002	(0.003)	–0.001	(0.004)	–0.003	(0.003)	0.007	(0.005)
Mother and one sibling	–0.002	(0.004)	0.001	(0.004)	–0.000	(0.003)	–0.003	(0.007)
Mother and more than one sibling	–0.010*	(0.006)	0.007	(0.006)	–0.000	(0.005)	–0.004	(0.008)
Mother and father only	–0.000	(0.002)	–0.004*	(0.002)	–0.003	(0.002)	–0.001	(0.005)
Mother, father, and more than one sibling	0.002	(0.002)	0.000	(0.003)	0.001	(0.002)	–0.000	(0.004)
Different living arrangement	–0.004	(0.003)	0.001	(0.003)	–0.003	(0.002)	0.003	(0.004)
Interaction terms: Homework help by mother and/or father
With educational and occupational background respectively	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Constant	4.698***	(0.047)	4.535***	(0.043)	4.644***	(0.039)	4.569***	(0.056)
Observations	20,869		21,087		34,498		7,458
R-squared	0.146		0.141		0.142		0.157
Number of schools	749		744		754		715

^[5]

Table 15:

School fixed effects regression for log test score – secondary school students: robustness continued

	Test score below 25%		Test score above 75%		No homework help		Without repeaters disabled, specialneeds students
Hours of homework	0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)	–0.001	(0.001)	–0.000	(0.000)
Hours of homework²	–0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)
Educational category parents:
Apprenticeship	–0.004	(0.005)	0.005	(0.004)	–0.002	(0.009)	–0.005	(0.007)
Upper secondary	–0.001	(0.004)	0.001	(0.003)	–0.002	(0.007)	0.003	(0.006)
Lower secondary	–0.001	(0.004)	0.003	(0.003)	–0.016**	(0.008)	–0.002	(0.007)
Incomplete compulsory	0.005	(0.007)	0.001	(0.005)	–0.007	(0.012)	–0.008	(0.012)
Occupational category parents:
Low white collar	–0.001	(0.004)	–0.007***	(0.003)	0.004	(0.007)	–0.002	(0.006)
High blue collar	0.002	(0.005)	–0.005	(0.003)	–0.001	(0.009)	–0.003	(0.008)
Low blue collar	–0.000	(0.007)	–0.010**	(0.004)	–0.004	(0.010)	–0.004	(0.011)
Interaction:
Hwk * Apprenticeship	0.001	(0.001)	–0.001	(0.001)	–0.000	(0.001)	–0.001	(0.001)
Hwk * Upper secondary	0.000	(0.001)	–0.000	(0.000)	0.001	(0.001)	–0.001	(0.001)
Hwk * Lower secondary	0.000	(0.001)	–0.000	(0.001)	0.003**	(0.001)	–0.000	(0.001)
Hwk * Incomplete compulsory	–0.001	(0.001)	–0.000	(0.001)	0.000	(0.002)	–0.001	(0.002)
Hwk * Low white collar	–0.000	(0.001)	0.001	(0.000)	–0.001	(0.001)	0.001	(0.001)
Hwk * High blue collar	–0.000	(0.001)	0.000	(0.000)	–0.001	(0.002)	0.001	(0.001)
Hwk * Low blue collar	–0.001	(0.001)	0.002**	(0.001)	–0.002	(0.002)	0.003	(0.002)
Hwk²* Apprenticeship	–0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)
Hwk²* Upper secondary	–0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)
Hwk²* Lower secondary	–0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	–0.000***	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)
Hwk²* Incomplete compulsory	0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)
