Back to Fichte?
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Garrett Zantow Bredeson
Abstract
It is well known that Husserl’s turn to a form of “transcendental” phenomenology troubled many of his followers in Munich and Göttingen. It was just as perplexing, though, for his contemporaries in the tradition of post-Kantian transcendental philosophy. Cohen had identified the living core of Kant’s philosophy as the “transcendental method,” and Natorp, in particular, had worked extensively to distinguish the principles of the Marburg recovery of Kant from his wayward appropriation by Fichte and others. In this chapter, I consider what the stakes of Husserl’s transcendental turn looked like from the Marburg perspective. Natorp warmly welcomed Husserl’s attempt to steer the nascent phenomenological movement in a “transcendental” direction, but he continued to wonder whether Husserl’s turn towards this tradition was aligned with the true spirit of Kant, or whether, on the contrary, phenomenology would settle into a broadly Fichtean appropriation of Kant’s legacy. Though Natorp’s public position is markedly conciliatory, he barely conceals his suspicion that it was the Kant of Fichte’s Jena, not the Kant of Cohen’s Marburg, to whom Husserl was (perhaps unwittingly) turning. This, I argue, is the background against which the Natorp-Husserl encounter on the eve of World War I must be understood.
Abstract
It is well known that Husserl’s turn to a form of “transcendental” phenomenology troubled many of his followers in Munich and Göttingen. It was just as perplexing, though, for his contemporaries in the tradition of post-Kantian transcendental philosophy. Cohen had identified the living core of Kant’s philosophy as the “transcendental method,” and Natorp, in particular, had worked extensively to distinguish the principles of the Marburg recovery of Kant from his wayward appropriation by Fichte and others. In this chapter, I consider what the stakes of Husserl’s transcendental turn looked like from the Marburg perspective. Natorp warmly welcomed Husserl’s attempt to steer the nascent phenomenological movement in a “transcendental” direction, but he continued to wonder whether Husserl’s turn towards this tradition was aligned with the true spirit of Kant, or whether, on the contrary, phenomenology would settle into a broadly Fichtean appropriation of Kant’s legacy. Though Natorp’s public position is markedly conciliatory, he barely conceals his suspicion that it was the Kant of Fichte’s Jena, not the Kant of Cohen’s Marburg, to whom Husserl was (perhaps unwittingly) turning. This, I argue, is the background against which the Natorp-Husserl encounter on the eve of World War I must be understood.
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Frontmatter i
- Table of Contents v
- Husserl, Kant, and Transcendental Phenomenology 1
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Section I: The Transcendantal and the A priori
- The Meaning of the Transcendental in the Philosophies of Kant and Husserl 23
- The Ethics of the Transcendental 41
- The Phenomenological a priori as Husserlian Solution to the Problem of Kant’s “Transcendental Psychologism” 57
- On the Naturalization of the Transcendental 83
- Kant, Husserl, and the Aim of a “Transcendental Anthropology” 101
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Section II: The Ego and the Sphere of Otherness
- Transcendental Apperception and Temporalization 127
- “The Ego beside Itself” 143
- Kant and Husserl on Overcoming Skeptical Idealism through Transcendental Idealism 163
- “Pure Ego and Nothing More” 189
- Towards a Phenomenological Metaphysics 213
- The Transcendental Grounding of the Experience of the Other (Fremderfahrung) in Husserl’s Phenomenology 235
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Section III: Aesthetic, Logic, Science, Ethics
- Aesthetic, Intuition, Experience 259
- Synthesis and Identity 279
- Questions of Genesis as Questions of Validity 303
- Philosophical Scientists and Scientific Philosophers 333
- A Phenomenological Critique of Kantian Ethics 359
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Section IV: Transcendental Philosophy in Debate
- Is There a “Copernican” or an “Anti-Copernican” Revolution in Phenomenology? 391
- Back to Fichte? 411
- “An Explosive Thought:” Kant, Fink, and the Cosmic Concept of the World 439
- Eugen Fink’s Transcendental Phenomenology of the World 455
- Amphibian Dreams 479
- Husserlian Phenomenology in the Light of Microphenomenology 505
- Index of Persons 523
- Subject Index 527
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Frontmatter i
- Table of Contents v
- Husserl, Kant, and Transcendental Phenomenology 1
-
Section I: The Transcendantal and the A priori
- The Meaning of the Transcendental in the Philosophies of Kant and Husserl 23
- The Ethics of the Transcendental 41
- The Phenomenological a priori as Husserlian Solution to the Problem of Kant’s “Transcendental Psychologism” 57
- On the Naturalization of the Transcendental 83
- Kant, Husserl, and the Aim of a “Transcendental Anthropology” 101
-
Section II: The Ego and the Sphere of Otherness
- Transcendental Apperception and Temporalization 127
- “The Ego beside Itself” 143
- Kant and Husserl on Overcoming Skeptical Idealism through Transcendental Idealism 163
- “Pure Ego and Nothing More” 189
- Towards a Phenomenological Metaphysics 213
- The Transcendental Grounding of the Experience of the Other (Fremderfahrung) in Husserl’s Phenomenology 235
-
Section III: Aesthetic, Logic, Science, Ethics
- Aesthetic, Intuition, Experience 259
- Synthesis and Identity 279
- Questions of Genesis as Questions of Validity 303
- Philosophical Scientists and Scientific Philosophers 333
- A Phenomenological Critique of Kantian Ethics 359
-
Section IV: Transcendental Philosophy in Debate
- Is There a “Copernican” or an “Anti-Copernican” Revolution in Phenomenology? 391
- Back to Fichte? 411
- “An Explosive Thought:” Kant, Fink, and the Cosmic Concept of the World 439
- Eugen Fink’s Transcendental Phenomenology of the World 455
- Amphibian Dreams 479
- Husserlian Phenomenology in the Light of Microphenomenology 505
- Index of Persons 523
- Subject Index 527
