“Physical Intentionality” and the Thomistic Theory of Formal Objects
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Michał Głowala
Abstract
In this paper I discuss the claim that theway inwhich powers are directed towards their manifestations resembles, in some crucial respects, the way in which intentional states or acts are directed towards their objects (the physical intentionality claim). My main thesis is that the scholastic notion of the formal object of a disposition or an act is indispensable for resolving the problem of “physical intentionality”. In particular, (i) it is necessary for a sound analysis of the “marks of intentionality”, (ii) it sheds considerable light on some parallels between the ontology of intentionality and the ontology of powers, and, finally, (iii) it allows one to demarcate the border between the physical and the mental.
Abstract
In this paper I discuss the claim that theway inwhich powers are directed towards their manifestations resembles, in some crucial respects, the way in which intentional states or acts are directed towards their objects (the physical intentionality claim). My main thesis is that the scholastic notion of the formal object of a disposition or an act is indispensable for resolving the problem of “physical intentionality”. In particular, (i) it is necessary for a sound analysis of the “marks of intentionality”, (ii) it sheds considerable light on some parallels between the ontology of intentionality and the ontology of powers, and, finally, (iii) it allows one to demarcate the border between the physical and the mental.
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Frontmatter I
- Contents V
- Some Introductory Thoughts on Contemporary Polish Ontology VII
- On Essential Structures and Symmetries 1
- Prospects for an Animalistically Oriented Simple View 25
- How Long Does the Present Last? The Problem of Fissuration in Roman Ingarden’s Ontology 51
- The Subject’s Forms of Knowledge and the Question of Being 71
- The World as an Object of Formal Philosophy 87
- Logic and the Ontology of Language 109
- Benedict Bornstein’s Ontological Elements of Reality 133
- On the Topological Modelling of Ontological Objects: Substance in the Monadology 149
- Does Mathematical Possibility Imply Existence? 161
- Neologicism for Real(s) – Are We There Yet? 181
- Possible Worlds and Situations: How Can They Meet Up? 205
- The Ontologic of Actions 219
- “Physical Intentionality” and the Thomistic Theory of Formal Objects 245
- An Assessment of Contemporary Polish Ontology 271
- Author Index 295
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Frontmatter I
- Contents V
- Some Introductory Thoughts on Contemporary Polish Ontology VII
- On Essential Structures and Symmetries 1
- Prospects for an Animalistically Oriented Simple View 25
- How Long Does the Present Last? The Problem of Fissuration in Roman Ingarden’s Ontology 51
- The Subject’s Forms of Knowledge and the Question of Being 71
- The World as an Object of Formal Philosophy 87
- Logic and the Ontology of Language 109
- Benedict Bornstein’s Ontological Elements of Reality 133
- On the Topological Modelling of Ontological Objects: Substance in the Monadology 149
- Does Mathematical Possibility Imply Existence? 161
- Neologicism for Real(s) – Are We There Yet? 181
- Possible Worlds and Situations: How Can They Meet Up? 205
- The Ontologic of Actions 219
- “Physical Intentionality” and the Thomistic Theory of Formal Objects 245
- An Assessment of Contemporary Polish Ontology 271
- Author Index 295
