On the Real Possibility of a Pure Moral Will: Maimon vs. Kant
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Amit Kravitz
Abstract
One of the main challenges of Kant’s moral theory is to show why a finite agent, whose will is already affected by natural driving-forces which generate pleasure, would actually choose to subordinate them to a pure driving-force - ‘respect for the moral law’ - which generates no pleasure (and even humiliates, as Kant has it). After outlining the subtle way Kant tackles this challenge I focus on Salomon Maimon’s alternative. Contrary to post-Kantian philosophers like Fichte or Schelling, Maimon does not try to trace back the ‘fact of reason’ - morality’s point of departure - to a prior metaphysical background. Rather, this ‘fact’ can be seen according to Maimon as an outcome of an observable natural driving-force (however a unique one). I then present at length Maimon’s alternative to Kant concerning the structure of a finite will and the possibility of a moral action and assess the strengths and weaknesses of Maimon’s solution, as well as its implication on his moral theory as a whole.
Abstract
One of the main challenges of Kant’s moral theory is to show why a finite agent, whose will is already affected by natural driving-forces which generate pleasure, would actually choose to subordinate them to a pure driving-force - ‘respect for the moral law’ - which generates no pleasure (and even humiliates, as Kant has it). After outlining the subtle way Kant tackles this challenge I focus on Salomon Maimon’s alternative. Contrary to post-Kantian philosophers like Fichte or Schelling, Maimon does not try to trace back the ‘fact of reason’ - morality’s point of departure - to a prior metaphysical background. Rather, this ‘fact’ can be seen according to Maimon as an outcome of an observable natural driving-force (however a unique one). I then present at length Maimon’s alternative to Kant concerning the structure of a finite will and the possibility of a moral action and assess the strengths and weaknesses of Maimon’s solution, as well as its implication on his moral theory as a whole.
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Table of Contents V
- Introduction 1
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Part I. Kant’s Conception of Will
- Free Will and Determinism: A Solution to the Kantian Paradox 7
- Spontaneity and Contingency: Kant’s Two Models of Rational Self-Determination 29
- How is the Corruption of the Will Possible? Kant on Natural Dialectic and Radical Evil 49
- Eleutheronomy: Will, Law and Liberty in Kant’s Esoterically Political Philosophy 71
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Part II. The Concept of Will after Kant
- The Fact of Freedom: Reinhold’s Theory of Free Will Reconsidered 89
- On the Real Possibility of a Pure Moral Will: Maimon vs. Kant 105
- Drive as a Constitutive Element of Practical Action in Jacobi and Fichte 125
- Drive and Will in Fichte’s System of Ethics 139
- Reality as Resistance: The Concept of the Will in Bouterwek’s Idea of an Apodictic (1799) 159
- “Will is Primal Being”: Schelling’s Critical Voluntarism 181
- Hegel’s Logical Foundation of the Will: Reconciling Psychology and Social-Ontology 203
- Hegel and the Paradox of Willkür 227
- Ethics and Will in Schopenhauer’s Philosophy 247
- Index of Names 263
- Index of Subjects 265
- Notes on Contributors 269
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Table of Contents V
- Introduction 1
-
Part I. Kant’s Conception of Will
- Free Will and Determinism: A Solution to the Kantian Paradox 7
- Spontaneity and Contingency: Kant’s Two Models of Rational Self-Determination 29
- How is the Corruption of the Will Possible? Kant on Natural Dialectic and Radical Evil 49
- Eleutheronomy: Will, Law and Liberty in Kant’s Esoterically Political Philosophy 71
-
Part II. The Concept of Will after Kant
- The Fact of Freedom: Reinhold’s Theory of Free Will Reconsidered 89
- On the Real Possibility of a Pure Moral Will: Maimon vs. Kant 105
- Drive as a Constitutive Element of Practical Action in Jacobi and Fichte 125
- Drive and Will in Fichte’s System of Ethics 139
- Reality as Resistance: The Concept of the Will in Bouterwek’s Idea of an Apodictic (1799) 159
- “Will is Primal Being”: Schelling’s Critical Voluntarism 181
- Hegel’s Logical Foundation of the Will: Reconciling Psychology and Social-Ontology 203
- Hegel and the Paradox of Willkür 227
- Ethics and Will in Schopenhauer’s Philosophy 247
- Index of Names 263
- Index of Subjects 265
- Notes on Contributors 269