Startseite Philosophie A Plurality of True Moralities? Tracing ‘Truth’ in Moral Relativism
Kapitel
Lizenziert
Nicht lizenziert Erfordert eine Authentifizierung

A Plurality of True Moralities? Tracing ‘Truth’ in Moral Relativism

  • Marie-Luisa Frick
Veröffentlichen auch Sie bei De Gruyter Brill
Erkunden Sie dieses Fachgebiet So veröffentlichen Sie bei uns
Realism - Relativism - Constructivism
Ein Kapitel aus dem Buch Realism - Relativism - Constructivism

Abstract

Commonly understood, moral relativism calls into question the capability of moral judgments to be true in an absolute manner. Yet, what truth means in that regard remains contested. If there is no single true morality, as moral relativists typically suggest, does this imply that there are multiple equally true moralities without any nuances of truth and error? By what standards would the assumption that there are no moral truths itself be either true or false? Setting apart moral relativism as a branch of limited or local relativism from types of universal relativism, it can be shown how moral relativism is relying upon a certain notion of truth in order to sweep away another. Far from shying away from it or fearing it, moral relativism embraces truth as a ‘weapon’ and a criterion of its own adequacy. Without it, moral relativism would not only risk self-defeating inconsistencies; it also would lose its critical potential rendering it a vital enrichment of ethical discourses not only in the eyes of its proponents but also in those of many of its antagonists.

Abstract

Commonly understood, moral relativism calls into question the capability of moral judgments to be true in an absolute manner. Yet, what truth means in that regard remains contested. If there is no single true morality, as moral relativists typically suggest, does this imply that there are multiple equally true moralities without any nuances of truth and error? By what standards would the assumption that there are no moral truths itself be either true or false? Setting apart moral relativism as a branch of limited or local relativism from types of universal relativism, it can be shown how moral relativism is relying upon a certain notion of truth in order to sweep away another. Far from shying away from it or fearing it, moral relativism embraces truth as a ‘weapon’ and a criterion of its own adequacy. Without it, moral relativism would not only risk self-defeating inconsistencies; it also would lose its critical potential rendering it a vital enrichment of ethical discourses not only in the eyes of its proponents but also in those of many of its antagonists.

Kapitel in diesem Buch

  1. Frontmatter i
  2. Preface v
  3. Table of Contents vii
  4. 1. Constructivism and Beyond
  5. Are Philosophers′ Actions Realist or Constructivist? 3
  6. On the Non-Dualizing Rhetoric. Some Preliminary Remarks 17
  7. Ist der Konstruktivismus selbstwidersprüchlich? 31
  8. Die Wahrheitsspieler. Strategische Kommunikation als Spiel 45
  9. Who Wants to Be a Non-Dualist and Why? 59
  10. Jean Piaget und die Erfindung von Radikalem Konstruktivismus und Kybernetik Zweiter Ordnung 73
  11. Two Ways of Exploring the World 83
  12. 2. Epistemology/Epistemological Relativism
  13. The Truth of Social Constructivism 103
  14. The Objectivity of Epistemic Values and the Argument from Immersion 117
  15. Epistemological Realism, Representation, and Intentionality 129
  16. Angelina’s Truth: Genetic Knowledge, Preventive Medicine, and the Reality of the Possible 137
  17. 3. Realism versus Relativism
  18. Neither Realism nor Anti-Realism: How to approach the Anthropocene? 153
  19. Ein Bild – ohne Betrachter – hielt uns gefangen. Wittgensteins ambivalenter Abschied vom Realismus 167
  20. Relativisms and Their Opposites 187
  21. When Paul Met Ludwig: Wittgensteinian Comments on Boghossian’s Antirelativism 203
  22. Fighting Relativism: Wittgenstein and Kuhn 215
  23. Wissenschaftstheoretische Überlegungen jenseits von Realismus, Relativismus und Konstruktivismus 233
  24. Realism without Foundation 241
  25. 4. Ontology/Ontological Relativism
  26. Constructed Reality 255
  27. Ontological Relativism as Transcendental Nominalism 269
  28. Realism about Identity and Individuality of Conscious Beings 279
  29. What is the Thing Whose Measure is Money? 293
  30. 5. Values and Value Relativism
  31. Relativism about Morality 301
  32. Slavery and Justice: Williams and Wiggins 313
  33. A Plurality of True Moralities? Tracing ‘Truth’ in Moral Relativism 327
  34. Zum Wert von Vertrauen 339
  35. Die Erfindung der Sein-Sollen-Dichotomie 353
  36. Wird die Moral von uns geschaffen? 365
  37. 6. Wittgenstein
  38. The Sociology of the Supernatural: Wittgenstein’s Lecture on Ethics 381
  39. Can We Piece Together a Coherent Account of the “Person” from the Writings of Wittgenstein? 397
  40. Wittgensteins Philosophieren zwischen Kodex und Strategie: Logik, Schach und Farbausdrücke 409
  41. Wittgenstein, Kierkegaard and the Significance of Silence 425
  42. Zweifeln können und zweifeln wollen: Über Gewissheit §217–231 435
  43. Rules and Privacy: Remarks on Philosophical Investigations §202 449
  44. Index of names 459
  45. Index of subjects 465
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110524055-025

