Towards a Phenomenological Metaphysics
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Irene Breuer
Abstract
Husserl defines eidetically-based transcendental phenomenology as “First Philosophy.” Accordingly, in Ideas I he conceives of the I as an “eidetic particularization” grounded on apodictic eidetic universalities. Insofar as the positing of the ego’s facticity is necessary to enable any self-reflection leading to the task of the eidetic variation, it seems to be necessary only on methodological grounds. Later on, however, at the end of his Cartesian Meditations and in a supplementary sheet to his First Philosophy, he establishes contingency and the “irrationality of the transcendental fact” as the contents of a “metaphysics in a new sense:” Phenomenological metaphysics encompasses originary primal facts (I, world, bodily existence, intersubjectivity, historicity) that are absolutely self-given and thus the condition for the possibility of the existence of every other fact. An embodied ego becomes thus ontologically necessary. The novelty lies in the insight that contingency not only characterizes the “core” of primal facts but even the very ego‘s essence due to its qualitative “openness,” as stated in Ideas II. Hence, the order of foundation is revised: a phenomenological metaphysics comprising these primal facts underlies transcendental phenomenology. This paper will focus on these transformations and distinguish among different senses of a concomitant ‘phenomenological openness.’
Abstract
Husserl defines eidetically-based transcendental phenomenology as “First Philosophy.” Accordingly, in Ideas I he conceives of the I as an “eidetic particularization” grounded on apodictic eidetic universalities. Insofar as the positing of the ego’s facticity is necessary to enable any self-reflection leading to the task of the eidetic variation, it seems to be necessary only on methodological grounds. Later on, however, at the end of his Cartesian Meditations and in a supplementary sheet to his First Philosophy, he establishes contingency and the “irrationality of the transcendental fact” as the contents of a “metaphysics in a new sense:” Phenomenological metaphysics encompasses originary primal facts (I, world, bodily existence, intersubjectivity, historicity) that are absolutely self-given and thus the condition for the possibility of the existence of every other fact. An embodied ego becomes thus ontologically necessary. The novelty lies in the insight that contingency not only characterizes the “core” of primal facts but even the very ego‘s essence due to its qualitative “openness,” as stated in Ideas II. Hence, the order of foundation is revised: a phenomenological metaphysics comprising these primal facts underlies transcendental phenomenology. This paper will focus on these transformations and distinguish among different senses of a concomitant ‘phenomenological openness.’
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Frontmatter i
- Table of Contents v
- Husserl, Kant, and Transcendental Phenomenology 1
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Section I: The Transcendantal and the A priori
- The Meaning of the Transcendental in the Philosophies of Kant and Husserl 23
- The Ethics of the Transcendental 41
- The Phenomenological a priori as Husserlian Solution to the Problem of Kant’s “Transcendental Psychologism” 57
- On the Naturalization of the Transcendental 83
- Kant, Husserl, and the Aim of a “Transcendental Anthropology” 101
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Section II: The Ego and the Sphere of Otherness
- Transcendental Apperception and Temporalization 127
- “The Ego beside Itself” 143
- Kant and Husserl on Overcoming Skeptical Idealism through Transcendental Idealism 163
- “Pure Ego and Nothing More” 189
- Towards a Phenomenological Metaphysics 213
- The Transcendental Grounding of the Experience of the Other (Fremderfahrung) in Husserl’s Phenomenology 235
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Section III: Aesthetic, Logic, Science, Ethics
- Aesthetic, Intuition, Experience 259
- Synthesis and Identity 279
- Questions of Genesis as Questions of Validity 303
- Philosophical Scientists and Scientific Philosophers 333
- A Phenomenological Critique of Kantian Ethics 359
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Section IV: Transcendental Philosophy in Debate
- Is There a “Copernican” or an “Anti-Copernican” Revolution in Phenomenology? 391
- Back to Fichte? 411
- “An Explosive Thought:” Kant, Fink, and the Cosmic Concept of the World 439
- Eugen Fink’s Transcendental Phenomenology of the World 455
- Amphibian Dreams 479
- Husserlian Phenomenology in the Light of Microphenomenology 505
- Index of Persons 523
- Subject Index 527
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Frontmatter i
- Table of Contents v
- Husserl, Kant, and Transcendental Phenomenology 1
-
Section I: The Transcendantal and the A priori
- The Meaning of the Transcendental in the Philosophies of Kant and Husserl 23
- The Ethics of the Transcendental 41
- The Phenomenological a priori as Husserlian Solution to the Problem of Kant’s “Transcendental Psychologism” 57
- On the Naturalization of the Transcendental 83
- Kant, Husserl, and the Aim of a “Transcendental Anthropology” 101
-
Section II: The Ego and the Sphere of Otherness
- Transcendental Apperception and Temporalization 127
- “The Ego beside Itself” 143
- Kant and Husserl on Overcoming Skeptical Idealism through Transcendental Idealism 163
- “Pure Ego and Nothing More” 189
- Towards a Phenomenological Metaphysics 213
- The Transcendental Grounding of the Experience of the Other (Fremderfahrung) in Husserl’s Phenomenology 235
-
Section III: Aesthetic, Logic, Science, Ethics
- Aesthetic, Intuition, Experience 259
- Synthesis and Identity 279
- Questions of Genesis as Questions of Validity 303
- Philosophical Scientists and Scientific Philosophers 333
- A Phenomenological Critique of Kantian Ethics 359
-
Section IV: Transcendental Philosophy in Debate
- Is There a “Copernican” or an “Anti-Copernican” Revolution in Phenomenology? 391
- Back to Fichte? 411
- “An Explosive Thought:” Kant, Fink, and the Cosmic Concept of the World 439
- Eugen Fink’s Transcendental Phenomenology of the World 455
- Amphibian Dreams 479
- Husserlian Phenomenology in the Light of Microphenomenology 505
- Index of Persons 523
- Subject Index 527
