“Pure Ego and Nothing More”
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Antoine Grandjean
Abstract
According to the Ideas, conscious life is the life of an ego which is a “pure I and nothing more.” This expression is decisive: here is largely at stake what makes Husserlian transcendental phenomenology different from a number of other philosophical trends, whether phenomenological or not (Neokantianism, Sartrian or Heideggerian phenomenology); it describes a specific moment in Husserl’s working out of his own point of view by distinguishing a central stage of his philosophy from previous and subsequent ones. We start with an analysis of the polarization of conscious life by an irreducible I, whose non-substantial signification and transcendence within immanence have to be explained. We maintain here that it is only when it became idealist that phenomenology could become egological. Secondly, we study the purity of this I: differing from any psychological ego, it implies a proper transcendental meaning of egoity. Then we consider Husserl’s refusal of any additional property of this I, which is only the title of an identity stating itself in each of its acts, and nothing more. We finally ask if maintaining such an egological polarization is not too much, and if it could reveal a lack of phenomenological radicality.
Abstract
According to the Ideas, conscious life is the life of an ego which is a “pure I and nothing more.” This expression is decisive: here is largely at stake what makes Husserlian transcendental phenomenology different from a number of other philosophical trends, whether phenomenological or not (Neokantianism, Sartrian or Heideggerian phenomenology); it describes a specific moment in Husserl’s working out of his own point of view by distinguishing a central stage of his philosophy from previous and subsequent ones. We start with an analysis of the polarization of conscious life by an irreducible I, whose non-substantial signification and transcendence within immanence have to be explained. We maintain here that it is only when it became idealist that phenomenology could become egological. Secondly, we study the purity of this I: differing from any psychological ego, it implies a proper transcendental meaning of egoity. Then we consider Husserl’s refusal of any additional property of this I, which is only the title of an identity stating itself in each of its acts, and nothing more. We finally ask if maintaining such an egological polarization is not too much, and if it could reveal a lack of phenomenological radicality.
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Frontmatter i
- Table of Contents v
- Husserl, Kant, and Transcendental Phenomenology 1
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Section I: The Transcendantal and the A priori
- The Meaning of the Transcendental in the Philosophies of Kant and Husserl 23
- The Ethics of the Transcendental 41
- The Phenomenological a priori as Husserlian Solution to the Problem of Kant’s “Transcendental Psychologism” 57
- On the Naturalization of the Transcendental 83
- Kant, Husserl, and the Aim of a “Transcendental Anthropology” 101
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Section II: The Ego and the Sphere of Otherness
- Transcendental Apperception and Temporalization 127
- “The Ego beside Itself” 143
- Kant and Husserl on Overcoming Skeptical Idealism through Transcendental Idealism 163
- “Pure Ego and Nothing More” 189
- Towards a Phenomenological Metaphysics 213
- The Transcendental Grounding of the Experience of the Other (Fremderfahrung) in Husserl’s Phenomenology 235
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Section III: Aesthetic, Logic, Science, Ethics
- Aesthetic, Intuition, Experience 259
- Synthesis and Identity 279
- Questions of Genesis as Questions of Validity 303
- Philosophical Scientists and Scientific Philosophers 333
- A Phenomenological Critique of Kantian Ethics 359
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Section IV: Transcendental Philosophy in Debate
- Is There a “Copernican” or an “Anti-Copernican” Revolution in Phenomenology? 391
- Back to Fichte? 411
- “An Explosive Thought:” Kant, Fink, and the Cosmic Concept of the World 439
- Eugen Fink’s Transcendental Phenomenology of the World 455
- Amphibian Dreams 479
- Husserlian Phenomenology in the Light of Microphenomenology 505
- Index of Persons 523
- Subject Index 527
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Frontmatter i
- Table of Contents v
- Husserl, Kant, and Transcendental Phenomenology 1
-
Section I: The Transcendantal and the A priori
- The Meaning of the Transcendental in the Philosophies of Kant and Husserl 23
- The Ethics of the Transcendental 41
- The Phenomenological a priori as Husserlian Solution to the Problem of Kant’s “Transcendental Psychologism” 57
- On the Naturalization of the Transcendental 83
- Kant, Husserl, and the Aim of a “Transcendental Anthropology” 101
-
Section II: The Ego and the Sphere of Otherness
- Transcendental Apperception and Temporalization 127
- “The Ego beside Itself” 143
- Kant and Husserl on Overcoming Skeptical Idealism through Transcendental Idealism 163
- “Pure Ego and Nothing More” 189
- Towards a Phenomenological Metaphysics 213
- The Transcendental Grounding of the Experience of the Other (Fremderfahrung) in Husserl’s Phenomenology 235
-
Section III: Aesthetic, Logic, Science, Ethics
- Aesthetic, Intuition, Experience 259
- Synthesis and Identity 279
- Questions of Genesis as Questions of Validity 303
- Philosophical Scientists and Scientific Philosophers 333
- A Phenomenological Critique of Kantian Ethics 359
-
Section IV: Transcendental Philosophy in Debate
- Is There a “Copernican” or an “Anti-Copernican” Revolution in Phenomenology? 391
- Back to Fichte? 411
- “An Explosive Thought:” Kant, Fink, and the Cosmic Concept of the World 439
- Eugen Fink’s Transcendental Phenomenology of the World 455
- Amphibian Dreams 479
- Husserlian Phenomenology in the Light of Microphenomenology 505
- Index of Persons 523
- Subject Index 527