Hwk²* Low white collar	0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)
Hwk²* High blue collar	0.000	(0.000)	–0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	–0.000**	(0.000)
Hwk²* Low blue collar	0.000	(0.000)	–0.000***	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	–0.000**	(0.000)
Homework help from:
Mother	0.002	(0.003)	–0.004**	(0.002)			–0.002	(0.003)
Father	–0.002	(0.004)	–0.003	(0.002)			0.006	(0.004)
Mother and father	0.001	(0.003)	–0.001	(0.002)			0.002	(0.003)
Private teacher	–0.004	(0.002)	–0.002*	(0.001)			0.002	(0.003)
Others	–0.000	(0.002)	0.001	(0.002)			0.003	(0.003)
Homework help from parents:
A little	–0.000	(0.002)	0.001	(0.001)			–0.000	(0.002)
Quite some	0.000	(0.002)	0.002	(0.002)			–0.001	(0.003)
Much	0.000	(0.004)	0.000	(0.003)			–0.002	(0.006)
All	0.006	(0.011)	0.004	(0.005)			–0.000	(0.015)
Started school
Between 3 and 5	0.000	(0.001)	0.000	(0.001)	0.001	(0.003)	–0.002	(0.002)
Age 6	0.004	(0.004)	0.001	(0.003)	–0.001	(0.007)	0.004	(0.006)
Age 7	0.009	(0.007)	0.002	(0.005)	–0.010	(0.012)	0.015	(0.015)
Born in
Latin America	0.001	(0.002)	0.000	(0.002)	–0.001	(0.004)	0.001	(0.003)
Romania	0.004	(0.005)	–0.006*	(0.003)	–0.002	(0.008)	–0.003	(0.008)
Morocco	–0.004	(0.009)	0.001	(0.004)	–0.004	(0.011)	0.014	(0.016)
China	0.008	(0.008)	0.007	(0.006)	–0.000	(0.014)	–0.007	(0.017)
Elsewhere	0.001	(0.003)	–0.003	(0.002)	0.000	(0.005)	–0.003	(0.004)
Individual characteristics:
With special needs	–0.064***	(0.004)	–0.023**	(0.009)	–0.183***	(0.009)
Disabled	–0.034***	(0.002)	–0.027***	(0.005)	–0.141***	(0.005)
Girl	–0.000	(0.001)	0.001	(0.001)	0.002	(0.002)	0.001	(0.001)
Has repeated grade	–0.002	(0.003)	–0.005**	(0.002)	0.001	(0.006)
Age	0.001	(0.002)	0.004***	(0.001)	–0.000	(0.004)	0.025	(0.022)
At home when returning from school:
Father	–0.000	(0.002)	0.000	(0.001)	0.004	(0.004)	0.002	(0.003)
Mother and father	–0.001	(0.002)	–0.002	(0.001)	0.000	(0.004)	–0.000	(0.002)
Others	0.002	(0.002)	0.000	(0.001)	0.002	(0.003)	0.002	(0.002)
Nobody	0.002	(0.002)	0.000	(0.001)	0.002	(0.003)	–0.001	(0.002)
Lives with:
Mother only	0.002	(0.003)	0.002	(0.002)	0.003	(0.004)	–0.001	(0.003)
Mother and one sibling	–0.001	(0.003)	–0.004*	(0.002)	0.002	(0.005)	–0.004	(0.004)
Mother and more than one sibling	0.004	(0.005)	–0.003	(0.003)	–0.004	(0.007)	–0.004	(0.006)
Mother and father only	0.001	(0.002)	0.001	(0.001)	–0.004	(0.004)	–0.000	(0.002)
Mother, father, and more than one sibling	–0.002	(0.002)	0.000	(0.001)	–0.003	(0.003)	–0.000	(0.002)
Different living arrangement	–0.001	(0.002)	–0.001	(0.001)	–0.004	(0.004)	–0.001	(0.003)
Interaction terms: Homework help by motherand/or father
With educational and occupational background respectively	Yes		Yes		No		Yes
Constant	4.407***	(0.033)	4.705***	(0.022)	4.622***	(0.056)	4.249***	(0.326)
Observations	10,540		10,427		10,628		25,643
R-squared	0.088		0.010		0.138		0.003
Number of schools	719		730		749		750

