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Hegel and Wittgenstein on Wirklichkeit: Sketch of a Comparison

  • Lorenzo Cammi
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Wittgenstein and Hegel
Ein Kapitel aus dem Buch Wittgenstein and Hegel

Abstract

In my paper, I aim to present Hegel’s and Wittgenstein’s notions of Wirklichkeit. As a first step, I offer my view on Hegel’s treatment of actuality, which consists in the following stages: firstly, the consideration of the knowledge of actuality as the fundamental purpose of philosophy; secondly, the distinction between Wirklichkeit and Realität, that is, between actuality and reality; and thirdly, the distinction between actuality and actualization, which traces back to Aristotle’s concepts of entelecheia and energeia. On this line, I offer a dynamic interpretation of Hegel’s understanding of the constitution of actuality. As a second step, after addressing the possibility of knowing actuality from Wittgenstein’s standpoint, I outline the issue concerning the relation among language, logic, and world, as well as the view regarding the way the actual world comes to be constituted as such, springing from what Wittgenstein calls substance of the world. By way of conclusion, I sketch a comparison of Hegel’s and Wittgenstein’s conceptions of Wirklichkeit.

Abstract

In my paper, I aim to present Hegel’s and Wittgenstein’s notions of Wirklichkeit. As a first step, I offer my view on Hegel’s treatment of actuality, which consists in the following stages: firstly, the consideration of the knowledge of actuality as the fundamental purpose of philosophy; secondly, the distinction between Wirklichkeit and Realität, that is, between actuality and reality; and thirdly, the distinction between actuality and actualization, which traces back to Aristotle’s concepts of entelecheia and energeia. On this line, I offer a dynamic interpretation of Hegel’s understanding of the constitution of actuality. As a second step, after addressing the possibility of knowing actuality from Wittgenstein’s standpoint, I outline the issue concerning the relation among language, logic, and world, as well as the view regarding the way the actual world comes to be constituted as such, springing from what Wittgenstein calls substance of the world. By way of conclusion, I sketch a comparison of Hegel’s and Wittgenstein’s conceptions of Wirklichkeit.

Kapitel in diesem Buch

  1. Frontmatter I
  2. Acknowledgements V
  3. Table of Contents VII
  4. List of Abbreviations XI
  5. Notes on Authors XV
  6. Introduction: Hegel, Wittgenstein, Identity, Difference 1
  7. Part 1. General Introduction, the Analytic-Continental Split
  8. On Metaphysical Images in Analytic Philosophy: Overcoming Empiricism by Logical Analysis of Language 25
  9. Part 2. From Identity to Difference
  10. Three Key Hypotheses regarding Hegel and Wittgenstein 51
  11. Wittgenstein, Hegel and Cognition 59
  12. No Evaluative Authority Is beyond Evaluation: Common Ground between Hegel and Wittgenstein 73
  13. The Diamond Net: Metaphysics, Grammar, Ontologies 89
  14. The Communitarian Wittgenstein and Brandom’s Hegel on Recognition and Social Constitution 103
  15. Hegel and Wittgenstein on Wirklichkeit: Sketch of a Comparison 119
  16. Beauty: Hegel or Wittgenstein? 141
  17. Part 3. From Difference to Identity
  18. Hegel and the Tractarian Conception of Judgement 161
  19. Forms of Thought, Forms of Life 181
  20. Rule-Following and Institutional Context 199
  21. Hegel and Wittgenstein: Elements for a Comparison 213
  22. Master, Slave and Wittgenstein: The Dialectic of Rule-Following 227
  23. Hegel and Wittgenstein on Identities and Contradictions 243
  24. Rethinking the Limits of Language: Wittgenstein and Hegel on the Unspeakable 259
  25. Part 4. Hegelian Approaches to Wittgenstein
  26. Hegel’s Speculative Method and Wittgenstein’s Projection Method 275
  27. A Hegelian Reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 291
  28. Are There Simple Objects? Hegel’s Discussion of Kant’s Second Antinomy in Relation to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 311
  29. Image, Reference, and the Level Distinction 325
  30. Identity in Difference—Wittgenstein’s Hegel 349
  31. Part 5. Wittgensteinian Approaches to Hegel
  32. Is the System of Personal Pronouns Somewhat Mysterious? Findlay and Weiss as Critics of Hegel and Wittgenstein 367
  33. Particularity as Paradigm: A Wittgensteinian Reading of Hegel’s Subjective Logic 379
  34. „In der Sprache“ (Wittgenstein) und im „Begriff“ (Hegel) „wird alles ausgetragen“ – Das Sprachspiel des Idealismus 401
  35. Subject Index 413
  36. Author Index 425
Heruntergeladen am 28.10.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/9783110572780-011/html
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