Startseite Philosophie The Phenomenological a priori as Husserlian Solution to the Problem of Kant’s “Transcendental Psychologism”
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The Phenomenological a priori as Husserlian Solution to the Problem of Kant’s “Transcendental Psychologism”

  • John Rogove
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Abstract

In this chapter we first propose an analysis of the Husserlian critique of the Kantian doctrine of the faculties (and of their transcendental division into sensibility and understanding in the first Critique) and of the premises of a “transcendental psychologism” such as they are found in Kant, but in terms of the genesis of this doctrine in the empirical division of the faculties in the Anthropology, relying on critiques proposed by Foucault and D. Pradelle. By underscoring the radical differences between Kant and Husserl, we critique the notion according to which Husserlian phenomenology is a Kantian-inspired “philosophy of the subject.” We then propose an analysis of this critique in terms of a mereological reading of Husserl’s understanding of the a priori in such a way as to examine and radicalize that de-anthropologization of the a priori that is carried out or made possible by Husserl. Our hypothesis is that this overcoming of the Kantian model, which is bogged down by naturalistic and empiricist metaphysical presuppositions, requires both an overcoming of classical hylomorphism in favor of the mereology of immanence and the transition to an a-subjective phenomenology required in turn by an extension of this interpretative model to Husserl’s “transcendental turn.”

Abstract

In this chapter we first propose an analysis of the Husserlian critique of the Kantian doctrine of the faculties (and of their transcendental division into sensibility and understanding in the first Critique) and of the premises of a “transcendental psychologism” such as they are found in Kant, but in terms of the genesis of this doctrine in the empirical division of the faculties in the Anthropology, relying on critiques proposed by Foucault and D. Pradelle. By underscoring the radical differences between Kant and Husserl, we critique the notion according to which Husserlian phenomenology is a Kantian-inspired “philosophy of the subject.” We then propose an analysis of this critique in terms of a mereological reading of Husserl’s understanding of the a priori in such a way as to examine and radicalize that de-anthropologization of the a priori that is carried out or made possible by Husserl. Our hypothesis is that this overcoming of the Kantian model, which is bogged down by naturalistic and empiricist metaphysical presuppositions, requires both an overcoming of classical hylomorphism in favor of the mereology of immanence and the transition to an a-subjective phenomenology required in turn by an extension of this interpretative model to Husserl’s “transcendental turn.”

Kapitel in diesem Buch

  1. Frontmatter i
  2. Table of Contents v
  3. Husserl, Kant, and Transcendental Phenomenology 1
  4. Section I: The Transcendantal and the A priori
  5. The Meaning of the Transcendental in the Philosophies of Kant and Husserl 23
  6. The Ethics of the Transcendental 41
  7. The Phenomenological a priori as Husserlian Solution to the Problem of Kant’s “Transcendental Psychologism” 57
  8. On the Naturalization of the Transcendental 83
  9. Kant, Husserl, and the Aim of a “Transcendental Anthropology” 101
  10. Section II: The Ego and the Sphere of Otherness
  11. Transcendental Apperception and Temporalization 127
  12. “The Ego beside Itself” 143
  13. Kant and Husserl on Overcoming Skeptical Idealism through Transcendental Idealism 163
  14. “Pure Ego and Nothing More” 189
  15. Towards a Phenomenological Metaphysics 213
  16. The Transcendental Grounding of the Experience of the Other (Fremderfahrung) in Husserl’s Phenomenology 235
  17. Section III: Aesthetic, Logic, Science, Ethics
  18. Aesthetic, Intuition, Experience 259
  19. Synthesis and Identity 279
  20. Questions of Genesis as Questions of Validity 303
  21. Philosophical Scientists and Scientific Philosophers 333
  22. A Phenomenological Critique of Kantian Ethics 359
  23. Section IV: Transcendental Philosophy in Debate
  24. Is There a “Copernican” or an “Anti-Copernican” Revolution in Phenomenology? 391
  25. Back to Fichte? 411
  26. “An Explosive Thought:” Kant, Fink, and the Cosmic Concept of the World 439
  27. Eugen Fink’s Transcendental Phenomenology of the World 455
  28. Amphibian Dreams 479
  29. Husserlian Phenomenology in the Light of Microphenomenology 505
  30. Index of Persons 523
  31. Subject Index 527
Heruntergeladen am 15.11.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/9783110564280-004/html?lang=de
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