^[6]

Table 16:

School fixed effects regression for test score (linear specification): robustnesscontinued

	Primary students		Secondary students
Hours of homework	0.537***	(0.037)	–0.042	(0.037)
Hours of homework²	–0.017***	(0.001)	0.001	(0.001)
Educational category parents:
Apprenticeship	–1.205***	(0.409)	–0.847*	(0.469)
Upper secondary	–1.400***	(0.349)	0.193	(0.400)
Lower secondary	–1.761***	(0.364)	–0.340	(0.429)
Incomplete compulsory	–3.617***	(0.564)	–0.557	(0.661)
Occupational category parents:
Low white collar	–2.317***	(0.324)	–0.031	(0.369)
High blue collar	–3.293***	(0.392)	–0.216	(0.475)
Low blue collar	–3.436***	(0.615)	–0.026	(0.593)
Interaction:
Hwk * Apprenticeship	0.062	(0.065)	0.043	(0.076)
Hwk * Upper secondary	0.064	(0.057)	–0.048	(0.061)
Hwk * Lower secondary	–0.014	(0.059)	0.035	(0.069)
Hwk * Incomplete compulsory	0.044	(0.101)	0.033	(0.115)
Hwk * Low white collar	0.063	(0.051)	0.054	(0.059)
Hwk * High blue collar	0.167***	(0.063)	0.048	(0.077)
Hwk * Low blue collar	0.184*	(0.100)	–0.042	(0.105)
Hwk²* Apprenticeship	–0.001	(0.002)	–0.001	(0.003)
Hwk²* Upper secondary	–0.001	(0.002)	0.002	(0.002)
Hwk²* Lower secondary	0.003	(0.002)	–0.002	(0.002)
Hwk²* Incomplete compulsory	0.001	(0.004)	–0.000	(0.004)
Hwk²* Low white collar	0.000	(0.002)	–0.002	(0.002)
Hwk²* High blue collar	–0.003	(0.002)	–0.002	(0.003)
Hwk²* Low blue collar	–0.002	(0.003)	0.001	(0.004)
Homework help from:
Mother	–1.506***	(0.190)	–0.319	(0.240)
Father	–0.690***	(0.251)	0.327	(0.321)
Mother and father	–0.370**	(0.175)	0.194	(0.220)
Private teacher	–6.482***	(0.254)	0.049	(0.212)
Others	–1.675***	(0.215)	0.185	(0.229)
Homework help from parents:
A little	–1.838***	(0.148)	–0.015	(0.137)
Quite some	–4.722***	(0.196)	–0.011	(0.209)
Much	–5.925***	(0.281)	–0.217	(0.396)
All	–8.087***	(0.580)	1.424	(0.930)
Started school
Between 3 and 5	–0.495***	(0.097)	–0.070	(0.122)
Age 6	–2.391***	(0.379)	0.205	(0.364)
Age 7	–4.350***	(0.516)	–0.405	(0.665)
Born in
Latin America	–2.248***	(0.204)	0.046	(0.217)
Romania	0.785**	(0.372)	–0.260	(0.464)
Morocco	–1.612***	(0.578)	0.511	(0.669)
China	0.554	(0.760)	–0.454	(0.777)
Elsewhere	–0.579**	(0.242)	–0.048	(0.260)
Individual characteristics:
With special needs	–12.870***	(0.310)	–17.192***	(0.472)
Disabled	–17.180***	(0.427)	–13.613***	(0.258)
Girl	–0.798***	(0.099)	–0.005	(0.111)
Has repeated grade	–10.198***	(0.726)	–0.077	(0.299)
Age	3.077***	(0.671)	0.021	(0.212)
At home when returning from school:
Father	–0.398***	(0.152)	0.021	(0.189)
Mother and father	–0.048	(0.132)	–0.246	(0.167)
Others	0.238*	(0.134)	–0.013	(0.173)
Nobody	–0.366*	(0.199)	–0.027	(0.171)
Lives with:
Mother only	–3.060***	(0.196)	0.050	(0.236)
Mother and one sibling	–0.882***	(0.248)	–0.147	(0.271)
Mother and more than one sibling	–1.626***	(0.345)	–0.287	(0.425)
Mother and father only	–1.061***	(0.136)	–0.295*	(0.159)
Mother, father, and more than one sibling	–0.451***	(0.135)	0.114	(0.173)
Different living arrangement	–1.134***	(0.157)	–0.136	(0.198)
Interaction terms: Homework help by motherand/or father
With educational and occupational background respectively	Yes		Yes
Constant	69.813***	(8.034)	101.772***	(3.216)
Observations	45,850		41,956
R-squared	0.354		0.130
Number of schools	1,222		755

^[7]

