Questions of Genesis as Questions of Validity
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Bernardo Ainbinder
Abstract
Can Husserl’s phenomenology be understood as a variety of transcendental philosophy in Kant’s sense? To compare their uses of this term would require examining the various places where Husserl’s and Kant’s paths seem to diverge.
Husserl’s insistence on including within the field of phenomenological inquiry allegedly causal, pre-personal, cognitive mechanisms seems to be one such divergence. In particular, it conflicts with Kant’s clear-cut distinction between questions of genesis and questions of validity. In this chapter, I claim that Husserl’s genetic analysis - at least in part - can be understood as a way of defending a transcendental perspective in the strong sense and of overcoming some of the flaws that he found in Kant’s critical philosophy. I will claim that Husserl’s appeal to mechanisms is transcendentally motivated: if transcendental philosophy is the inquiry into the conditions of possibility of cognition in terms of the justification of the validity of our claims to knowledge, analyzing the mechanisms involved and their transcendental role contributes to understanding what rational grounding is and how rational norms can inform our cognitive processes.
Abstract
Can Husserl’s phenomenology be understood as a variety of transcendental philosophy in Kant’s sense? To compare their uses of this term would require examining the various places where Husserl’s and Kant’s paths seem to diverge.
Husserl’s insistence on including within the field of phenomenological inquiry allegedly causal, pre-personal, cognitive mechanisms seems to be one such divergence. In particular, it conflicts with Kant’s clear-cut distinction between questions of genesis and questions of validity. In this chapter, I claim that Husserl’s genetic analysis - at least in part - can be understood as a way of defending a transcendental perspective in the strong sense and of overcoming some of the flaws that he found in Kant’s critical philosophy. I will claim that Husserl’s appeal to mechanisms is transcendentally motivated: if transcendental philosophy is the inquiry into the conditions of possibility of cognition in terms of the justification of the validity of our claims to knowledge, analyzing the mechanisms involved and their transcendental role contributes to understanding what rational grounding is and how rational norms can inform our cognitive processes.
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Frontmatter i
- Table of Contents v
- Husserl, Kant, and Transcendental Phenomenology 1
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Section I: The Transcendantal and the A priori
- The Meaning of the Transcendental in the Philosophies of Kant and Husserl 23
- The Ethics of the Transcendental 41
- The Phenomenological a priori as Husserlian Solution to the Problem of Kant’s “Transcendental Psychologism” 57
- On the Naturalization of the Transcendental 83
- Kant, Husserl, and the Aim of a “Transcendental Anthropology” 101
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Section II: The Ego and the Sphere of Otherness
- Transcendental Apperception and Temporalization 127
- “The Ego beside Itself” 143
- Kant and Husserl on Overcoming Skeptical Idealism through Transcendental Idealism 163
- “Pure Ego and Nothing More” 189
- Towards a Phenomenological Metaphysics 213
- The Transcendental Grounding of the Experience of the Other (Fremderfahrung) in Husserl’s Phenomenology 235
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Section III: Aesthetic, Logic, Science, Ethics
- Aesthetic, Intuition, Experience 259
- Synthesis and Identity 279
- Questions of Genesis as Questions of Validity 303
- Philosophical Scientists and Scientific Philosophers 333
- A Phenomenological Critique of Kantian Ethics 359
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Section IV: Transcendental Philosophy in Debate
- Is There a “Copernican” or an “Anti-Copernican” Revolution in Phenomenology? 391
- Back to Fichte? 411
- “An Explosive Thought:” Kant, Fink, and the Cosmic Concept of the World 439
- Eugen Fink’s Transcendental Phenomenology of the World 455
- Amphibian Dreams 479
- Husserlian Phenomenology in the Light of Microphenomenology 505
- Index of Persons 523
- Subject Index 527
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Frontmatter i
- Table of Contents v
- Husserl, Kant, and Transcendental Phenomenology 1
-
Section I: The Transcendantal and the A priori
- The Meaning of the Transcendental in the Philosophies of Kant and Husserl 23
- The Ethics of the Transcendental 41
- The Phenomenological a priori as Husserlian Solution to the Problem of Kant’s “Transcendental Psychologism” 57
- On the Naturalization of the Transcendental 83
- Kant, Husserl, and the Aim of a “Transcendental Anthropology” 101
-
Section II: The Ego and the Sphere of Otherness
- Transcendental Apperception and Temporalization 127
- “The Ego beside Itself” 143
- Kant and Husserl on Overcoming Skeptical Idealism through Transcendental Idealism 163
- “Pure Ego and Nothing More” 189
- Towards a Phenomenological Metaphysics 213
- The Transcendental Grounding of the Experience of the Other (Fremderfahrung) in Husserl’s Phenomenology 235
-
Section III: Aesthetic, Logic, Science, Ethics
- Aesthetic, Intuition, Experience 259
- Synthesis and Identity 279
- Questions of Genesis as Questions of Validity 303
- Philosophical Scientists and Scientific Philosophers 333
- A Phenomenological Critique of Kantian Ethics 359
-
Section IV: Transcendental Philosophy in Debate
- Is There a “Copernican” or an “Anti-Copernican” Revolution in Phenomenology? 391
- Back to Fichte? 411
- “An Explosive Thought:” Kant, Fink, and the Cosmic Concept of the World 439
- Eugen Fink’s Transcendental Phenomenology of the World 455
- Amphibian Dreams 479
- Husserlian Phenomenology in the Light of Microphenomenology 505
- Index of Persons 523
- Subject Index 527
