Startseite Philosophie Merits and Limits of AI: Philosophical Reflections on the Difference between Instrumental Rationality and Praxis-Related Hermeneutical Reason
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Merits and Limits of AI: Philosophical Reflections on the Difference between Instrumental Rationality and Praxis-Related Hermeneutical Reason

  • Ludwig Nagl
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Abstract

Part one looks at some innovations made possible by machine-executed algorithms that undoubtedly prove useful, such as the digitization of libraries and the gains in precision in medical diagnosis. These forms of AI may be called “weak”: they are instances of an “instrumental rationality” which can be explained without the Utopian claim that digital machines are leading us towards a post-humanistic “singularity”. They all rest on algorithms that, in their core, are “tools” which - with regard to their social consequences - need permanent public control. Part two analyzes the Utopian ideal of “strong AI” - of (as John Searle pointed out) the “false” claim “that appropriately programmed computers literally have cognitive states.”. After a brief reference to a classical critique of the idea “that human perception is explicable in terms of mechanical reason” (Leibniz, Monadology), the essay examines core arguments developed by Hubert Dreyfus, Hilary Putnam and Charles Taylor - philosophers who all challenge the reductionist overrating of “instrumental rationality”. A rich, non-reductive conception of praxis addresses the ability of humans to act according to their moral judgment: an ability which - to speak with Kant - cannot be fully simulated by AI’s “heteronomous” mechanical execution of programmed “norms”.

Abstract

Part one looks at some innovations made possible by machine-executed algorithms that undoubtedly prove useful, such as the digitization of libraries and the gains in precision in medical diagnosis. These forms of AI may be called “weak”: they are instances of an “instrumental rationality” which can be explained without the Utopian claim that digital machines are leading us towards a post-humanistic “singularity”. They all rest on algorithms that, in their core, are “tools” which - with regard to their social consequences - need permanent public control. Part two analyzes the Utopian ideal of “strong AI” - of (as John Searle pointed out) the “false” claim “that appropriately programmed computers literally have cognitive states.”. After a brief reference to a classical critique of the idea “that human perception is explicable in terms of mechanical reason” (Leibniz, Monadology), the essay examines core arguments developed by Hubert Dreyfus, Hilary Putnam and Charles Taylor - philosophers who all challenge the reductionist overrating of “instrumental rationality”. A rich, non-reductive conception of praxis addresses the ability of humans to act according to their moral judgment: an ability which - to speak with Kant - cannot be fully simulated by AI’s “heteronomous” mechanical execution of programmed “norms”.

Kapitel in diesem Buch

  1. Frontmatter I
  2. Table of Contents V
  3. Acknowledgements VII
  4. Introduction: Affirmative and Critical Approaches to Artificial Intelligence and Human Enhancement 1
  5. Part 1: Challenging “Strong AI” from the Perspective of Human Agency
  6. The Artificiality of the Human Mind: A Reflection on Natural and Artificial Intelligence 17
  7. Merits and Limits of AI: Philosophical Reflections on the Difference between Instrumental Rationality and Praxis-Related Hermeneutical Reason 33
  8. Experience, Identity and Moral Agency in the Age of Artificial Intelligence 51
  9. Outsourcing the Brain, Optimizing the Body: Retrotopian Projections of the Human Subject 79
  10. Life Care/Lebenssorge and the Fourth Industrial Revolution 101
  11. Part 2: Examining Merits and Limits of Applied AI
  12. AI’s Winograd Moment; or: How Should We Teach Machines Common Sense? Guidance from Cognitive Science 127
  13. Passing the Turing Test? AI Generated Poetry and Posthuman Creativity 151
  14. Why Neuroenhancement is a Philosophical Issue 167
  15. The Future of Artificial Intelligence in International Healthcare: An Index 181
  16. Part 3: Encounters with Artificial Beings in Film, Literature, and Theater
  17. Dark Ecology and Digital Images of Entropy: A Brief Survey of the History of Cinematic Morphing and the Computer Graphics of Artificial Intelligence 209
  18. Sentience, Artificial Intelligence, and Human Enhancement in US-American Fiction and Film: Thinking With and Without Consciousness 225
  19. “I, Robot”: Artificial Intelligence and Fears of the Posthuman 237
  20. AI on Stage: A Cross-Cultural Check-Up and the Case of Canada and John Mighton 261
  21. Artificial Intelligence from Science Fiction to Soul Machines: (Re‐)Configuring Empathy between Bodies, Knowledge, and Power 287
  22. List of contributors 309
  23. Index of Authors 315
  24. Index of Subjects 319
Heruntergeladen am 20.10.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/9783110770216-004/html
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