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1
For instance, Bressoux, Kramarz, and Prost (2004) and Angrist and Lavy (1999) find that larger class size affects educational outcomes clearly negatively, while Woessmann and Fuchs (2008) or Anghel and Cabrales (2010) do not find any strong effects. Gibbons, Silva, and Machin (2008) find the effect of competition among schools on scholarly achievement to be neglectably small, while Hoxby (2000) estimates it to be positive and significant.
2
Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2006a) suggest that heterogeneity in non-cognitive skills (different “psychic costs”) might explain drop-out rates in the US, and Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006b) or Osborne Groves (2005) estimate similar effects of non-cognitive and cognitive abilities on wages.
3
Despite students and their effort being central to the production of education, policy discussions hardly ever include students as active participants of education, see Levin (2000).
4
Segal (2013) proposes a similar student effort function. In pioneering works on human capital as Ben-Porath (1967), costs of spending time studying are forgone earnings. In other contexts, similar increasing and convex effort functions have been proposed for managers or subordinates (see Laffont and Tirole (1986) or Aghion and Tirole (1997), respectively). In our empirical specification effort is approximated by time spent doing homework.
5
We make this simplifying assumption given the lack of consensus on the effects of school characteristics on educational outcomes; e.g. Todd and Wolpin (2007) find no significant effect of schooling inputs on test scores.
6
Grades as imperfect measures of achievement have been discussed as early as Starch and Elliott (1912); for a discussion see Allen (2005).
7
There is substantial empirical evidence showing a positive relation between qualification and future earnings in the labor market, see for instance Psacharopoulos and Layard (1979) for the United Kingdom.
8
We assume that ϕ′⋅>0 and ϕ′⋅>ϕ⋅ξee⋅A−ψ′′eξe⋅2A for any e, such that EU′′<0 holds.
9
The second-order differential of effort e, with respect to the passing standard is d2e/dqˆ2=ϕ′′⋅ξe⋅Aψ′′e−ϕ⋅ξee⋅A/−EU′′⋅2. This ratio is negative if and only if ϕ′′⋅<0. Note that this condition is satisfied only if ϕ⋅ is concave near the mode.
10
The only other empirical analysis that considers the relationship between student effort and family background we are aware of is De Fraja, Oliveira, and Zanchi (2010). Different from our results, the authors find that children from different backgrounds do not differ significantly in their propensity to exert effort.
11
Access to this data set is restricted which is one of the reasons that it has been used little. One exception is Anghel and Cabrales (2010). Up to now, this data has not been collected as a panel and thus we cannot link observations of students as they advance from primary to secondary school.
12
For both test scores on language and mathematics, deviations from the sample mean score have been obtained and they have been divided by the standard deviation of the sample. In order to avoid zero scores unsuitable for a logarithmic scale, scores have been adjusted to an IQ scale, multiplying the result by 15 and summing one hundred points. To obtain one unified test score we take the average of both standardized scores.
13
We have transformed categorical variables on parents’ education into years of schooling, assuming that individuals do not repeat courses; see Table 6 of Appendix A for years of schooling for each educational category.
14
According to this division, occupations such as legislators, senior official, managers, professionals, technicians, and associate professionals are considered as high white collar occupations. Clerks, service workers, and market sales workers are low white collar occupations. Skilled agricultural and fishery workers and craft and related trades workers are classified as high blue collar occupations. Plant and machine operators and assemblers or elementary occupations are regarded as low blue collar occupations.
15
For our data these groups include the following: (i) high white collar: administrative workers, professional or technical worker (e.g. professor, scientist, doctor, engineer, lawyer, economist, psychologist, artist), manages a firm, works in a Ministry, works for the regional government, or works in the town hall; (ii) low white collar: military, secretary, works in a restaurant or hotel, policeman, fire-fighter, sales-man, shop assistant, cashier, and so forth; (iii)high blue collar: works on construction site, maintenance worker, carpenter, works in a factory, and so forth; and (iv) low blue collar: works in somebody’ else household, security guard, cleaning service, janitor, and so forth.
16
Table 7 of Appendix A displays the distribution of students according to these combined groups of parental background.
17
In the US, on the other hand, test scores gaps along racial and gender lines seem to widen with students’ age, see Todd and Wolpin (2007).
18
To deal with students who report zero hours of homework on a logarithmic scale, we follow Hu (1972) substituting these values by 0.000001.
19
Our data set does not provide all information needed to estimate our theoretical student’s effort best response function (e∗=eqˆ,x,b,θ). In particular, we lack information about the labor market premium (x), as well as the passing standard (qˆ), given that scores from neither test have any academic consequences for students.
20
While there might exist an endogeneity problem regressing homework habits on hours of homework, we consider it of secondary nature given that it only operates through the effect of homework on achievement. In addition, coefficients change little when including homework habits, i.e. when moving from column 1 to columns 2, 3, or 4.
21
Note that this result is strongly determined by our assumption that costs of effort are independent of parental background.
22
Cooper, Civey Robinson, and Patall (2006) report findings of a hump-shaped relationship between homework and educational outcome. However, the cited study only considers Asian-American and Caucasian-American students.
23
Findings by Murane, Maynard, and Ohls (1981) suggest that mothers with higher education can provide better homework help. In case the student indicates that both mother and father usually help with homework we use the highest educational category among both parents. In case students report no help by neither fathers nor mothers we set the interaction term to zero, independently of information on parental education being provided.
24
It could be the case that parents who live with their children (not separated) and those who are at home after school, or assure that somebody else is, are in a better position to exert this type of parental effort. In our regressions, we control for a student’s living situation and who is at home when they return from school.
25
Cunha et al. (2006) consider early interventions those directed towards pre-school or even pre-kindergarten children. For interventions directed towards adolescents the authors report larger effects on non-cognitive skills than cognitive skills.
26
Note that results for secondary school students in 9th grade are not likely to be driven by drop-outs. Two-thirds to 80% of students who drop out – i.e. leave school without any academic qualification – do so after the age of 16, see Fernández Enguita, Mena Martínez, and Riviere Gomez (2010). Students in 9th grade would have to have repeated courses twice to be over 16.

Published Online: 2014-5-17

Published in Print: 2014-10-1

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Artikel in diesem Heft

https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2013-0150

Schlagwörter für diesen Artikel

student effort; family background; risk aversion; educational standards