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Saying What is Not

  • Markus Gabriel
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Idealism, Relativism, and Realism
Ein Kapitel aus dem Buch Idealism, Relativism, and Realism

Abstract

A major weakness of contemporary accounts of existence and non-existence alike arises from the tendency to believe that the answers to questions of existence can put us in touch with a distinctive “catalogue” of reality. Applying instead his ontology of “fields of sense,” Gabriel questions in this paper both the idea of existence as dependent upon this “catalogue” conception of reality and, equally, on the Meinongian and Neo-Meinongian positions recently defended by Graham Priest and others, according to which there are objects that do not exist, including even contradictory ones. While the first leads to a “furniture ontology,” the latter provokes semantic randomness, in that there is no longer any regular way to answer questions of existence. Gabriel’s ontological descriptivism, by contrast, guarantees that the resolution to the question of objectivity depends on nothing but a coherent domain (a field of sense) and its objects.

Abstract

A major weakness of contemporary accounts of existence and non-existence alike arises from the tendency to believe that the answers to questions of existence can put us in touch with a distinctive “catalogue” of reality. Applying instead his ontology of “fields of sense,” Gabriel questions in this paper both the idea of existence as dependent upon this “catalogue” conception of reality and, equally, on the Meinongian and Neo-Meinongian positions recently defended by Graham Priest and others, according to which there are objects that do not exist, including even contradictory ones. While the first leads to a “furniture ontology,” the latter provokes semantic randomness, in that there is no longer any regular way to answer questions of existence. Gabriel’s ontological descriptivism, by contrast, guarantees that the resolution to the question of objectivity depends on nothing but a coherent domain (a field of sense) and its objects.

Kapitel in diesem Buch

  1. Frontmatter I
  2. Table of Contents V
  3. Introduction 1
  4. Part 1 Idealism
  5. Metaphysics, Thinking, and Being 17
  6. Jacobi’s Dare: McDowell, Meillassoux, and Consistent Idealism 35
  7. How Not to Be a Naïve Realist: On Knowledge and Perception 57
  8. Is Hermeneutic Realism a Dialectical Materialism? 81
  9. Nature After Nature, or Naturephilosophical Futurism 97
  10. Part 2 Relativism
  11. Metaontological Deflationism and Ontological Realism 115
  12. Stances, Voluntarism, Relativism 131
  13. Subjectivity as a Feature of Reality: On Diffraction Laws of Consciousness and Reality Within Justified True Belief 155
  14. Concrete-in-Thought, Concrete-in-Act: Marx, Materialism, and the Exchange Abstraction 175
  15. Matter and Indifference: Realism and Anti-realism in Feminist Accounts of the Body 193
  16. Part 3 Realism
  17. Saying What is Not 217
  18. Sense, Realism, and Ontological Difference 233
  19. Realism without Hobbes and Schmitt: Assessing the Latourian Option 257
  20. The Objectivity of the Actual: Hegelianism as a Metaphysics of Modal Actualism 275
  21. Nomological Realism 293
  22. Realism Without Entities 311
  23. Notes on the contributors 325
  24. Index of Names 329
  25. Index of Subjects 333
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110670349-012

Kapitel in diesem Buch

  1. Frontmatter I
  2. Table of Contents V
  3. Introduction 1
  4. Part 1 Idealism
  5. Metaphysics, Thinking, and Being 17
  6. Jacobi’s Dare: McDowell, Meillassoux, and Consistent Idealism 35
  7. How Not to Be a Naïve Realist: On Knowledge and Perception 57
  8. Is Hermeneutic Realism a Dialectical Materialism? 81
  9. Nature After Nature, or Naturephilosophical Futurism 97
  10. Part 2 Relativism
  11. Metaontological Deflationism and Ontological Realism 115
  12. Stances, Voluntarism, Relativism 131
  13. Subjectivity as a Feature of Reality: On Diffraction Laws of Consciousness and Reality Within Justified True Belief 155
  14. Concrete-in-Thought, Concrete-in-Act: Marx, Materialism, and the Exchange Abstraction 175
  15. Matter and Indifference: Realism and Anti-realism in Feminist Accounts of the Body 193
  16. Part 3 Realism
  17. Saying What is Not 217
  18. Sense, Realism, and Ontological Difference 233
  19. Realism without Hobbes and Schmitt: Assessing the Latourian Option 257
  20. The Objectivity of the Actual: Hegelianism as a Metaphysics of Modal Actualism 275
  21. Nomological Realism 293
  22. Realism Without Entities 311
  23. Notes on the contributors 325
  24. Index of Names 329
  25. Index of Subjects 333
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Heruntergeladen am 3.10.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/9783110670349-012/html
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