Kapitel in diesem Buch

  1. Frontmatter i
  2. Preface v
  3. Table of Contents vii
  4. 1. Constructivism and Beyond
  5. Are Philosophers′ Actions Realist or Constructivist? 3
  6. On the Non-Dualizing Rhetoric. Some Preliminary Remarks 17
  7. Ist der Konstruktivismus selbstwidersprüchlich? 31
  8. Die Wahrheitsspieler. Strategische Kommunikation als Spiel 45
  9. Who Wants to Be a Non-Dualist and Why? 59
  10. Jean Piaget und die Erfindung von Radikalem Konstruktivismus und Kybernetik Zweiter Ordnung 73
  11. Two Ways of Exploring the World 83
  12. 2. Epistemology/Epistemological Relativism
  13. The Truth of Social Constructivism 103
  14. The Objectivity of Epistemic Values and the Argument from Immersion 117
  15. Epistemological Realism, Representation, and Intentionality 129
  16. Angelina’s Truth: Genetic Knowledge, Preventive Medicine, and the Reality of the Possible 137
  17. 3. Realism versus Relativism
  18. Neither Realism nor Anti-Realism: How to approach the Anthropocene? 153
  19. Ein Bild – ohne Betrachter – hielt uns gefangen. Wittgensteins ambivalenter Abschied vom Realismus 167
  20. Relativisms and Their Opposites 187
  21. When Paul Met Ludwig: Wittgensteinian Comments on Boghossian’s Antirelativism 203
  22. Fighting Relativism: Wittgenstein and Kuhn 215
  23. Wissenschaftstheoretische Überlegungen jenseits von Realismus, Relativismus und Konstruktivismus 233
  24. Realism without Foundation 241
  25. 4. Ontology/Ontological Relativism
  26. Constructed Reality 255
  27. Ontological Relativism as Transcendental Nominalism 269
  28. Realism about Identity and Individuality of Conscious Beings 279
  29. What is the Thing Whose Measure is Money? 293
  30. 5. Values and Value Relativism
  31. Relativism about Morality 301
  32. Slavery and Justice: Williams and Wiggins 313
  33. A Plurality of True Moralities? Tracing ‘Truth’ in Moral Relativism 327
  34. Zum Wert von Vertrauen 339
  35. Die Erfindung der Sein-Sollen-Dichotomie 353
  36. Wird die Moral von uns geschaffen? 365
  37. 6. Wittgenstein
  38. The Sociology of the Supernatural: Wittgenstein’s Lecture on Ethics 381
  39. Can We Piece Together a Coherent Account of the “Person” from the Writings of Wittgenstein? 397
  40. Wittgensteins Philosophieren zwischen Kodex und Strategie: Logik, Schach und Farbausdrücke 409
  41. Wittgenstein, Kierkegaard and the Significance of Silence 425
  42. Zweifeln können und zweifeln wollen: Über Gewissheit §217–231 435
  43. Rules and Privacy: Remarks on Philosophical Investigations §202 449
  44. Index of names 459
  45. Index of subjects 465
Jetzt anmelden und 20% sparen
Institutioneller Zugang
Wie funktioniert Authentifizierung?
Haben Sie eine Idee, wie wir unsere Website verbessern können?
Bitte schreiben Sie uns.
© 2025 De Gruyter Brill
Heruntergeladen am 9.9.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/9783110524055-025/html
Button zum nach oben scrollen