“Will is Primal Being”: Schelling’s Critical Voluntarism
-
Jörg Noller
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to analyze Schelling’s conception of will particularly in his Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom (1809). Whereas many interpreters tend to understand his theory as an obscure metaphysics of will, I shall argue that Schelling does not hold a metaphysical voluntarism, but rather develops what I shall call a “critical voluntarism.” According to Schelling’s critical voluntarism, the will is deeply connected to the faculty of reason although it is not identical with it as Kant seems to suggest. Schelling transforms Kant’s conception of autonomy into what he calls a “real and vital concept” of freedom that is, according to him, “the capacity for good and evil” (FE, 352). Schelling’s critical voluntarism entails what I shall call a “real compatibilism,” according to which being a natural entity does not rule out our freedom of the will but rather grounds it. I shall finally analyze Schelling’s conception of freedom by referring to Harry Frankfurt’s theory of volitional necessity.
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to analyze Schelling’s conception of will particularly in his Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom (1809). Whereas many interpreters tend to understand his theory as an obscure metaphysics of will, I shall argue that Schelling does not hold a metaphysical voluntarism, but rather develops what I shall call a “critical voluntarism.” According to Schelling’s critical voluntarism, the will is deeply connected to the faculty of reason although it is not identical with it as Kant seems to suggest. Schelling transforms Kant’s conception of autonomy into what he calls a “real and vital concept” of freedom that is, according to him, “the capacity for good and evil” (FE, 352). Schelling’s critical voluntarism entails what I shall call a “real compatibilism,” according to which being a natural entity does not rule out our freedom of the will but rather grounds it. I shall finally analyze Schelling’s conception of freedom by referring to Harry Frankfurt’s theory of volitional necessity.
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Frontmatter I
- Table of Contents V
- Introduction 1
-
Part I. Kant’s Conception of Will
- Free Will and Determinism: A Solution to the Kantian Paradox 7
- Spontaneity and Contingency: Kant’s Two Models of Rational Self-Determination 29
- How is the Corruption of the Will Possible? Kant on Natural Dialectic and Radical Evil 49
- Eleutheronomy: Will, Law and Liberty in Kant’s Esoterically Political Philosophy 71
-
Part II. The Concept of Will after Kant
- The Fact of Freedom: Reinhold’s Theory of Free Will Reconsidered 89
- On the Real Possibility of a Pure Moral Will: Maimon vs. Kant 105
- Drive as a Constitutive Element of Practical Action in Jacobi and Fichte 125
- Drive and Will in Fichte’s System of Ethics 139
- Reality as Resistance: The Concept of the Will in Bouterwek’s Idea of an Apodictic (1799) 159
- “Will is Primal Being”: Schelling’s Critical Voluntarism 181
- Hegel’s Logical Foundation of the Will: Reconciling Psychology and Social-Ontology 203
- Hegel and the Paradox of Willkür 227
- Ethics and Will in Schopenhauer’s Philosophy 247
- Index of Names 263
- Index of Subjects 265
- Notes on Contributors 269
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Frontmatter I
- Table of Contents V
- Introduction 1
-
Part I. Kant’s Conception of Will
- Free Will and Determinism: A Solution to the Kantian Paradox 7
- Spontaneity and Contingency: Kant’s Two Models of Rational Self-Determination 29
- How is the Corruption of the Will Possible? Kant on Natural Dialectic and Radical Evil 49
- Eleutheronomy: Will, Law and Liberty in Kant’s Esoterically Political Philosophy 71
-
Part II. The Concept of Will after Kant
- The Fact of Freedom: Reinhold’s Theory of Free Will Reconsidered 89
- On the Real Possibility of a Pure Moral Will: Maimon vs. Kant 105
- Drive as a Constitutive Element of Practical Action in Jacobi and Fichte 125
- Drive and Will in Fichte’s System of Ethics 139
- Reality as Resistance: The Concept of the Will in Bouterwek’s Idea of an Apodictic (1799) 159
- “Will is Primal Being”: Schelling’s Critical Voluntarism 181
- Hegel’s Logical Foundation of the Will: Reconciling Psychology and Social-Ontology 203
- Hegel and the Paradox of Willkür 227
- Ethics and Will in Schopenhauer’s Philosophy 247
- Index of Names 263
- Index of Subjects 265
- Notes on Contributors 269
