Synthesis, Logical Forms, and the Objects of our Ordinary Experience Response to Michael Friedman
Abstract
In the 82/2 (2000) issue of this journal, Michael Friedman has offered a stimulating discussion of my recent book, Kant and the Capacity to Judge. His conclusion is that on the whole I fail to do justice to what is most revolutionary about Kant's natural philosophy, and instead end up attributing to Kant a pre-Newtonian, Aristotelian philosophy of nature. This is because, according to Friedman, I put excessive weight on Kant's claim to have derived his categories from a set of logical forms of judgment which he inherits from a traditional Aristotelian logic. In taking Kant at his word on this point, I fail to give their full import to Kant's insights into the newly discovered applications of mathematical concepts and methods to the science of nature.
© Walter de Gruyter
Articles in the same Issue
- Scepticism as a Kind of Philosophy
- Metaphysik oder Metaphysikkritik? Das Kausalitätsproblem in Kants Abhandlung Über die negativen Gröβen
- Benjamin Constant und die naturrechtliche Tradition
- Von der cartesianischen zur hermeneutischen Subjektivität. Werkgeschichtliche Annäherungen an Heideggers Sein und Zeit
- Synthesis, Logical Forms, and the Objects of our Ordinary Experience Response to Michael Friedman
- Rezensionen
Articles in the same Issue
- Scepticism as a Kind of Philosophy
- Metaphysik oder Metaphysikkritik? Das Kausalitätsproblem in Kants Abhandlung Über die negativen Gröβen
- Benjamin Constant und die naturrechtliche Tradition
- Von der cartesianischen zur hermeneutischen Subjektivität. Werkgeschichtliche Annäherungen an Heideggers Sein und Zeit
- Synthesis, Logical Forms, and the Objects of our Ordinary Experience Response to Michael Friedman
- Rezensionen
